Stuart Glen Svonkin

The defendant, The Corporation of the City of Brampton, brought a summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action, but later abandoned it.

The plaintiff, Inzola Group Limited, sought costs for the abandoned motion on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs for the period up to September 2016 and substantial indemnity costs for the period between September and November 2016, concluding that the defendant acted unreasonably in delaying the abandonment of the motion after critical evidence emerged.

The court fixed the total costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs in two related actions brought motions for the production of information by the corporate defendants under the Business Corporations Act.

The parties settled the motions 'except for costs' and filed written costs submissions.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motions were unnecessary as the defendants ultimately consented to the relief sought.

The court declined to award costs, holding that costs generally should not be awarded when parties settle 'except for costs.' The court reasoned that determining costs in such circumstances would require a hypothetical adjudication of the merits, which is an inefficient use of judicial resources and runs counter to the principle that costs are an incident of the determination of rights, not the subject matter of the dispute itself.

The plaintiff, Husky, brought an action against its founder, Robert Schad, his new company Athena, and others, alleging misuse of confidential information relating to injection molding machines.

Husky claimed that Athena accessed confidential information from Husky machines placed at a third-party facility (Niigon) and used it to develop competing machines.

The defendants argued the claims were statute-barred, that most issues were settled during prior negotiations, and that no confidential information was misused.

The court dismissed Husky's claims, finding they were statute-barred as Husky knew of the material facts more than two years before commencing the action.

The court also found that the commercially available machines were not confidential, and that Athena did not make material use of any confidential information from the prototype machines.

Athena's counterclaim for abuse of process and injurious falsehood was also dismissed for lack of evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to extensive undertakings and refusals arising from discoveries in a municipal procurement action alleging biased disqualification, misleading of council, and improper favouring of the successful bidder.

The court imposed a staged timetable for outstanding undertakings, rejected the respondent's request for a lengthy extension, and held that certain questions said to require expert analysis instead sought fact evidence.

On refusals, the court required narrower questioning regarding the Integrity Commissioner's investigations, ordered production and answers concerning the final agreements with the successful bidder, and held that communications between municipal councillors and counsel were not protected by solicitor-client privilege solely because councillors were decision-makers.

Applying litigation privilege principles, the court required disclosure of non-privileged communications and particulars for any privilege claims, while resolving the remaining refusals on a question-by-question basis.

The moving defendants sought an order that further particulars of an injurious falsehood counterclaim be disclosed only subject to an undertaking limiting use of the information to the litigation.

The court held that the demanded particulars were material facts that had to be pleaded and filed, and were therefore subject to the open court principle.

The deemed undertaking rule did not apply to pleadings, public interest privilege did not extend to protect sources of private litigants, and there was no gap in the Rules warranting use of inherent jurisdiction.

The motion was dismissed and costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding plaintiff.

In an aviation insurance dispute arising from an aircraft crash, the defendants sought production of documents from the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and provisions of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act.

The court considered whether statutory privileges over cockpit voice recordings, statements to investigators, and representations made regarding draft TSB reports could be overridden.

Applying the statutory balancing tests, the court ordered production of the cockpit voice recorder recordings and certain factual documents where the public interest in the proper administration of justice outweighed the privilege.

Statements given to investigators for aviation safety purposes were largely protected, and representations regarding the TSB draft report remained absolutely privileged.

The flight data recorder information was ordered produced as it was not covered by statutory privilege.

Following a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to individually named defendants whose claims had been struck as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had asserted a $10 million claim against individual employees and directors of corporate defendants without adequately pleading separate acts or interests beyond their corporate roles.

The individual defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the claims constituted tactical harassment.

The court found the claims against the individuals lacked proper particulars but concluded the circumstances did not justify elevated costs.

Partial indemnity costs were instead fixed at reduced amounts reflecting duplication of work with corporate defendants’ counsel.

The defendants moved under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging civil conspiracy, unlawful interference with economic interests, trespass, and breach of confidence arising from alleged GPS tracking of the plaintiff’s service vehicles to obtain customer information.

The court held that the pleadings for civil conspiracy lacked the required material facts and particulars but granted leave to amend.

The claim for intentional interference with economic interests was struck without leave to amend because the pleadings failed to allege unlawful means directed at a third party as required by the Supreme Court’s formulation of the tort.

Allegations against individual corporate officers were struck as an abuse of process for failing to plead independent tortious conduct.

Claims for trespass to chattels and breach of confidence were allowed to proceed, while the trespass to land claim was struck with leave to amend.

In a proposed class proceeding, the plaintiffs alleged that Ticketmaster breached s. 2(a) of the Ticket Speculation Act by charging fees above the base price of tickets sold in the primary market, constituting unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court held that although the statute could apply to certain primary-market transactions, the relevant prohibition concerns selling a ticket at a price higher than the price at which it was first issued.

Ticketmaster’s sales constituted the first issuance of the tickets at the full price charged, including service-related fees, and therefore did not contravene the Act.

The plaintiffs’ interpretation equating the “price first issued” with a base ticket price was found to be artificial and inconsistent with the statute’s purpose of targeting ticket scalping.

The appellant, Jetport Inc., appealed a Master's order regarding discovery refusals in three related actions arising from an aviation insurance coverage dispute.

The court allowed the appeal in part, ordering the respondent insurer to answer questions about its course of conduct with other insureds regarding policy exemptions, finding them relevant to the pleadings.

The court also relieved the appellant from answering a question about claims against other third parties, as it was not relevant to mitigation.

However, the court upheld the Master's order requiring the appellant to answer questions about whether its employee sought legal advice from in-house counsel regarding a pilot clause, finding that disclosing the fact of such discussions did not breach solicitor-client privilege.

The applicants, who identify as atheists, alleged that the respondent school board discriminated against them on the basis of creed by permitting only the Gideons to distribute religious literature (the New Testament) to grade five students.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario held that atheism falls within the definition of 'creed' under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the board's original policy, which allowed only one religious group to distribute texts, was discriminatory.

Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded that the board's revised policy, which ostensibly allowed other groups to distribute materials but was applied inconsistently and restrictively, also failed to comply with the Code.

The Tribunal ordered the board to cease distributing religious publications unless it developed a new, non-discriminatory policy.

The appellants appealed a decision denying certification of a proposed class proceeding against CIBC and CIBC World Markets for alleged misclassification of employees making them ineligible for overtime.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that despite an amended class definition, the issue of eligibility for overtime for Investment Advisors and Associate Investment Advisors required individual, case-by-case determinations regarding their managerial or supervisory functions.

The appellants failed to establish a basis in fact that the job functions were sufficiently similar to be resolved as a common issue.

Following the dismissal of appeals from a master's decision rejecting claims of litigation privilege, the court determined costs.

The responding parties sought partial indemnity costs reflecting significant legal work and extensive materials filed on the appeal.

The court applied the principles under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that costs must be fair and reasonable and should reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations.

The court rejected arguments that the large volume of materials filed by the appellant should influence the award and noted that the appellant advanced an arguable legal position without misconduct.

The court awarded $8,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and tax to each group of respondents.

Appeal from a Master's order compelling production of communications and answers on discovery despite a claim of litigation privilege.

The appellant argued that emails and a meeting with its insurance broker were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation following denial of insurance coverage for an aircraft crash.

The court held that the appellant failed to establish an evidentiary basis that the dominant purpose of the communications was litigation, noting that the available evidence suggested the discussions focused on advancing the insurance claim rather than preparing for litigation.

The court further held that any common interest litigation privilege between the insured and the broker would have been dissolved once the insured commenced an action against the broker.

The Master's order compelling disclosure was upheld.

The applicants, an atheist father and his daughter, brought human rights applications alleging that the respondent school board's policies regarding the distribution of religious publications in schools discriminated on the basis of creed.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association sought leave to intervene.

The Tribunal granted the Commission leave to intervene and make an opening statement.

The CCLA was granted leave to intervene, but its participation was limited to submissions on how Charter values should inform the interpretation of the Code, as the Tribunal declined to allow the CCLA to introduce new constitutional issues not raised by the applicants.

On a consent motion in a proposed class action concerning ticket resale practices, the court considered certification for settlement purposes and approval of a negotiated settlement under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The action alleged that the defendants’ primary and secondary market ticket sales violated the Ticket Speculation Act through resale pricing and related practices.

The court held that the criteria for certification under s. 5(1) were satisfied, including the existence of an identifiable class and common issue relating to whether the defendants breached the statute.

The proposed settlement provided refunds of $36 per ticket to class members and required changes to the defendants’ ticket resale website practices.

The court concluded the settlement and the requested contingency fee arrangement were fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action on behalf of CIBC customer service employees for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge and Divisional Court had found it plain and obvious that CIBC's policy requiring pre-approval for overtime complied with the Canada Labour Code, and that individual issues predominated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable the pre-approval requirement violated the Code's mandate to pay for overtime 'required or permitted' by the employer.

The Court also found some basis in fact that CIBC's systemic practices breached employment contracts, satisfying the common issues requirement for certification.

Employees sought certification of a class action alleging that a bank misclassified analysts, investment advisors, and associate investment advisors as ineligible for overtime pay contrary to the Canada Labour Code and the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The proposed class relied on job titles and levels to establish commonality, arguing that eligibility for overtime could be determined collectively or through statistical sampling.

The court held that determining whether an employee exercised managerial or supervisory functions required a fact‑specific assessment of the actual duties performed by each employee.

Evidence showed wide variation in responsibilities even among employees sharing identical job titles, defeating the proposed common issues and rendering statistical sampling inappropriate for determining liability.

As the central issues of overtime eligibility and breach required individualized inquiries, a class proceeding was not a preferable procedure and the certification motion was dismissed.

In a proposed overtime misclassification class action against a financial institution and its affiliate, the plaintiffs brought a motion to compel answers to refusals and undertakings arising from cross‑examinations on affidavits filed for an upcoming certification motion.

The court balanced the need for a full evidentiary record against the proximity of the certification hearing and the burden of additional production.

Requests for a third‑party inspection of the defendants’ human resources system and certain historical records were refused as disproportionate or unnecessary at the certification stage.

However, several questions concerning the duties of investment advisors, associate investment advisors, and the rationale for overtime eligibility policies were ordered answered because they related to class definition and commonality issues.

Other questions relating to merits issues, irrelevant job descriptions, or hypothetical inquiries were not compelled.

The appellant, a bank employee, sought to certify a class action against the respondent bank for systemic unpaid overtime.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding no common issues that would advance the litigation and that the bank's overtime policy requiring pre-approval was lawful under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge also awarded $525,000 in costs to the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the claims required individual assessments and that the costs award was reasonable.