CITATION: Inzola Group v. City of Brampton, 2015 ONSC 1423
COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-2721-00
DATE: 2015-03-03
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Inzola Group Limited v. The Corporation of the City of Brampton
BEFORE: Tzimas, J.
COUNSEL: S. Svonkin, for the Plaintiff
Elizabeth Bowker, for the Defendant
HEARD: February 11, 2015
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The plaintiff, Inzola Group Limited, (“Inzola”), brought a motion for an order to compel the defendant, the City of Brampton, (“the City”) to answer undertakings and refusals that were give by the City’s representative at his examination for discovery.
[2] The motion was first brought in July 2014. It followed on discoveries over a period of ten days: four days in September 2012, two days in March 2013, three days in April 2014 and one day in May 2014. Both the undertakings given by the City and the refusals were voluminous. By the time of the hearing of this motion the City had made significant strides in its obligations. However, several of the undertakings and refusals remained outstanding.
[3] Underlying the extensive discoveries in this matter is Inzola’s claim against the City for a breach of contract and negligence. The City issued a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) in 2009 for the construction of an addition to City Hall and other public buildings. Potential parties were invited to participate in what was described as a “Competitive Dialogue”. That process involved the submission by interested parties of an initial proposal. The process then anticipated a dialogue between the interested parties and the City where the City would disclose confidential information about the project to the interested parties. That would then enable the interested parties to develop and submit a final offer for the City’s consideration and selection.
[4] Inzola claims in its pleadings that the City ran a biased procurement process, that it was wrongfully disqualified from that process, that certain city staff concealed information from City Council and overtly misled it as to the merits of what became the recommended proposal and finally that Mayor Fennell was directly involved in the City’s breaches with a clear bias in favour of the party that was eventually successful.
[5] In its defence, the City denies the allegations in their entirety and pleads that Inzola was properly disqualified because of its failure to comply with the confidentiality provisions of the RFP process. The City also pleads that even if Inzola had remained in the “Competitive Dialogue”, it would not have been the successful party.
[6] Before I go further, I wish to commend counsel for both parties for their professionalism and their able submissions to the court. Their respectful conduct and their advocacy on behalf of their clients enabled the court to focus on the underlying difficulties that have impeded the completion of the discovery process in a timely manner.
[7] What follows is my consideration and decision regarding the appropriate timetable for the completion of the undertakings and the refusals. Where possible with respect to the refusals, I have grouped them into categories so as to work through them in an efficient and meaningful manner.
A. Timetable for the Completion of Undertakings
[8] It is trite that answers to undertakings given at discoveries must be provided in a timely manner. As of last spring when the examinations were adjourned, there were 221 undertakings and 198 refusals given by the City. By the time of the hearing of this motion, the City had answered 76 undertakings and the refusals were reduced to 48, some of which were further resolved in the course of submissions to the Court.
[9] Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the delay of several months to answering, at the very least, the undertakings is unacceptable especially because it concerns the transparency of government actions. He argued that the City should not be given any more than ten days to complete the outstanding undertakings.
[10] In response, Counsel for the City sought 90 days to complete the outstanding undertakings. In addition, with respect to certain specific questions that counsel said were in the nature of a hypothetical analysis of Inzola’s potential bid, counsel asked that those questions be answered along the timelines allowed for the submission of expert reports.
[11] Insofar as the 90-day request is concerned, counsel explained that City staff would have to be reassembled to answer the various undertakings. They would also have to undertake this task alongside their various other responsibilities and ordinary tasks. Then, there are individuals who are no longer with the city who would have to be tracked down and asked to assist. As for the delay to date, counsel said that last year’s elections was one of the reasons that her client was not nearly as responsive as it could have been.
[12] Having regard for the circumstances as outlined by counsel, while I cannot agree to a suggested deadline of ten days, the requested 90 days suggests that the City fails to appreciate that time is of the essence in the completion of its obligations. The City’s explanation regarding its difficulties with the reassembling of the staff is far from convincing. The questions and the corresponding obligations do not come as a surprise to the City and the City has already had ample time to pull in whatever resources would be required to meet its obligations.
[13] There is no question that significant time has passed since the discoveries were adjourned last year. The difficulty is that such lost time cannot be retrieved. Nor will it serve anyone’s purpose to set an unrealistic future date of completion because of the delay. Parenthetically, it must also be noted that if the plaintiff was so concerned about the delays, it could have sought the court’s assistance much earlier.
[14] At this point, my task is to set a timetable that is meaningful and that will enable the City to produce answers that are responsive. Answers that are merely given for the sake of meeting a deadline run the risk of being brief or otherwise superficial, and ultimately unhelpful to the plaintiff and eventually the Court. A cycle of “hurry up and wait” will not assist anyone and may result in oversights and shortcomings that eventually may cause further delays and surprises at trial.
[15] In an effort to find the appropriate balance in the setting of a deadline, I fix the final due date for the answers to the undertakings for the end of the day on April 27, 2015. I describe the date as a final date because I also encourage the City, with the aid of counsel to review the outstanding questions to consider whether it is feasible to stagger the delivery of the answers such that the questions are answered in groups or batches in advance of the final due date.
[16] With respect to the suggestion that questions 21[^1], and 38-42 amount to a hypothetical analysis and are akin to obtaining an expert opinion such that the answers to those questions ought to be aligned with the timetable anticipated by the rules for expert opinions, with respect, I disagree. Counsel for Inzola was clear that he is not seeking opinion evidence but rather fact evidence from those who were involved in the review of the various offers. I can see, however, that the answers for these questions are involved and I, therefore, set the due date for the answering of these questions to June 30, 2015.
B. Refusals
[17] The refusals divide themselves into four categories. Three of those categories deal with a discreet theme. Then there are a number of miscellaneous questions, some of which seemed to be resolved during the hearing of the motion but others that require my ruling. My decision for each grouping is outlined below.
i. Questions Pertaining to the Findings of the Integrity Commissioner – Qs. 50-51 and 67
[18] One of the allegations in Inzola’s pleadings concerns the role of Mayor Fennell in the RFP process. In particular, Inzola pleads that the successful bidder, Dominus gave targeted financial contributions to the Mayor, the Mayor’s Gala and the Mayor’s Golf Tournament in an effort to gain favour for its proposal.
[19] In response, the City denies the allegations and relies in part on the findings of two separate investigations by the City’s Integrity Commissioner, the Honourable David R. Cameron which concluded that Mayor Fennell did not contravene the “Brampton Code of Conduct for Members of Council”. Counsel for the City further characterizes the questions by Inzola to amount to a collateral attack on the Commissioner’s findings. Finally, in her factum, and relying on the affidavit evidence of Julian Patteson, the Chief Public Services Officer, counsel indicates that it would be “extremely time-consuming” for City Staff to attempt to reassemble the documents that were provided to the Integrity Commissioner for his investigation that took place over three years ago. In addition according to Julian Patteson, the City staff does not have the means to identify the documents that were provided to the Commissioner.
[20] The questions, as framed by Inzola’s counsel, are too broad and seem to be out of proportion with the magnitude of the inquiry and the effort that would be required to respond to those questions. However, they do not amount to a collateral attack on the conclusions of the Commissioner.
[21] Since the City seeks to rely on the Commissioner’s conclusions as one of the defences, the report is relevant. But what is also relevant is whether the activities by Dominus in its interaction with the Mayor, either directly or through two fundraisers, were even on the Commissioner’s radar when he conducted his investigations. On the face of the two documents in question, it is impossible to determine that question with any certainty. In his letter of March 7, 2013, that responded to a complaint dated January 28, 2013, Commissioner Cameron, had one sentence at the very end that stated: “No preferential treatment was given to any person to advance a private interest”. Nothing else is included in that letter to place that conclusion into any context, or to be able to conclude that “any person” includes Dominus and/or its principals, and officers, or other representatives.
[22] Commissioner Cameron’s response to another complaint dated October 20, 2011, made reference to an allegation by one person whom he interviewed to the effect that some individuals were asked to “contribute substantial amounts to the Mayor’s Gala in excess of the price of the dinner tickets in order not to incur disfavor with the Mayor”. The Commissioner went on to explain that he asked certain Councillors about this allegation but there was nothing more than rumours. In any event, he concluded that even if such an allegation were true, it would not be contrary to the Code.
[23] It is not for this Court to comment on the strength of these statements as they relate to the City’s defence. However, it is appropriate that the plaintiff scope questions 50 - 51 down to focus them with specific reference to Dominus. I leave it to counsel to re-frame these questions but they ought to be with respect to Dominus. One possible approach may be along the lines of the following example: “When Commissioner Cameron undertook his investigations, did that include the study of Dominus’ interactions with Mayor Fennell?” This suggestion is made only in an attempt to illustrate and frame the parameters of Inzola’s inquiry. It is for Counsel to articulate the precise questions on this subject in a way that is proportional to the particular discovery process.
[24] Insofar as question 50(ii) asks for details of who gave the information, when and under what circumstances, this particular question is too broad. Since Commissioner Cameron referenced Councillors and others, the names of those individuals and the dates when they would have been interviewed or spoken to by the Commissioner ought to be sufficient.
ii. Questions Pertaining to the Final Agreement with the Successful Party
[25] As noted above, at the heart of Inzola’s claim is its allegation that city staff misled City Council on the terms of the final agreement from Dominus. Between Dominus’ final offer and the ultimate final agreements, Inzola contends that the City staff inserted significant financial clauses to the final agreements for the benefit of Dominus, without the knowledge of City Council. One such benefit was the inclusion of an interest adjustment provision. The discovery of this difference raises questions about whether the final agreement included additional financial benefits for Dominus that were not anticipated in Dominus’ final offer. The only way to answer that question would be to compare the Dominus’ final offer with the final agreements.
[26] In the same vein, Inzola contends that the completed project is so different from what was anticipated at the beginning of the RFP process that the only way to determine the actual project that Dominus was required to deliver would be to review the final agreements. The determination of that question would enable Inzola to demonstrate how its final offer was consistently superior to the one that Dominus was ultimately required to deliver to the City.
[27] Finally, Inzola contends that the only way to demonstrate that the Dominus final offer was inferior, flawed and non-compliant would be to compare it to the ultimate binding agreements that were signed. The implication of this argument is that Dominus’ final offer had to be changed very materially to bring it in line with what the City was seeking to accomplish.
[28] In response, the City offers eight reasons that the final agreements are irrelevant to the issues in dispute. In sum the City contends that the final agreements reached with Dominus were unique to the specific project that was developed with Dominus through the “Competitive Dialogue Process”. The final agreements with Dominus were entered into after August 10, 2011, a full year after Inzola was disqualified from the RFP. In addition, the City agreed to pay a fixed price for 25 years. In the result, the interest adjustment provision was not a material difference. Furthermore, the critical point in time is August 10, 2011, when City Council approved of Dominus as the contractor. The agreements that followed reflected tweaks to the Dominus proposal that were immaterial to the substantive agreement. Whether those tweaks were more or less favourable to Dominus is irrelevant to whether City Council was misled because the final texts of the agreements were never put to City Council for a further review and approval. Finally, the City says that it has already produced all of the documents that were put to council for their consideration.
[29] Even with August 10, 2011, as a pivotal date in the approval process of Dominus’ offer, and even if the RFP process differed from conventional processes and involved a competitive dialogue, I have difficulty accepting the arguments that the documents that followed the approval date are irrelevant. At this stage in the litigation, and with the evidence before me I have no way of evaluating the competing contentions on this issue. What one side says is a material difference the other side says is a tweak. For example, Inzola says that the interest adjustment provision amounted to an additional benefit for Dominus. The City says that the provision was an immaterial provision. Similarly, Inzola questions whether the final agreements had additional terms that were never put before City Council. The City says the negotiations that followed August 10, 2011, were only tweaks.
[30] Having reviewed the arguments and the submissions of both sides, the only way to resolve these different viewpoints is for the City to answer the cluster of questions put to it by Inzola on this issue. The comparative analysis is critical to being able to draw conclusions over the bona fides conduct of the City staff and the overall RFP process. I encourage counsel to discuss possible ways of rationalizing the productions for these questions.
iii Questions Pertaining to the City Councillors
[31] The next set of refusals arises from questions 160-163 and relates to communications between the City Councillors and legal counsel, both internal and external and the disclosure of those communications. For greater certainty they are listed in the table just below. In Inzola’s factum there is also reference to question 1725 from the examination transcript through which Inzola’s counsel seeks permission to contact Mayor Fennell and / or the city councilors directly to request their information and documents relating to the matters at issue in the lawsuit.
Q.160
Non-Privileged Documents/Communications Involving City’s Counsel
Advise whether there were one-on-one meetings or telephone calls between individual councillors and the City’s internal legal counsel or external legal counsel. If so, provide the substance of the communications, including what was conveyed to the councilors and what the councilors told legal counsel.
Refusal Maintained. Councillors are the decision-makers for the City, and as such have received privileged information regarding the lawsuit and have participated in meetings which are protected by litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege. The City will not disclose any legal advice given to Councillors.
Q. 161
Non-Privileged Documents/Communications Involving City’s Counsel
Advise whether the individual councillors were told, either as advice or as a directive, not to communication with Inzola with respect to the lawsuit and more generally.
Refusal Maintained. Councillors are the decision-makers for the City, and as such have received privileged information regarding the lawsuit and have participated in meetings which are protected by litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege. The City will not disclose any legal advice given to Councillors.
Q. 162
Non-Privileged Documents/Communications Involving City’s Counsel
Produce all documents relating to communications between legal counsel and the individual councillors.
Refusal Maintained. Councillors are the decision-makers for the City, and as such have received privileged information regarding the lawsuit and have participated in meetings which are protected by litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege. The City will not disclose any legal advice given to Councillors.
Q. 163
Non-Privileged Documents/Communications Involving City’s Counsel
Produce all documents related to any direction or advice or recommendation given by members of City staff, including the mayor, to individual councillors about not communicating with Inzola.
Refusal Maintained. Councillors are the decision-makers for the City, and as such have received privileged information regarding the lawsuit and have participated in meetings which are protected by litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege. The City will not disclose any legal advice given to Councillors.
[32] Underlying the City’s refusal to these questions is the fuller argument that city councillors are decision-makers of the City who collectively form a City Council, which does have a solicitor-client relationship. Although city councillors are not agents or employees of a municipal corporation and are therefore not with the City’s power or control and cannot be compellable witnesses, as decision-makers of the municipal corporation, the City contends that they may obtain information that is confidential and often highly sensitive. In accordance with the City’s Code of Conduct for the Members of Council, City of Brampton, the City Councillors are required to keep information confidential and to safeguard the municipality’s interests. The City also relies on s.239(2)(e) and (f) for the proposition that the Municipal Act, anticipates in camera sessions of Council if the subject-matter being discussed concerns litigation or advice that is subject to solicitor-client.
[33] In light of these observations, the City contends that communications between counsel for the City and the Councillors are communications with respect to the City’s defence of this action and are therefore privileged. The City argues that the communications are solicitor-client privileged because of the City Councillors’ unique decision-making role for the City. Alternatively, and at the very least, the City further contends that if the communications are not protected by solicitor-client privilege they are protected by litigation privilege.
[34] In the course of submissions, the City was asked by the Court if the City Councillors who were not re-elected last fall were considered decision-makers. Counsel for the City conceded that those counselors were not decision-makers and that counsel for Inzola could speak to them independent of any oversight as otherwise anticipated by Rule 7.2-8 -8.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
[35] In response, Inzola’s counsel challenges the City’s arguments on a couple of grounds. First, Inzola contends that it cannot be both the case that city councillors are to be treated as third parties for the sake of production and therefore beyond the City’s control, but otherwise be decision-makers who are represented by the City’s lawyers and who can shelter behind solicitor-client privilege. It has to be one or the other. Second, Inzola’s counsel argues that a bald claim to privilege is in an insufficient response by the City. Mr. Patteson’s statement in his affidavit provides no particulars whatsoever on the privilege being claimed. In the absence of such break down, counsel urges the court to conclude that privilege has not been made out and to order the City to answer the questions that have been refused.
[36] Beginning with the issue of whether city councillors are compellable witnesses for the purposes of discovery, the law is settled on this point. City councillors are not agents or employees of a municipal corporation. See: St. Elizabeth Home Society v. Hamilton (City), [2005] O.J. No. 5369. The City is, therefore, not in a position to obtain the personal files and documents of the City’s City Councillors for the period that decisions were being made with respect to the project in question and the issues in dispute.
[37] The question that this Court has to consider is what if any privilege might attach to the communications between the City Councillors of the City and legal counsel. Insofar as city councillors are not officers or employees or agents of the City, they are not the client. The City, therefore, cannot rely on solicitor-client privilege to shield communications that may have taken place between legal counsel and the City Councillors.
[38] The contention that city councillors are decision-makers and that, therefore, they are automatically to be afforded protection from disclosure is not convincing either. That said, as decision-makers within the City, there may be certain communications between legal counsel and the city councillors that may be protected by litigation privilege. But that conclusion requires a rigorous review and application of the principles of litigation privilege.
[39] Litigation privilege contemplates the protection of certain communications between a solicitor and third parties. Generally speaking, information that is imparted to lawyers by third parties is not expected to be kept confidential. The object of litigation privilege is to ensure the efficacy of the adversarial process. Parties to a litigation must be left to prepare their contending positions in private, without adversarial interference and without the fear of premature disclosure, see: Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319 at paras.26-27. In General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz, (1999), 1999 7320 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (3d) 321, the Ontario Court of Appeal referred to litigation privilege as a “zone of privacy” that enables a solicitor to prepare for trial without intrusion on his or her thoughts or work product. See also, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant – The Law of Evidence, 4th Edition.
[40] There are two conditions that must be satisfied for communications to fall within the protection of litigation privilege. First, the communications with third parties must have been made specifically in light of either contemplated or existing litigation. Third parties may be experts or they may be individuals with special knowledge. They cannot be communications in the context of general legal advice. See: The Law of Evidence in Canada. Second, the privilege will only attach if the dominant purpose for the third-party communications is to assist counsel with respect to the litigation that is either imminent or underway. In his endorsement of the “dominant purpose test”, Justice Fish noted that litigation privilege “should be viewed as a limited exception to the principle of full disclosure and not as an equal partner of the broadly interpreted solicitor-client privilege”, see Blank, at para. 60.
[41] Applying these principles to this case the city councillors, as decision-makers may be treated as individuals with special knowledge. It is therefore possible, if not probable, that legal counsel would seek to communicate with them to obtain information about the legal issues in dispute. To the extent that such communications satisfy the conditions noted above, namely, that they occurred in the context of the litigation underway, and that they satisfy the dominant purpose test, then those communications are protected by litigation privilege. All other communications that fall outside of these parameters, are not protected.
[42] Turning to the specific questions under this heading of refusals, communications that are not protected by litigation privilege are to be identified and produced. For all communications that the City claims litigation privilege, it is to provide full particulars, including the date of the particular communication and the subject of such and nature of such communication. This may be outlined in Schedule “B” of the City’s affidavit of documents. I am mindful of Inzola’s argument to the Court that the City should have explained the privileges claimed at the motion and that its bald claim to privilege was inadequate. However, I am not prepared to make a blanket ruling in favour of disclosure.
[43] I leave it to counsel for Inzola to consider whether it might re-frame the questions outlined in Qs. 160-163 to bring them into greater focus and to add some precision to the communications that they are seeking to obtain. Counsel for both parties are free to consider whether an alternative approach might be for the city councillors in question to be asked to volunteer disclosure or to answer questions by way of written interrogatories. I also note that in the unlikely event that counsel have difficulties with a particular question or with a particular privilege being claimed, they may seek my assistance by arranging for a teleconference through my office.
[44] Regarding Q.161, this questions should be answered by the City. Insofar as it is asking about a communication by legal counsel in the nature of a directive, I see no privilege that attaches to the question.
[45] Finally, regarding the issue of whether the city councillors who were not re-elected remained decision-makers for the purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, although counsel for the City conceded that they were no longer decision-makers and Inzola’s counsel was free to communicate with them, that concession is likely incorrect. Insofar as the former city councillors were decision-makers in relation to the project and the process that is the subject of the litigation, it stands to reason that if they could not be spoken to prior to the elections, they ought not to be spoken to after the elections without the corresponding obligations being observed.
[46] It may be that given the time lapse between the submissions made in court and this ruling, such communications were initiated and possibly concluded. However, going forward, the question of who is a decision-maker is to be addressed with reference to the operative timeline of the issues in dispute and the underlying process that led to the selection of Dominus and the conclusion of the final agreements. I would also add that given the submissions concerning the Rules of Professional Conduct, I do not believe that the recognition that the city councillors are decision-makers would be a bar to a Rule 30.10 motion for third-party disclosure. That said, should Inzola consider that avenue as a further course of action, it and the City would be well advised to seek as a first step the voluntary disclosure from the city councillors.
All Other Refusals
[47] Apart from these three categories, there were a series of questions that were refused by the City. In some instances, in the course of submissions to the court, Inzola clarified the scope of its questions and the City agreed to answer them. My review of these questions and my ruling for each is outlined below:
Qs. 24, 49, 59, 60: The communications referred to in this questions are not confined to written communications but rather concern all communications. the City agreed with this clarification and will produce all communications.
Q.67: Refusal is sustained. The relevance of this question is dubious. There may be any number of reasons that Mayor Fennell retained her own counsel. The question of who is paying for her own legal fees is not necessarily probative with respect to her role in this matter.
Q.68: The answer from Ms. Bailey is outstanding and must be answered. The City agreed to answer this question during submissions.
Q.73: The second part of the question must also be answered. The City agreed to answer this question during submissions.
Q.78: The refusal to answer the 2nd question is dubious. The implication of the City’s decision to answer the first part of the question is that there is some relevance to that question. If that question is relevant, then it is difficult to see how part two of the question is not relevant. The question must be answered in full.
Qs. 89 + 90: With respect to those documents and information that is not privileged, they are to be produced. With respect to those documents and information for which privilege is claimed, the City is to list them in a Schedule “B” format and explain the basis for the privilege being claimed.
Q. 123: Refusal to Q.123 is sustained insofar as Mayor Fennell’s personal e-mail box is not within the City’s power and control. Furthermore, there is a serious concern with the proportionality of this question. There is only one business e-mail identified to date that Mayor Fennell forwarded to her personal address and the subject does not appear to have anything to do with this dispute. It is a stretch to conclude that because of this one exchange, Mayor Fennell might have used her personal address interchangeably with her business e-mail address. The court’s view on this may have been different if there was evidence that Mayor Fennell used her gmail account interchangeably with her City account. In that situation a request to access the City’s metadata of the Mayor’s computer activity to track the frequency of her gmail access through the City’s computer might have been are possible remedy. Since there is no such evidence before me at this time, I do not need to explore this further.
Q. 124: The City has undertaken to make the inquiries of Mayor Fennell as requested. As there was some discussion on this point during the submissions in court, I wish to confirm that the City’s proposed approach is the correct approach.
Q. 133: I am satisfied with the response from the City’s response to this question.
Q. 152: The City’s counsel was under the impression that this question was answered in its entirety. Counsel will double-check and if there is anything that is outstanding, it will be addressed and provided.
Q. 159: The City’s counsel agreed in submissions to the court to make the request of Bennett Jones. There is therefore no need for a ruling.
Q.175: The requested information, if it is privileged, is to be listed in a Schedule “B” format with an explanation as to the basis for the privilege claimed.
Q. 176: The second part of the question, as framed is stated in broad terms and raises valid proportionality concerns. Since the relevant issue concerns a comparative analysis of the valuations between the other properties and Inzola’s property, it is appropriate that the question be scoped down to request from Brampton all the valuations and related documents concerning the other expropriated properties.
Q. 196-198: These three questions are cast in very broad terms such that they may be read to create obligations that go over and above what is required by Rule 30.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. As variants of what are often referred to as “clean-up” questions at the conclusion of a discovery examination, they are to be read down to reflect the obligations under the Rules and the City shall comply with those obligations.
COSTS
[48] In the ordinary course, where success is divided and where some of the refusals raise novel issues for consideration, I would order that each party bare its own costs. In this instance, since I indicated to counsel that they would be given the opportunity to make cost submissions following my ruling, the parties shall have until March 27, 2015, to do so, such submissions to be limited to three pages double-spaced along with the respective bill of costs and any relevant offers.
Tzimas J.
DATE: March 03, 2015
CITATION: Inzola Group v. City of Brampton, 2015 ONSC 1423
COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-2721-00
DATE: 2015-03-03
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: INZOLA GROUP LIMITED and
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BRAMPTON
COUNSEL: David Chernos, for the Plaintiff
Elizabeth Bowker, for the Defendant
ENDORSEMENT
TZIMAS J.
DATE: March 03, 2015
[^1]: My references to the number of each question is the question number as listed in the Respondent’s table contained in the Responding material.