Stephen T. Bale

The appellant, J. Michael Evans, appealed the refusal of building and septic permits for Harry Island in the Township of Muskoka Lakes.

The court found that Evans failed to establish a legal nonconforming residential use of the boathouse on Harry Island, as there was no evidence of actual residential use or intention to continue such use since the 1920s or 1930s.

The court also held that the chief building official did not have discretion under the zoning bylaw to deem the undersized island to conform.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the septic permit, finding that compliance with the Building Code superseded the municipal bylaw’s setback requirement.

The applicant, an occupational therapist, sought judicial review of a decision by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordering her to complete a Specified Continuing Education or Remediation Program (SCERP).

The investigation focused on two specific billing issues, and the applicant was advised by the College to restrict her response to those issues.

However, the ICRC imposed the SCERP based on broader practice management concerns not explicitly raised in the investigation.

The Divisional Court found the process procedurally unfair, as the applicant was not given adequate notice or an opportunity to respond to the broader concerns.

The application was allowed, the ICRC's decision was quashed, and the matter was not remitted for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Independent Police Review Director, which confirmed that his complaints of neglect of duty and discreditable conduct against a police officer were unsubstantiated.

The Divisional Court found the Director's decision unreasonable because it relied on a fundamental misapprehension of evidence regarding the timeline of the alleged assault and failed to address the applicant's central argument that video evidence proved the officer had lied.

The application was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Complaints Director for further review.

The applicant career college sought judicial review of a decision by Accreditation Canada to revoke the accreditation of its Diagnostic Medical Sonography Program, and the Superintendent's subsequent decision to revoke the program's approval.

Accreditation Canada brought a motion to stay the judicial review proceedings under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, relying on an arbitration clause in the accreditation contract.

The Divisional Court found that while the accreditation decision was an exercise of statutory authority with sufficient public character to be subject to judicial review, the technical requirements for a mandatory stay in favour of arbitration were met.

The court held that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable and that the subject matter was capable of being arbitrated.

The motion to stay the judicial review was granted.

The applicant career college brought a motion for a stay of the Superintendent's decision to revoke approval of its diagnostic medical sonography program pending a judicial review application.

The revocation followed the loss of the program's accreditation status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of irreparable harm, such as financial inability to pay required student refunds.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay to allow students to receive refunds and pursue education elsewhere, rather than remaining trapped in an unaccredited program.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a temporary spousal support order.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the sole issue of whether the motion judge failed to consider and apply the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Leave was denied on all other issues, including findings of fact and income determination.

The underlying decision was not stayed pending the appeal, and costs were reserved.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision dated December 31, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal dated October 27, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outlines were filed, the court made no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $2,712.

The moving party sought a panel review under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act of a single judge's decision denying an extension of time to apply for judicial review of a City Council zoning decision.

The moving party attempted to introduce new affidavit evidence, which the panel rejected as improper and available at the original hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension due to unexplained delay and prejudice.

The court considered a motion by LLF Lawyers LLP to dismiss the action against them on the basis that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that confidential information was disclosed by an LLF employee to her spouse, who then defamed the plaintiff.

The court found that the statement of claim, as supplemented by particulars, disclosed a cause of action in favour of Michael Kelsey against LLF Lawyers LLP, and dismissed the motion as against him.

The action by The House Consulting Group Inc. was dismissed for not pleading a lawyer-client relationship or disclosure of its confidential information.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the Crown could not be compelled to answer questions on an examination for discovery in an action brought under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming binding Court of Appeal precedent that the Crown's privilege to refuse discovery can only be taken away by express statutory words.

The court also rejected the argument that the Crown had attorned to the court's jurisdiction for discovery purposes by defending the action and voluntarily participating in some discovery.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash two Orders in Council (OICs) related to the expropriation of its lands for a transit-oriented community project.

The first OIC designated the lands as transit-oriented community land, removing the right to a hearing of necessity, while the second authorized the expropriation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, applying the Auer framework to find that both OICs were reasonably within the scope of authority delegated by the enabling legislation.

The court rejected arguments that the OICs were arbitrary, discriminatory, unnecessary, or made in bad faith.

The court sentenced Anden Alexander, convicted by a jury of possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm, unauthorized possession of a firearm in a vehicle, and flight from a peace officer.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the offence and the offender, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and canvassed the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less 92 days, to be served in the community, followed by two years' probation, and made ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, forfeiture, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and notified his insurer the next day that his vehicle sustained heavy damage.

He did not apply for statutory accident benefits until 17 months later, when he learned of his entitlement.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed his claim for failing to provide notice of his intention to apply for benefits within seven days under s. 32(1) of the SABS.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the LAT's decision, holding that the SABS is consumer protection legislation and that notifying the insurer of the accident itself satisfies the seven-day notice requirement, triggering the insurer's obligation to inquire about injuries and provide benefit information.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,400 to the responding party.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissing his appeal of a Ministry of Labour Field Visit Report for delay and denying reconsideration.

The applicant had filed his appeal approximately 17 months after the 30-day statutory deadline.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board provided procedural fairness and reasonably concluded that the applicant failed to provide a cogent explanation for the delay.

The court also denied the applicant's request to introduce fresh evidence.

The applicant First Nations sought judicial review of the Ministry's decisions to amend a Crown Land Use Policy Atlas and transfer a parcel of Crown land to the Municipality of Red Lake for housing development.

The applicants argued the Ministry breached its duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and failed to obtain their consent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that Treaty No. 3 allows the Crown to take up land subject to a duty to consult, which does not amount to a First Nation veto.

The court held that the duty to consult was at the lower end of the spectrum and that the Ministry's consultation process was reasonable and fulfilled its constitutional obligations.

The decision concerns a dispute over the return of a deposit following the termination of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a property, in the context of a receivership and subsequent refinancing.

The court orders the return of the deposit to 2557905 Ontario Inc., with interest only from the date the deposit was placed in an interest-bearing account, and denies the listing broker's request for costs from the deposit.

The accused, Anden Alexander, applied under section 24(2) of the Charter to exclude firearm evidence, alleging that his initial traffic stop was the result of racial profiling and constituted arbitrary detention.

He further argued that his subsequent arrest for flight from police and the warrantless searches of his person and vehicle were unlawful.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the police officers had valid Highway Traffic Act grounds for the stop based on database searches conducted prior to the detention.

Consequently, the court held that there was no racial profiling or arbitrary detention, the subsequent arrest and searches were lawful, and the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.