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Dentist in detaxing scheme granted conditional discharge requiring $200,000 payment and 36-month suspension.
Dr. Baldeep Kaur Saran, a dentist, applied for a discharge from bankruptcy, which was opposed by her Trustee and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).
The bankruptcy was tax-driven, stemming from her participation in a 'natural person' detaxing scheme and a charitable giving scheme, resulting in over $3.1 million in tax debt (including penalties and interest).
The court found that her assets were less than 50 cents on the dollar of unsecured liabilities and that she contributed to the bankruptcy through unjustifiable extravagance in living.
The court rejected her claims of being duped and imputed income to her based on her past earnings and her husband's control over their combined income.
A conditional discharge was granted, requiring her to pay an additional $200,000 to the Trustee, file accurate tax returns, remain current with CRA obligations, and her discharge was suspended for a minimum of 36 months.
A bankrupt who filed false corporate dissolution documents was granted a conditional discharge requiring an additional $6,000 payment.
The bankrupt, Raymond Henry Lalonde, sought discharge from bankruptcy.
Jevco Insurance Company, an unsecured creditor, opposed the discharge on two grounds under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act: assets not equaling $0.50 on the dollar of unsecured liabilities (s. 173(1)(a)), and putting creditors to unnecessary expense by a frivolous or vexatious defence (s. 173(1)(f)).
The court found the s. 173(1)(a) ground was met, as the bankrupt's assets were significantly less than 50% of liabilities, and he was responsible for signing the indemnity.
The court did not find the s. 173(1)(f) ground met regarding a frivolous defence, as the statement of defence was not in evidence.
However, the court found the bankrupt's conduct in filing false Articles of Dissolution for a corporation, stating no proceedings were pending, to be dishonest.
Balancing the interests of the bankrupt and creditors, and considering the dishonesty, the court granted a conditional discharge, requiring an additional payment of $6,000 to the Trustee for the benefit of creditors, in addition to the $50,000 for equity repurchase.
The court lifted a bankruptcy stay to allow creditors to quantify claims and pursue non-monetary relief.
The creditors sought to lift a stay of proceedings in bankruptcy to continue a civil action against the bankrupt, Thomas G. Assaly, and to annul his bankruptcy.
The court found that the bankrupt had engaged in a pattern of filings (US Chapter 11, consumer proposal, then bankruptcy) to avoid litigation.
While the consumer proposal ceased to exist upon bankruptcy, the court declined to annul the bankruptcy, finding that the bankrupt's liabilities exceeded his assets, distinguishing it from cases where annulment was granted due to solvency or abuse of process.
The court lifted the stay of proceedings to allow the quantification of provable claims for the purpose of filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, and also allowed non-monetary claims (declaration of vexatious litigant, and an order restricting future proceedings) to proceed as they are not provable in bankruptcy.
The court also ordered the bankrupt to disclose all worldwide creditors and for the trustee to investigate certain assets.
The court dismissed an application to void a wind project contract, finding no legitimate expectations or negligent misrepresentation.
The Alliance to Protect Prince Edward County (APPEC) sought a declaration that a Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) Contract between the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) and WPD White Pines Wind Incorporated (White Pines) was null and void, arguing White Pines failed to meet contractual capacity requirements.
APPEC also raised issues of legitimate expectations and negligent misrepresentation by IESO.
The court dismissed APPEC's application, finding that the doctrine of legitimate expectations did not apply as it creates procedural, not substantive, rights, and APPEC was not a party to the contract.
Furthermore, no special relationship existed to support a claim of negligent misrepresentation, and IESO and White Pines properly amended their contract in accordance with the FIT Rules and the Environmental Review Tribunal's decision.
Mother ordered to return child to Ottawa as it was the child's habitual residence.
The applicant father brought a motion for the return of the parties' child to Ottawa, while the respondent mother brought a cross-motion to stay the Ottawa proceedings and continue the matter in the York Region.
The mother had unilaterally moved with the child to Markham shortly before commencing her application.
The court determined that the child's habitual residence was Ottawa, where the child was born and raised before the mother's departure.
The court ordered the mother to return the child to Ottawa within 10 days, finding that Ottawa was the proper jurisdiction for the proceedings.
Application for duty to defend dismissed as underlying claims fell outside indemnity agreement and policy exclusions applied.
The National Gallery brought an application seeking a declaration that its contractor, Lafleur, and Lafleur's insurer, Intact, owed a duty to defend it in two underlying actions arising from a fatal trip and fall by a Lafleur employee on the Gallery's premises.
The court reviewed the commercial general liability policy and the service contract's indemnity provisions.
It found that the underlying claims alleged negligence relating to the design and control of the premises by the Gallery as occupier, independent of any activities by Lafleur.
Furthermore, the policy's exclusions for workers' compensation and employer's liability applied.
The application was dismissed, as neither respondent owed a duty to defend.
Statement of claim struck as former employer owed no duty of care to complete reference form.
The plaintiff, a former probationary employee of the defendant, sued for negligence and breach of a duty of good faith after the defendant failed to fully complete a verification of experience form required for the plaintiff to obtain a nursing license in the Northwest Territories.
The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
The court granted the motion, finding that the employment contract had been terminated during the probationary period and there was no recognized duty of care requiring a former employer to provide a reference or complete such forms.
The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend.
Deathbed will upheld as testator had capacity when giving instructions and reviewing draft prior to stroke.
The applicant challenged the validity of his late father's will, arguing that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity when he executed a 'deathbed will' in the hospital following a severe stroke.
The court applied the relaxed test for capacity from Parker v. Felgate, finding that the deceased had full capacity when he gave instructions and reviewed the draft will prior to his stroke.
The court held that the propounders of the will met their burden of proving capacity and that the applicant failed to establish suspicious circumstances or incapacitating delusions.
The will was ordered to be probated.
Appeal from Consent and Capacity Board dismissed; findings of incapacity for treatment and property upheld.
The appellant, an inpatient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable with respect to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and incapable of managing his property.
The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence and reached unreasonable conclusions.
The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review to the Board's findings of mixed fact and law.
The court found that the Board's conclusions regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decisions, due to his denial of illness and paranoid delusions, were reasonable and supported by the evidence.
The appeal was dismissed.
Application to set aside an $11 million arbitration award for procedural unfairness and bias dismissed.
The applicants sought judicial review to set aside an arbitration award that ordered the applicant son to pay his respondent father over $11 million to dissolve their gas bar partnership.
The applicants alleged procedural unfairness and a reasonable apprehension of bias by the arbitrator, raising issues regarding the non-attendance of a party, the removal of a party from the style of cause, the rules of procedure used, the treatment of expert testimony, and the refusal to admit post-arbitration financial evidence.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds of the application, finding no procedural irregularities or bias on the part of the arbitrator, and noting that the applicants themselves were responsible for their expert witness not testifying.
Consent order issued at pre-trial vacating trial dates and establishing protocol for joint site inspection.
At a pre-trial conference for a construction dispute, the parties agreed to vacate the scheduled trial dates and establish a protocol for a joint site inspection.
The inspection will involve representatives from various engineering and consulting firms to determine structural deficiencies, remediation methods, and costs.
The court issued a consent order detailing the inspection process, deadlines for expert reports, and scheduled a further pre-trial conference.
Conditional discharge granted requiring $100,000 payment due to tax debt and unjustifiable extravagance.
The bankrupt, a 72-year-old self-employed businessman with significant tax debts, applied for a discharge from bankruptcy.
The discharge was opposed by the Canada Revenue Agency and the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
The court found that the bankrupt had engaged in unjustifiable extravagance and had structured his affairs through a family trust to artificially lower his income.
The court granted a conditional discharge, requiring the bankrupt to pay $100,000 to the Trustee for the benefit of his creditors.
Father credited for child support overpayment, offset by Section 7 and Child Tax Benefit amounts owed.
The applicant father brought a motion regarding child support, and the respondent mother raised claims for RESP contributions, Section 7 expenses, and Child Tax Benefit payments.
The court found that the father had overpaid child support by $6,432.
The court dismissed the mother's claim for RESP reimbursement but found the father owed her $511 for his share of Section 7 expenses and $3,496 for Child Tax Benefit payments he received.
Setting off the amounts, the court ordered the mother to pay the father the net amount of $2,425 in monthly installments, plus $750 in costs.
An erroneous termination severs the employment relationship, but immediate rehiring continues employment under the prior contract's terms.
An application for wrongful dismissal where the enforceability of a termination clause limiting notice to Employment Standards Act minimums was at issue, along with the effect of an erroneous initial termination and subsequent re-hiring.
The court found the termination clause enforceable, supported by consideration.
It ruled that the initial termination was effective, but the employee's immediate re-hiring occurred under the same contractual terms.
The applicant was awarded seven weeks' notice under the ESA, plus benefits and mobile phone costs, significantly less than the nine months' common law notice sought.
Child support Motion granted
The Respondent Father brought a motion seeking unsupervised access to his two young children, while the Applicant Mother brought a cross-motion for sole custody and continued supervised access.
The court granted the Father unsupervised access, to be implemented gradually, finding no evidence to support the Mother's safety concerns regarding the Father's and his family's medical conditions or housing.
The Mother's request for interim sole custody was denied, with the court preferring to leave the final custody determination to a trial judge to avoid prejudging the issue.
Costs for the motion and cross-motion were awarded to the Father.
The court granted a conditional discharge requiring the bankrupt to pay outstanding surplus income and an additional sum due to his inappropriate conduct.
The bankrupt's discharge was opposed by the Trustee in Bankruptcy and an unsecured creditor, Tammy Dupuis.
The opposition was based on the bankrupt's failure to disclose a post-bankruptcy posting loan, non-compliance with surplus income obligations, and allegations of causing or contributing to bankruptcy through reckless speculation or negligence.
The court found that the bankrupt's assets were not equal to $0.50 on the dollar of unsecured liabilities, for which the bankrupt was justly responsible, and that he failed to comply with surplus income obligations.
The court ordered a conditional discharge, requiring the bankrupt to pay outstanding surplus income and an additional amount to the estate.
The court allowed the bankruptcy trustee's appeal, finding the creditor failed to perfect its security interest in a vehicle brought into Ontario.
The Trustee in Bankruptcy appealed a Registrar's decision that allowed a secured claim by Snap Auto Finance Corp. The Trustee had initially disallowed Snap's claim, arguing that Snap failed to perfect its security interest in a vehicle within the timeframes required by Ontario's Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) after the vehicle was brought into Ontario.
The Registrar found the vehicle had not been "brought in" to Ontario.
The Superior Court found the Registrar erred by not considering the debtor's assignment in bankruptcy in Ontario and his sworn Statement of Affairs, which indicated Ontario residency.
The Court concluded the vehicle was "brought in" to Ontario in November 2015, and Snap failed to perfect its security interest within the statutory 60 days or 15 days of notice.
The Trustee's appeal was allowed, restoring the disallowance of Snap's secured claim, making Snap's interest subordinate to the Trustee's.
Court adjusts father's corporate expenses to impute income for child support and section 7 expenses.
The mother brought a motion to impute income to the father under s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, arguing his corporate expenses for two trucking and mobile wash businesses should be reduced by 50% and added to his income.
The father brought a cross-motion to reduce his child support based on his reported income.
The court reviewed the corporate expenses, disallowing or reducing certain claims for meals, home office, and professional fees, and imputed the father's income at $70,681 for 2014 and $71,921 for 2015.
The court ordered the parties to share section 7 post-secondary expenses proportionately based on their incomes.
The court dismissed a husband's motion to set aside previous orders due to his persistent non-compliance and delay.
The Husband brought a motion to set aside all previous court orders, including a writ of seizure and sale, alleging the Wife misled the court and that orders were unfair due to non-compliance with disclosure.
The Wife opposed, citing the Husband's prolonged non-compliance with multiple disclosure and costs orders, and his delay in bringing the motion.
The court dismissed the Husband's motion, finding no evidence of fraud, mistake, or lack of notice, and that the Husband's conduct subverted the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to deal with cases justly.
Motion to set aside order extending time to perfect child protection appeal dismissed.
The applicant child protection agency brought a motion to set aside an order extending the respondent mother's time to perfect her appeal of a Crown wardship order, and to dismiss the appeal for delay.
The court found that the motion judge had properly exercised his inherent jurisdiction and considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the mother's difficulties with legal aid, when granting the extension.
The agency's motion was dismissed, and the court set peremptory deadlines for the perfection and hearing of the appeal.