Sopinka

The Crown appealed a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that ordered a new trial based on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown counsel's address to the jury exceeded the limits laid down in Boucher v. The Queen, and the trial judge inadequately directed the jury regarding these improprieties.

The Court noted no error in the charge regarding corroborative or alibi evidence, but upheld the order for a new trial.

The respondent purchaser agreed to buy a house from the appellant vendor.

The vendor reneged on the agreement before the closing date.

The purchaser sued for specific performance or damages in lieu thereof.

At trial, the purchaser elected to take damages.

The property value had increased significantly by the time of trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that damages in lieu of specific performance should be assessed as of the date of trial, not the date of breach, to provide a true substitute for specific performance.

The Court also held that the increase in value of the purchaser's own unsold residence should not be deducted from the damages award.

The appellants were convicted of sexually and physically abusing their three children.

At trial, the judge admitted out-of-court statements made by one of the children, restricted the defence expert from testifying about the reliability of the children's memories, and prevented the defence from cross-examining the child therapist using transcripts of police interviews.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judge erred in these evidentiary rulings and in rendering inconsistent verdicts with inadequate reasons.

The Court entered an acquittal for D.W. due to insufficient evidence and ordered a new trial for D.R. and H.R.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences, arguing that the police search of his car violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant had freely and voluntarily consented to the search before he was detained.

The appellant appealed as of right from a decision of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, Appeal Division, which set aside his acquittal for possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that there were reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant and that exigent circumstances authorized the police to conduct a search under s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act.

The Court concluded the search was conducted reasonably and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings ordered after a lengthy pre-trial delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, finding that a stay could not be ordered absent proof of impairment of the ability to present a full answer and defence or proof of oppressive or vexatious behaviour by the Crown or police.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada to quash his guilty pleas, arguing they resulted from the undue influence of his counsel.

The Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Bisson J.A. in the Court of Appeal, and quashed the guilty pleas.

The accused, a 22-year-old teacher, was charged with sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual activity with a 14-year-old student during the summer holidays.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding he was not in a position of trust or authority and had not exploited his position, which the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and entered a conviction, holding that actual exploitation is not a constituent element of the offence.

The Court further held that teachers are inherently in a position of trust and authority towards their students, and absent evidence raising a reasonable doubt, the accused occupied such a position.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault against his father.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on several self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code, including sections 26, 27, 34(1), 34(2), and 37(1).

The jury asked a question regarding excessive force, to which the trial judge provided a misleading response.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction by applying the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions were unnecessarily confusing and contained serious errors of law by leaving inapplicable defences to the jury and misdirecting them on the effect of excessive force.

The Court held that the curative proviso could not be applied and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his wife while severely intoxicated.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the effect of drunkenness on his ability to form the requisite intent for murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly link the common sense inference that a person intends the natural consequences of their actions to the evidence of the appellant's intoxication.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, which were subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.

After exhausting his appeals, the appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his continued detention violated the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that habeas corpus cannot be used as a collateral attack on a conviction by a superior court once the accused is no longer in the judicial system, and that the doctrine of res judicata applies.

The appellant, charged with murder in Canada, fled to the United States where he was arrested by American police on an extradition warrant.

The American police obtained a statement from the appellant without advising him of his right to counsel forthwith, as required by the Charter, though they complied with American law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to foreign police gathering evidence in their own jurisdiction.

Consequently, there was no Charter breach, and the evidence could not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the effects of intoxication and the common sense inference, as well as errors in the Crown's re-examination of the complainant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no significant error in the jury charge and agreeing with the Court of Appeal that any error in the re-examination did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was acquitted of robbery at trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on complicity as an alternative basis for guilt under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on complicity warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences involving multiple counts and complainants.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that the trial judge's charge to the jury was inadequate because it failed to properly instruct the jury that evidence on one count could not be used on other counts, and failed to warn about the dangers of the potential influence of evidence of numerous alleged criminal acts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by relying on the contents of the complainant's diary as corroboration of her testimony, even though the diary was not introduced into evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's application of the proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge and the Tax Court.

The Court held that the property in question retained its character as inventory in the hands of the appellant company after being acquired from a subsidiary.

The parties divorced in Maryland, with the father granted custody and the mother granted access rights.

The father moved to Quebec with the child while the mother's motions to modify access were pending in Maryland.

The mother obtained an ex parte interim custody order in Maryland and sought the child's return under the Quebec Act implementing the Hague Convention.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act did not apply because the father had custody at the time of removal and no custody modification proceedings were pending.

However, the Court affirmed the order returning the child to the United States, finding that the Quebec Superior Court had jurisdiction under civil law and correctly determined that returning the child was in her best interests.

The employer posted a position for a personal care attendant but rejected a female union member's application because it had determined a male was needed for the intimate personal care of elderly male residents.

The collective agreement contained a no-discrimination clause without a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception, whereas the provincial Human Rights Code included a BFOQ provision.

An arbitration board held that the employer could rely on the BFOQ provision, finding that the parties could not contract out of the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while parties can contract out of human rights legislation to provide greater protection, the arbitration board's interpretation that the collective agreement should be read in harmony with the Code's BFOQ provision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and manslaughter.

The appeal concerned whether the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on self-defence and defence of another following a verbal threat made to an inmate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.