Sopinka

The respondents were issued speeding tickets under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act.

They failed to pay the fines and did not appear in court, resulting in convictions without a trial pursuant to s. 16 of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 16, arguing it infringed their right to be presumed innocent and to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 16 does not infringe s. 11(d), as the regulatory scheme provides sufficient safeguards and notice such that an accused's failure to act constitutes a valid waiver of their s. 11(d) rights.

The appellant suffered back injuries in two successive motor vehicle accidents.

While recovering, he experienced a disc herniation during a mild stretching exercise.

The trial judge found the accidents contributed 25% to the herniation and awarded 25% of the global damages, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that apportionment between tortious and non-tortious causes is contrary to tort principles.

Because the accidents materially contributed to the indivisible injury, the defendants were fully liable for the entire loss under the thin skull rule.

The appellant bank loaned money to the respondent's wife, secured by a mortgage and guaranteed by the respondent.

When the mortgage matured, the bank and the mortgagor renewed it at a higher interest rate without notice to the respondent.

The mortgagor defaulted, and the bank obtained summary judgment against both.

The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment against the respondent, finding he was released from the guarantee.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bank's appeal, holding that the renewal agreement constituted a material alteration of the principal contract without the surety's consent, thereby discharging the guarantor.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that late Crown disclosure prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and that the trial judge erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement for its substantive use under a K.G.B. application.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the late disclosure.

The Court also held that a witness's failure of memory, which prevents complete cross-examination, is a factor going to the weight of the prior inconsistent statement rather than its admissibility.

The appellant employer provided an income replacement insurance policy that terminated benefits for mentally disabled employees after two years unless they were institutionalized, while physically disabled employees received benefits until age 65 regardless of institutionalization.

The respondent, who became mentally disabled, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurance plan discriminated on the basis of mental disability contrary to s. 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, as the true purpose of the plan was to insure against the income-related consequences of disability generally, making the distinction between mental and physical disabilities discriminatory.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of welfare fraud after selling real property without informing social assistance authorities.

The trial judge found her conduct did not create a risk of deprivation exceeding $1,000 and that she honestly believed her circumstances had not changed to affect her entitlement, negating mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding the trial judge made no error of law.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

During deliberations, the jury announced an impasse.

The trial judge exhorted the jury to reach a verdict, referencing the public expense of a new trial, the inconvenience to participants, and suggesting the minority reconsider the majority's views.

The jury returned a guilty verdict 15 minutes later.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the exhortation introduced irrelevant, coercive factors that interfered with the jury's right to deliberate freely.

The respondent was imprisoned for failing to pay fines under the Quebec Highway Safety Code.

He sought authorization to bring a class action against the government for damages, alleging the sentencing provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court denied authorization, finding no serious colour of right, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an action for damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter generally cannot be coupled with a declaratory action for invalidity under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Superior Court judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny authorization.

The appellants crossed the Canada-U.S. border at an uncontrolled point of entry.

An RCMP officer received a radio report of the crossing and stopped the appellants' truck a few kilometres away.

The officer questioned the driver, who admitted to carrying whisky, and a subsequent search revealed liquor.

The appellants were charged with customs offences.

The trial judge acquitted them, finding the stop arbitrary and excluding the evidence under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the stop authorized by the Customs Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a contravention of the Customs Act based on the totality of the circumstances, and therefore the detention and search did not violate the Charter.

The appellant challenged a securities disciplinary process on the basis that the appointment of the hearing panel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the tribunal's practice was only one of many factors in assessing whether the necessary degree of independence existed.

In the self-regulatory context, the circumstances were materially different from the authority relied on by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a Mohawk, was charged with fishing without a licence in Lake St. Francis, contrary to the Quebec Fishery Regulations.

He argued that he was exercising an aboriginal right to fish for food protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title, and that the appellant had demonstrated an aboriginal right to fish for food in the area.

The Court found that this right had not been extinguished, and that the regulatory scheme, which subjected the right to unstructured ministerial discretion, constituted an unjustified infringement.

The appellants, members of the Algonquin people, were convicted of entering a controlled harvest zone without paying a motor vehicle access fee, and one appellant was convicted of fishing without a licence.

They argued they were exercising an aboriginal right to fish.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title and that the failure of the French colonial regime to legally recognize such rights did not extinguish them.

The Court found the appellants had an aboriginal right to fish for food in the zone.

The federal fishing licence requirement was found to be an unjustified infringement of this right, but the provincial motor vehicle access fee was held to be a valid user fee that did not infringe the right.

The individual appellant, a 50 percent shareholder in the corporate appellant autobody shop, was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the respondents.

The individual appellant could no longer perform heavy physical labour, causing the corporate appellant to hire replacement labour and suffer a loss of profits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the corporate appellant could not recover its pure economic loss, as it was a contractual relational economic loss that lacked sufficient proximity and foreseeability.

However, the Court restored the trial judge's award of $290,000 to the individual appellant for loss of earning capacity, finding no palpable and overriding error to justify the Court of Appeal's interference.

The respondent logging company obtained an interim injunction prohibiting named defendants and 'John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown' from blocking roads to its logging operations.

The appellants, environmental protesters, appealed the order, arguing that courts lack jurisdiction to grant injunctions against non-parties or the general public in private civil litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts of inherent jurisdiction have the power to make orders binding on non-parties to protect private rights from mass obstruction.

Non-parties who violate such orders with notice may be found guilty of contempt of court.

The appellant, an elected member of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly, was convicted of an illegal practice under the Elections Act for inducing a minor to vote.

Consequently, he was expelled from the legislature and disqualified from seeking electoral office for five years pursuant to s. 119(c) of the Act.

He challenged the constitutionality of these provisions under ss. 3 and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the disqualification infringed the right to be qualified for membership in a legislative assembly under s. 3, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

The Court also found no violation of s. 12.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a food processing company, was convicted of purchasing and selling salmon caught by members of the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht bands under Indian food fish licences, contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

The appellant argued that the regulations infringed the aboriginal rights of the bands to sell fish, protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the exchange of fish for money or other goods was not an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht prior to contact with Europeans.

Therefore, no aboriginal right to sell fish was established, and the regulations were validly applied.

The accused was convicted of narcotics offences based on the viva voce evidence of a co-accused who had been arrested during an illegal search of a marijuana-growing operation.

The co-accused had pleaded guilty and volunteered to testify.

The Court of Appeal excluded the testimony under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the connection between the illegal search and the witness's decision to testify was too remote.

The Court distinguished between the discovery of inanimate objects and live witness testimony, noting that the witness's voluntary decision to cooperate severed the temporal and causal links to the Charter breach.

The employer changed the work schedule of its employees, resulting in the loss of Sunday rest days.

The union filed a grievance and sought an interim injunction from the British Columbia Supreme Court to postpone the implementation of the new schedule pending arbitration.

The employer appealed the court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts retain a residual discretionary power to grant interlocutory relief where no adequate alternative remedy exists under the statutory labour scheme, even in the absence of a cause of action claiming final relief.

The appellant appealed his convictions on numerous weapons charges, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the conduct of a search was not unreasonable under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and threatening, arguing that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly charged the jury with respect to the special need for caution in considering identification evidence and sufficiently alerted the jury to the weaknesses in the evidence.