Sopinka

The Crown appealed a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from a conviction for second degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The appellants, members of the Squamish Indian Band, were charged with contravening the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations for net fishing on the Squamish River adjacent to their reserve.

They argued that a band by-law, passed pursuant to s. 81(1)(o) of the Indian Act, authorized their fishing and superseded the federal regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the fishery was not part of the reserve, the ad medium filum aquae presumption did not apply to navigable rivers to extend the reserve boundary, and the phrase 'on the reserve' in the Indian Act meant strictly within the reserve boundaries.

Consequently, the band by-law did not apply extra-territorially to the river, and the convictions were upheld.

The appellant, a Wet'suwet'en Indian, was charged with fishing without a licence contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

He argued that the licensing scheme infringed his aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that a band by-law applied to the river.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the river was not part of the reserve, so the band by-law did not apply.

While the mere requirement of a licence did not infringe the appellant's aboriginal rights, the mandatory conditions attached to the licence did constitute a prima facie infringement that the government failed to justify.

Because the unconstitutional conditions were integral to the licence and not severable, the licence itself was invalid.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant's acquittal was restored.

A public school teacher publicly made anti-Semitic statements during his off-duty time.

A Jewish parent filed a human rights complaint alleging the school board discriminated by failing to discipline the teacher, thereby condoning his views and creating a poisoned educational environment.

The human rights board of inquiry found discrimination and ordered the school board to place the teacher on leave, appoint him to a non-teaching position if available, or terminate his employment, and to terminate him immediately if he published anti-Semitic materials in the future.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the school board discriminated and that the order to remove the teacher from his teaching position infringed his freedom of expression and religion but was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

However, the permanent ban on publishing was not minimally impairing and was severed.

Three status Indians under Treaty No. 8 were convicted of hunting offences under the Alberta Wildlife Act after shooting moose on privately owned lands.

They appealed, arguing the Act infringed their treaty right to hunt for food.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA) modified the treaty right, preserving the right to hunt for food on unoccupied Crown lands and other lands to which Indians have a right of access.

The Court found that Indians have a right of access to privately owned lands only if they are not put to a visible use incompatible with hunting.

Two appellants were hunting on visibly used land, so their convictions were upheld.

The third appellant was hunting on unoccupied land, so the licensing requirement constituted a prima facie infringement of his treaty right.

A new trial was ordered to determine if the infringement could be justified under the Sparrow test.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in applying the Debot factors to find that the police officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The judgments below were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to purchase the sexual services of a person under 18.

During the investigation, he made a statement to police without being informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge excluded the statement from the Crown's case in chief under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

When the accused testified at trial, the Crown sought to use the excluded statement to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

The trial judge refused, and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the proposed use of the statement for impeachment was not a material change of circumstances that warranted reconsidering the initial ruling that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant fatally shot his live-in companion during an argument and was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, he claimed the shooting was an accident, but the jury rejected this defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence of intoxication vitiating intent, which could have reduced the conviction to manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the strict capacity test from Beard no longer governs, the evidence of intoxication in this case was insufficient to permit a reasonable inference that the appellant did not in fact foresee the consequences of his actions.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following a severe beating of the victim.

At trial, the judge found that the appellants had the capacity to form the intent to commit murder despite evidence of their intoxication.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misdirected himself by focusing on the capacity to form intent rather than whether the appellants possessed the actual specific intent to kill, applying the newly established framework from R. v. Robinson.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, finding that the trial judge erred in excluding portions of the defence evidence.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of a minor, arguing that the trial judgment was unreasonable due to a lack of corroborative evidence and issues with witness credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, agreeing with the majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the trial judgment was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender, and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the court below, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Minister of Justice appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the surrender of a fugitive to a foreign state.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge in the court below.

The Court held that the Minister's surrender decision did not infringe the fugitive's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and restored the Superior Court's decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus.

The appellant appealed his convictions for cultivating and possessing marijuana, arguing that evidence should be excluded due to a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming a breach of s. 8 occurred, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the trial judge misdirected the jury on consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal had previously found no substantial wrong and upheld the verdict.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Dubin C.J. at the Court of Appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that had ordered a new trial for the accused on charges of inciting hatred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal regarding the trial judge's handling of jury requests.

The Court also reaffirmed its previous ruling that the reverse onus in s. 319(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, while infringing s. 11(d) of the Charter, is justified under s. 1.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The appellant employer and respondent union were engaged in a bitter, 18-month strike marked by violence.

The employer refused to negotiate a grievance arbitration process for employees dismissed for picket-line violence, making it a precondition to further bargaining.

The Canada Labour Relations Board found this constituted a failure to bargain in good faith and ordered the employer to table its previous tentative agreement, with four unresolved issues subject to binding mediation.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's decision, finding that the determination of bad faith bargaining was within the Board's specialized jurisdiction and not patently unreasonable.

The Court also held that the Board's broad remedial order under s. 99(2) of the Canada Labour Code was rationally connected to the breach and necessary to counteract the consequences of the employer's intransigence, thus not exceeding its jurisdiction.

The bankrupt transferred funds from his non-exempt RRSPs into an exempt RRIF (a life insurance annuity) and designated his wife as beneficiary prior to declaring bankruptcy.

The appellant creditor sought to attach the RRIF, arguing the transfer was a void settlement under s. 91 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the designation of a beneficiary is a settlement that is void against the trustee under s. 91, the RRIF remains exempt from the claims of creditors under s. 67(1)(b) of the Act and provincial insurance legislation.

The two provisions operate at different stages of bankruptcy: s. 91 brings property into the trustee's possession, while s. 67(1)(b) prevents the trustee from dividing exempt property among creditors.

The appellant borrowed $1 million to purchase shares, later transferring them to a holding company in a section 85 rollover transaction for replacement shares with a fair market value of $1,000.

The Minister reassessed the appellant, limiting his interest deduction under section 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act to the interest on $1,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the interest deduction is based on the amount of the original loan, not the value of the replacement property, provided the entire proceeds of disposition are reinvested in an eligible use property.