Shaun Nakatsuru

The accused was charged with four serious offences: conspiracy to commit weapons trafficking, offer to transfer a firearm, conspiracy to commit extortion, and conspiracy to commit robbery.

The Crown's case relied almost entirely on intercepted private communications from Project RX between the accused and an alleged co-conspirator.

The accused testified in his own defence and made significant admissions regarding discussions about illegal activities.

The court found that while the accused engaged in discussions about these crimes, the Crown failed to prove the essential element of agreement required for conspiracy charges.

The court distinguished between mere discussion and negotiation versus a true meeting of the minds.

The court also applied the mutuality of object doctrine to the weapons trafficking charge, finding that a simple buy-sell agreement does not constitute a conspiracy to traffic firearms.

The accused was acquitted on all four counts.

The accused was charged with assault on a peace officer, escape from lawful custody, and failing to comply with recognizance.

The court considered a Charter application to exclude fingerprint evidence obtained during a traffic stop that evolved into an investigative detention.

The accused argued violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the initial detention and pat-down search were justified, the officer's attempt to handcuff the accused without reasonable grounds constituted an arbitrary detention in violation of section 9.

However, the fingerprint evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor and technical, the impact on the accused's liberty interest was minimal, and the evidence was vital to the truth-finding process.

This is a trial decision on a voir dire regarding the admissibility of expert evidence in a prosecution under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a stage collapse at a concert venue that resulted in a fatality.

The defendant Live Nation Canada Inc. challenged the qualification of two Ministry of Labour engineers to provide expert opinion evidence on the cause of the stage collapse.

The court found that both experts met the threshold requirement to testify, applying the test established in White Burgess v. Abbott and Haliburton Co. The court rejected arguments that the experts' involvement in the investigation, their employment relationship with the Ministry of Labour, and their participation in interviews with defendants undermined their independence and impartiality.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant issued under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude evidence of a marijuana grow operation discovered at 277 Birkdale Road in Toronto.

The warrant was based on a Crime Stoppers tip, hydro consumption records showing a cyclical pattern consistent with indoor cultivation, police observations including a snow-free roof patch, and information that the applicant previously held a medical marijuana production license.

The court dismissed the application, finding that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the warrant's issuance based on the totality of the circumstances, particularly the distinctive cyclical hydro consumption pattern corroborated by police investigation.

The appellant appealed convictions for drive under suspension and drive with a licence issued in another jurisdiction while under suspension in Ontario.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the originating process was defective or that there was no power to amend the tickets; and second, that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court dismissed both grounds, finding that the appellant had been properly arraigned on a Part III information after attorning to jurisdiction, and that the Justice of the Peace's findings were reasonable based on the evidence.

The appellant had been previously convicted of impaired driving, failed to pay the fine, and subsequently drove while suspended, claiming he had been misled by a Ministry of Transportation counter clerk.

The Crown appealed acquittals on two Highway Traffic offences entered by a Justice of the Peace.

The trial judge erred in granting a non-suit motion brought by the defence before the prosecution had completed its case.

A non-suit motion must be brought only after the prosecution has formally closed its case, allowing the Crown to present its full evidence before the defence challenges it.

Additionally, the police officer had provided some evidence of identification by testifying that the defendant was the driver, which was sufficient to pass the non-suit threshold.

The appeal was allowed and the parties agreed to a substituted conviction to a lesser offence rather than a retrial.

An Aboriginal offender with a lengthy history of property crimes and breaches of court orders was sentenced in the Gladue court.

The offender had demonstrated a pattern of minor criminality spanning several months, committing thefts from businesses and repeatedly breaching probation and bail conditions.

Despite previous sentences including jail time, probation, and conditional sentences, the offender showed no signs of rehabilitation or deterrence.

The court imposed a 14-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, emphasizing the application of Gladue principles while balancing public protection and the need for accountability.

The offender subsequently breached the conditional sentence but later voluntarily requested incarceration to access mental health treatment at a specialized facility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a commercial motor vehicle with an insecure load contrary to section 111(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the Crown was required to prove that the vehicle was a commercial motor vehicle weighing over 4,500 kilograms.

The court held that the offence under section 111(2) does not require proof that the vehicle is commercial; rather, the commercial motor vehicle designation is a penalty provision under section 111(5).

The court further held that the weight threshold is an exception or exemption that must be proven by the defendant under section 47(3) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with failing to stop for a red light under the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, an individual claiming to represent the appellant appeared and made frivolous submissions regarding writs and the appellant's status as a "corporate construct." The Justice of the Peace disqualified this individual from acting as an agent, then treated the appellant's failure to respond to a page as a failure to appear and convicted him in his absence.

The appeal court found that the appellant was denied procedural fairness and ordered a new trial, holding that when an agent is disqualified, the trial should be adjourned to allow the appellant to appear personally or through another agent.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that her right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court examined the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, prejudice, and societal interests.

The court found that the operative institutional delay of approximately 8 months and 21 days fell within the Morin guidelines, that actual prejudice to the applicant was minor, and that the applicant failed to discharge the onus of proving a violation.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge made comments at the outset suggesting the defendant should resolve the matter by guilty plea, and later curtailed cross-examination of the police officer regarding the laser speed detection device.

The appellate court found a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the trial judge's remarks and conduct, which suggested predisposition to conviction and concern about court docket management rather than fair adjudication.

Although the trial judge erred in refusing to admit the laser device manual as an exhibit, this ground of appeal was dismissed as the cross-examination could have proceeded without the exhibit.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered, as ordering a new trial would not serve the ends of justice given the minor nature of the offence, the flawed process, and the burden on court resources.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs.

The Crown sought to call a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) to give opinion evidence regarding the accused's impairment.

The court ruled that no formal voir dire under the Mohan test is required for DRE evidence.

The officer's opinion is admissible under s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code provided the officer is certified as required by regulation.

The opinion must be limited to the prescribed evaluation tests and procedures, or alternatively may be admitted as lay opinion evidence under the compendious statement of facts exception.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) alleging that her right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that the operative delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court attributed delay to various factors including intake, defence preparation, defence unavailability, and neutral delay inherent to the trial process.

Finding no actual or inferred prejudice and that societal interests did not weigh heavily, the court dismissed the application.

The defendant pleaded guilty to misrepresenting her identity to claim refugee status under section 127(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a three-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the joint submission, finding it contrary to the public interest, and instead imposed a suspended sentence with six months probation and conditions including reporting to a probation officer, counselling, and 20 hours of community service.

The court distinguished the case from similar immigration fraud cases based on the defendant's status as a Canadian citizen, her age and immaturity at the time of the offence, her genuine remorse, and the absence of economic loss to the public.

During a preliminary inquiry into charges including attempted murder, the Crown sought to introduce a written report from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police indicating that a DNA specimen from a jacket found at the crime scene matched the accused Russell Bullock on the National DNA Data Bank.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the report, arguing inadequate notice was given and that the evidence was not credible or trustworthy.

The court ruled the report admissible under section 540(7) of the Criminal Code, finding that the legislative framework governing the National DNA Databank and the statutory duties of the RCMP Commissioner provided sufficient credibility and trustworthiness to the evidence at the preliminary inquiry stage.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving, driving with a BAC over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while disqualified.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, finding that while there was some Crown delay in disclosure (approximately 1 month 25 days), the total operative delay was only 15 days beyond the Morin guidelines.

The court found no actual or inferred prejudice to the applicant and concluded that societal interests in having the serious charges tried on their merits outweighed the Charter violation claim.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

At sentencing, the Crown sought the mandatory minimum punishment of one year imprisonment pursuant to section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, based on the accused's prior trafficking conviction.

The defence objected on the grounds that inadequate notice was given, arguing that written notice was required rather than the verbal notice provided at a pre-trial.

The court rejected this argument and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.

The accused was charged with indecent act in public and mischief to private property for masturbating on a Toronto subway car on July 7, 2012.

Identity was a key issue at trial.

The Crown sought to introduce lay recognition opinion evidence from two police officers who arrested the accused on July 13, 2012, and who testified that they recognized the suspect in a photograph taken by the complainant as the accused.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of this evidence and ruled it inadmissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding 57 km/hr in a posted 40 km/hr zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: the reliability of the officer's speed measurement and the proper posting of speed limit signs in accordance with regulations.

The appellant also raised a common law defence of necessity at trial, which was rejected and not appealed.

The court upheld the conviction, finding that the Justice of the Peace properly applied the presumption of regularity to the posting of signs and that the signs were in substantial compliance with regulations.

The court applied the principle from R. v. Priest that strict compliance with sign specifications is not required if substantial compliance is demonstrated and the signs serve their intended purpose.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, assault with a weapon, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and flight from police arising from a road rage incident.

The Crown sought 18 months custody (12 months concurrent for the primary offences and 6 months consecutive for flight from police).

The defence sought 6 to 9 months.

The court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine whether the accused intentionally struck the victim with his vehicle.

The court found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to strike the victim, though he recklessly drove toward the van and used it as a weapon to threaten.

The court imposed 9 months total custody (7 months concurrent for the primary offences and 2 months consecutive for flight from police), followed by 18 months probation, a 3-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and a section 109 weapons prohibition order.