Shaun Nakatsuru

Estate trustees sought repayment of an equitable interest in a property purchased by the defendants with funds advanced by the deceased, claiming a resulting trust.

The defendants argued the claim was statute-barred and that the funds were resolved by a share distribution.

Both parties sought summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the action, finding the claim for a resulting trust in real property was statute-barred by the 10-year limitation period under section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, with the right to action accruing at the time the trust was created or, at the latest, when the property was sold.

The respondents brought a motion to convert an application into an action, arguing that the application involved complex factual disputes, serious allegations of misconduct, and required pleadings and discoveries.

The applicants opposed, seeking a determination on the merits of the application.

The court found that the application suffered from ambiguity, lacked clarity regarding the relief sought, and involved material facts in dispute, including allegations of negligence and perjury.

The court granted the motion, converting the application into an action to allow for proper pleadings and discovery, emphasizing that procedural fairness required a full evidentiary record.

The plaintiff, a commercial landlord, moved for summary judgment against the defendants for breach of a lease agreement.

While the breach was undisputed, the live issues concerned damages and the defendants' counterclaim.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, particularly regarding the plaintiff's mitigation efforts and the defendants' counterclaim for premises maintenance issues.

The court determined that these issues involved conflicting evidence and credibility assessments that could not be fairly resolved on the motion record alone, necessitating *viva voce* evidence at trial.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims of breach of contract, interference with contractual relations, breach of fidelity, and fiduciary duty brought by their former employer, the plaintiff.

The plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment and leave to amend its statement of claim.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that there was no restrictive covenant, no fiduciary relationship between the former employee and the plaintiff, and no misuse of confidential information (as client names and contact details stored on a personal phone were not deemed confidential).

Furthermore, the court determined that the former employee's communication with clients did not constitute solicitation.

The plaintiff's attempt to amend its claim to include a failure to give reasonable notice was rejected as statute-barred.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's claims were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking payment of a $300,000 judgment from either Gore Mutual Insurance Company or Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, following a motor vehicle accident.

The central issue was whether Gore's insured (the driver and owner) breached their insurance policy's cooperation clause.

The court found that the policy owner, Ms. Bass, did not breach her obligation to cooperate, despite Gore's difficulties in locating her, attributing these issues to Gore's own errors in communication and search efforts.

Consequently, the court ordered Gore Mutual Insurance Company to pay the judgment.

David Persaud appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had conducted a blended trial and Charter application, granting a s. 10(b) application but dismissing a s. 8 application, and then convicting Persaud.

The appeal court found that the trial judge conflated s. 8 Charter issues with the trial proper, provided insufficient reasons for conviction, and improperly used evidence admissible only for the Charter application to convict on the substantive charge.

The court dismissed grounds related to unreasonable verdict and a new ground raised on appeal.

Ultimately, the conviction could not stand due to significant flaws in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an order for a new trial on the impaired driving charge.

The applicant, Kevin Morris, sought a stay of proceedings for firearm offences, alleging violations of his Charter rights under ss. 7, 9, and 10.

The court found no s. 9 violation regarding arbitrary detention or arrest, as police had reasonable grounds to arrest after the applicant fled.

A s. 7 violation was found due to D.C. Moorcroft's careless driving that struck the applicant, but not for excessive force by P.C. Faduck during the arrest.

A s. 10(b) violation occurred when P.C. Keefer questioned the applicant after he asserted his right to counsel, though the delay in accessing counsel was deemed reasonable due to medical needs.

Despite the Charter violations, the court dismissed the stay application, finding the violations were not egregious enough to warrant a stay, and a sentence reduction would be a more appropriate remedy.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter right.

The total delay was approximately 54.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling under R. v. Jordan.

The court found certain periods of defence delay and identified three discrete exceptional circumstances related to the preliminary inquiry: a last-minute election for a preliminary inquiry, the illness of the assigned justice, and underestimation of the preliminary inquiry's length.

The court also determined the case was particularly complex due to voluminous disclosure, numerous witnesses, and multiple co-accused, and that the Crown had a concrete plan to manage this complexity.

Additionally, the transitional exceptional circumstance was applied, finding that the institutional delay was acceptable under the previous Morin framework and that the Crown reasonably relied on the prior state of the law.

No actual prejudice to the accused was found.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

A provincial court judge presiding over a lengthy trial involving charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a stage collapse at a Radiohead concert in Toronto was appointed to the Superior Court of Justice mid-trial.

The Crown argued the judge retained jurisdiction to complete the trial under the Provincial Offences Act, while the defence argued the appointment resulted in loss of jurisdiction.

The court found that the judge had lost jurisdiction to continue the trial, as the Provincial Offences Act lacks a provision comparable to section 669.3 of the Criminal Code permitting continuing jurisdiction upon appointment to another court.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Michael Majeed, challenged the validity of a search warrant under s. 8 of the Charter, arguing that evidence obtained from his home should be excluded due to an unreasonable search and seizure.

The court conducted a *Garofoli* review, assessing whether the affiant subverted the pre-authorization process through deliberate non-disclosure, bad faith, or fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court found that while the affiant's disclosures were not full or fair and showed a lack of care, they did not meet the high threshold of deliberate deception or subversion required to invalidate the warrant.

The s. 8 application was dismissed.

The applicant, Michael Majeed, facing fraud charges, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of a search warrant Information to Obtain (ITO).

The defence challenged the search warrant's validity under s. 8 of the Charter, alleging the affiant misled the issuing justice.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court applied the Garofoli test for leave to cross-examine and considered the residual discretion to set aside a warrant for subversion of the pre-authorization process.

The court found a realistic likelihood that cross-examination in three specific areas (source of physical description, source of fraudulent funds, and frequency of sightings) would assist in determining whether the affiant deliberately misled or acted with significant carelessness.

Leave to cross-examine was granted.

The Crown sought to detain an Indigenous accused facing serious charges of gang sexual assault pending trial.

The accused had spent months in pretrial custody and had no surety available due to his difficult personal history, including childhood in state care and lack of family connections.

His co-accused, facing similar charges with comparable evidence, had been released on bail with family support.

The court released the accused on his own recognizance with Toronto Bail Program supervision and conditions, finding that detention was not necessary for public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The decision emphasizes the disproportionate incarceration of Indigenous persons and the importance of considering systemic factors and unique circumstances in bail determinations for Indigenous accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a traffic stop at approximately 5:05 a.m. on April 12, 2015.

Police received a radio call about a possible impaired driver who appeared to be asleep at the wheel.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer observed signs of impairment and arrested the accused.

A Charter application was brought challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the seizure of breath samples.

The trial judge found reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest existed based on the totality of circumstances.

However, the trial judge found a violation of section 8 of the Charter because the officer gave an approved screening device demand rather than the required approved instrument demand.

Despite this violation, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving, and the over 80 charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of heroin and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

During sentencing, it was discovered that the accused had been held in custody unlawfully for approximately one month despite having an existing bail order.

The Crown had indicated an intention to bring a section 524 application to review the bail, but never proceeded with it.

When new charges were stayed, the accused should have been released on his existing recognizance but was not.

The court found a violation of the accused's section 9 Charter right to be free from arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

Instead, the court imposed a suspended sentence with probation as an alternative remedy.

Defendants charged with offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act brought applications alleging violations of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, determining that while the net delay of approximately 44 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice trials, the Crown established exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

The court found the case was particularly complex due to the nature of the evidence and issues involved, and that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied to cases in the system when Jordan was released.

The applications were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for speeding, failing to surrender his motor vehicle permit, and failing to surrender his insurance card.

The court allowed the appeal regarding the permit and insurance card convictions, finding that the appellant had surrendered the documents within a reasonable time and had exercised due diligence.

The court classified these offences as strict liability offences and found that the appellant's conduct met the due diligence defence, particularly considering his concerns about personal safety during the police interaction.

The appeal regarding the speeding conviction was dismissed as the evidence supported the conviction.

The accused was charged with trafficking in heroin, possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all applications.

The section 11(b) delay application was dismissed on the basis that while the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months, exceptional circumstances justified a deduction of approximately 4 months, bringing the net delay to 17 months.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The sections 8 and 7 applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and search were dismissed based on findings that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on information provided by a witness, and that the search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

The court rejected the accused's abuse of process application.

The appellant appealed a conviction for pass off roadway contrary to the Highway Traffic Act, which was entered through default proceedings under the Provincial Offences Act.

The sole ground of appeal was that the certificate of offence was defective because it failed to indicate whether the time of the alleged offence (April 24, 2015, at 4:59) was in the A.M. or P.M., as a box on the certificate intended for this designation was left blank.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the omission was highly technical and could not have caused prejudice, as only two realistic times were possible and the context would make clear which was alleged.

The accused, a 31-year-old First Nations woman, pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term offender supervision order by testing positive for cocaine metabolites.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment.

The court imposed a sentence of 1 day, taking into account the accused's Gladue factors, including her status as a Residential School survivor, her history of trauma, her addiction issues rooted in systemic discrimination against Indigenous peoples, and her rehabilitation potential.

The court emphasized the importance of restraint in sentencing Indigenous offenders and the principle of rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for improper right turn and failing to surrender his driving licence under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant's primary ground of appeal was that he did not receive fair disclosure of the audio portion of the arresting officer's dash-camera recording.

The trial judge found that the Crown had provided full disclosure of the in-car recording on DVD, but the audio had not been recorded due to the officer's failure to activate the audio pack.

The appellant refused to participate in his trial after his requests for the missing audio and an adjournment were denied.

The appeal court upheld the convictions, finding that the appellant received a fair opportunity to make full answer and defence but chose not to participate, and that the trial judge properly handled the disclosure issue and the adjournment request.