Shaun Nakatsuru

The defendant was charged with two counts of being a party to unregistered real estate trading under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

Following the prosecution case, the defence raised the issue of the defendant's capacity to conduct his defence due to alleged mental disorder.

The court was required to determine whether the defendant was, on a balance of probabilities, unable to conduct his defence due to mental disorder.

The court found that the defendant was capable of conducting his defence and ordered the suspended proceeding to continue.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual assault, sexual touching of a person under 16, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

At sentencing, the court imposed a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order for ten years.

The Crown subsequently brought an application to correct the order to life, as mandated by the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding it was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to correct the error.

The court held that while judges may correct errors in expressing their manifest intention, they cannot simply correct manifest errors where the original decision was one of commission rather than omission.

The accused pleaded guilty to counselling to make child pornography and counselling to transmit child pornography.

The Crown and defence reached a joint submission on sentence, but disagreed on whether a weapons prohibition under s. 110 of the Criminal Code was appropriate.

The court imposed a three-year weapons prohibition, finding that offences involving child pornography inherently constitute violence against persons within the meaning of s. 110(1)(a), and that the accused's conduct included implicit threats of sexual violence against children.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in connection with a search warrant executed on an apartment.

The Crown conceded violations of sections 8 and 10(b).

The court found violations of all three sections.

The applicant was charged with unlawful production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for trafficking, and possession of MDMA for trafficking.

The court conducted a section 24(2) analysis and excluded evidence consisting of keys and a lease seized during the search, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant was charged with unlawful production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court found that the applicant had suffered Crown delay of approximately two months, institutional delay of approximately 14 months and 13 days, and actual prejudice to both his liberty and security interests.

The operative delay of 16 months and 13 days exceeded the Morin guidelines by approximately six and a half months.

Balancing all factors, including the seriousness of the offences against the applicant's prejudice and the institutional failures to expedite the proceedings, the court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The appellant appealed her convictions for two offences under the Highway Traffic Act: failing to surrender her insurance card and careless driving.

The parties agreed the insurance card conviction appeal should be dismissed.

The appellant argued the careless driving conviction should be quashed because the certificate of offence contained an incorrect total payable amount ($485 instead of $490), rendering it incomplete and irregular on its face.

The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing between errors in the set fine (which require quashing) and errors in the total payable amount (which do not).

The court held that while the set fine must be accurate to provide effective notice to the defendant, the total payable amount—which includes costs and victim fine surcharge—is not expressly required by statute and errors therein can be corrected by the justice of the peace upon conviction.

The Crown appealed a fine imposed by a justice of the peace for a speeding offence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to speeding 45 kilometres per hour in a 30 kilometre per hour zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice of the peace imposed a reduced set fine of $37.50 instead of the statutory fine of $45.00.

The Crown appealed, arguing the justice of the peace lacked authority to impose a set fine rather than the statutory fine.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to impose the statutory fine of $45.00 plus costs and victim fine surcharge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident on January 15, 2011.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breathalyzer demand, that the accused's right to counsel was properly respected, and that the Crown proved impairment and the blood alcohol readings beyond a reasonable doubt.

The over 80 charge was stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle, with conviction entered on the impaired operation charge.

The accused sought leave to cross-examine the informant who swore the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant for his residence.

The court dismissed the application.

While confirming that a preliminary inquiry justice has jurisdiction to grant leave to cross-examine an informant under the Garofoli test, the court held that the contextual factors at a preliminary inquiry—particularly the protection of confidential informers and concerns about prolixity—warrant a more restrictive approach than at trial.

The court found that the accused failed to meet the threshold for leave in all proposed areas of cross-examination.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption under s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code based on the accused occupying the driver's seat when police arrived.

The court found the presumption was rebutted because the accused was initially outside the vehicle, was directed into the car by police for safety reasons, and the vehicle was inoperable.

The court further found that even without the presumption, the Crown failed to prove care or control beyond a reasonable doubt because the vehicle posed no realistic risk of danger given its location in a remote ditch, its inoperability, and the absence of any attempt by the accused to operate it.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with possession of multiple controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of delay attribution under the Morin framework, examining the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, prejudice, and societal interests.

The court found that the operative delay fell within acceptable guidelines and that no actual prejudice had been demonstrated.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of oxycodone, possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking, and failure to comply with his recognizance.

The accused pleaded guilty to the failure to comply charge but brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of the drugs seized by police.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter and that the search of his person was unreasonable in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on the first two counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a violation of his section 8 rights regarding an unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including aggressive driving, physical indicia of impairment, and the accused's uncooperative behaviour.

The court further found that the breath samples were taken within a reasonably prompt time as required by the Criminal Code.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with the over 80 charge being stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against a four-year-old child.

During a voir dire into the admissibility of a video-recorded police interview with the child complainant, the defence brought a motion for further Crown disclosure seeking police training materials, policy manuals, and information regarding the interviewing officer's training in child interrogation techniques.

The Crown argued these materials were not in its possession and control, and that the defence should pursue a third-party records application.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering disclosure of police-wide standards, policies, and protocols governing child interviews, but refusing disclosure of general training and reference materials.