Sharon Jeethan

During a trial for second-degree murder and aggravated assault, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of utterances made by the defendant to a detective.

The Crown sought to admit the statements, arguing they were voluntary and that any Charter breach should not lead to exclusion.

The defence contended the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and thus should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found the utterances voluntary and no infringement of s. 10(a).

However, it found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to the police's failure to facilitate access to counsel for 4.5 hours after the defendant asserted his right.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore ruled the utterances inadmissible.

The offender, an inmate at a detention centre, was convicted of aggravated assault and weapons offences following a pre-planned attack on another inmate using an edged weapon.

The Crown sought a consecutive sentence of 8 to 9 years, while the defence argued this would violate the totality principle given the offender's existing 10-year sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for violence within correctional facilities but found the Crown's proposed sentence would be crushing.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, with 2.5 years to be served consecutively and 2.5 years concurrently, along with a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of her three‑year‑old child following a prolonged pattern of physical abuse.

Medical evidence established multiple blunt‑force injuries of varying ages, including skull fractures and internal bleeding, culminating in a fatal head injury inflicted while the child was in the accused’s sole care.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that earlier injuries resulted from an accidental bookcase incident and found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had inflicted numerous prior assaults over weeks or months.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in cases involving violence against vulnerable children and abuse of parental trust, the court imposed a substantial penitentiary term.

Immigration consequences were considered but given only modest weight.

During a jury trial for second degree murder arising from the death of a young child, the defence sought to call a kinesiologist as a forensic expert to testify that the child’s fatal injuries could have resulted from a series of accidental falls.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence set out in Mohan and Abbey, the court found the proposed witness was not properly qualified and that the proposed field of "forensic kinesiology" was not a recognized scientific discipline.

The court also found the proposed opinion relied on limited anecdotal factual foundations and reflected an advocacy-driven approach rather than objective expertise.

The probative value of the evidence was minimal and its prejudicial effect significant because it purported to address the ultimate issue of accident versus homicide.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

During a trial for second-degree murder involving the death of a three-year-old child, the Crown sought to introduce graphic autopsy photographs.

The accused objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and would alienate the jury.

The court ruled the photographs admissible, finding they were necessary to demonstrate the nature and extent of the injuries, which was critical to the Crown's theory that the injuries were inflicted deliberately rather than accidentally.

The court concluded the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder following the death of her three-year-old child from blunt force head trauma, applied for a directed verdict on both second-degree murder and manslaughter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and expert medical testimony indicating the child suffered multiple inflicted injuries of varying ages while in the exclusive care of the accused.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude the accused committed an unlawful act causing death, and that she had the requisite intent for murder.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

Media organizations applied to vary a publication ban in a second degree murder prosecution involving the death of a child.

The Crown and defence sought to maintain broader anonymity for the accused, the deceased, and family members, while the applicants proposed a narrower ban limited to the surviving siblings.

Applying the Dagenais-Mentuck framework, the court held the evidentiary record did not establish that a broader ban was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice.

The ban was varied to prohibit only publication of the names of the surviving children.

The accused applied to rejoin his trial with that of a co-accused after previously consenting to severance.

The court considered the discretion under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code and the general presumption that co-accused should be tried together.

However, the court held that the interests of justice favoured maintaining the severance given the age of the case, the readiness of the parties and witnesses for trial, and the absence of demonstrable prejudice to the accused.

The court also noted that the defence sought to reverse a prior tactical decision and that the co-accused’s testimony could still be obtained as a witness.

The application to rejoin the trials was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on similar fact evidence from two other convenience store robberies.

He also argued the trial judge erred in sentencing by failing to enhance pre-sentence credit for lack of earned remission, using probation breaches to infer resistance to rehabilitation, and imposing a consecutive sentence for breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis of the signature features of the robberies or in the exercise of his sentencing discretion.