Superior Court of Justice

The self-represented plaintiff brought a $200 million action against the provincial Crown, the Secretary of the Cabinet, a hospital, and various physicians, alleging medical malpractice and abuse of power.

The Crown requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim against the government defendants lacked any legal basis or material facts, and the claim against the other defendants was an abuse of process as it duplicated an existing action.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants operated a wedding venue on their property without obtaining building permits or proper zoning.

The Township issued an Unsafe Order and subsequently Orders Prohibiting Occupancy under the Building Code Act, citing the lack of a building permit.

The appellants appealed the Orders Prohibiting Occupancy.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal and rescinded the orders, finding that the absence of a building permit does not, on its own, constitute an 'unsafe' condition under s. 15.9(2) of the Act, and the Township committed a palpable and overriding error by using the orders for a collateral purpose.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with a probation order following an altercation in a residential building.

The Crown relied on CCTV footage to prove the accused's identity and participation in the assault alongside a co-accused who stabbed the complainant with a screwdriver.

The court found that even if the accused was the man in the video, the circumstantial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the complainant's injuries or aided and abetted the co-accused.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The defendants, in turn, brought a third-party claim against the buyers of their own home, who had also failed to close, causing the defendants to default on their purchase from the plaintiff.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court found the defendants liable to the plaintiff for the loss in property value and carrying costs.

The court further held that the third-party buyers were liable to the defendants for those same damages, as it was reasonably foreseeable that their failure to close would cause the defendants to default on their subsequent purchase.

The court declined to grant relief from forfeiture for the third-party buyers' deposit and refused to stay enforcement of the judgment pending a fourth-party action against a real estate agent.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced an action against the Attorney General of Ontario seeking damages for alleged wrongs committed by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The plaintiff had previously brought a similar action directly against the HRTO, which was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendant requested that the current action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the action was an attempt to relitigate the previously dismissed claim and constituted a collateral attack on the HRTO's decision.

Furthermore, the Crown is immune from liability for acts of a judicial nature.

The action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

In an estates dispute over jointly held property alleged to be held on resulting trust for the deceased's estate, the moving party sought summary judgment dismissing the trust claim as statute-barred and extending that ruling to a related passing of accounts application.

The court held that summary judgment is not available in an application, applying the Court of Appeal's direction that Rule 20 is restricted to actions.

The court further declined to convert the matter into a partial hearing of substantive issues, finding that piecemeal adjudication would be disproportionate given the overlap between the trust claim, the estate trustee's accounting obligations, and potential breach of duty issues.

The limitation issue was left for determination at a joint hearing of both applications, and costs were deferred.

The plaintiff developer brought a motion without notice for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the defendant purchaser's existing home.

The parties had entered into a pre-construction agreement of purchase and sale for a condominium, which included a clause granting the plaintiff an equitable interest in the defendant's existing home as security in the event of default.

The court found that the plaintiff raised a triable issue regarding an interest in land based on the contractual terms and the defendant's alleged failure to pay the deposit and complete occupancy closing.

The motion for leave to issue a CPL was granted.

The moving party, a respondent in the underlying application, brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to vary a consent order that had approved a share purchase agreement, alleging newly discovered fraud by the responding party.

The moving party sought to have the share sale proceeds paid into court as security for claims in related actions, or alternatively, a Mareva injunction restraining the responding party from dealing with the proceeds.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 59.06(2) cannot be used to amend the terms of a contract approved by a consent order.

The court also denied the Mareva injunction, finding no evidence to support a reasonable inference of a real risk that the responding party would dissipate or remove the assets to avoid a judgment.

The applicant sought a declaration under s. 31 of the Marriage Act that her 2005 religious marriage to the deceased was valid, despite the marriage licence never being registered.

The deceased and the applicant lived together as husband and wife for 18 years before the deceased, struggling with severe addiction, purportedly married the respondent in a civil ceremony in 2023.

The court found that the 2005 marriage was solemnized in good faith, the parties intended to comply with the Act, neither was disqualified, and they cohabited as a married couple.

The application was granted, the 2005 marriage was deemed valid, and the 2023 marriage to the respondent was declared void ab initio and annulled.

The plaintiff suffered a severe wrist injury after falling on unsecured wooden steps at the defendant's property.

The defendant's pleadings were struck, resulting in a default judgment on liability.

The court found the defendant 100% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for failing to ensure the premises were reasonably safe.

The plaintiff was awarded $280,000 in damages, plus an OHIP subrogation claim and substantial indemnity costs, due to the permanent and debilitating nature of her injury.

The offender pled guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (108 grams).

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence reduced to 8 years for harsh pre-trial conditions, while the defence sought 4-5 years less time served plus additional credit for lockdowns and triple bunking.

The court determined the appropriate global sentence was 7 years, reflecting the mid-level commercial quantity and the offender's prior record, balanced against his guilty plea and rehabilitative potential.

After applying 29 months of standard pre-sentence custody credit and an additional 12 months of Duncan/Marshall credit for severe lockdown and triple-bunking conditions, the net sentence imposed was 43 months.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in writing for court approval of a $10,000 settlement of the minor plaintiff's derivative Family Law Act claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court approved the settlement amount as fair and reasonable.

However, the court declined the request to pay the settlement funds directly to the minor's parent and litigation guardian, interpreting recent amendments to Rule 7.09 and the Children's Law Reform Act to maintain the presumption of payment into court absent evidence justifying an alternative arrangement.

The court also refused to sign the submitted draft judgment because it improperly incorporated unsigned minutes of settlement, bound a non-party insurer, and included overly broad release language.

The applicant father brought a second motion seeking the recusal of the case management judge.

The father argued that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed because he had commenced a civil action against the judge personally and because the judge had initiated a vexatious litigant proceeding against him under Rule 2.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a litigant cannot create a conflict of interest or engage in judge shopping simply by suing the presiding judge, and that initiating a vexatious litigant proceeding is a judicial function that does not rebut the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The self-represented accused was charged with multiple gun trafficking and related offences following an undercover police operation.

Over eight transactions, the accused sold 20 handguns and rifles, along with magazines and ammunition, to an undercover officer for over $100,000.

The court found the undercover officer's testimony credible and corroborated by surveillance, messages, and physical evidence.

The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly sold illegal firearms and possessed proceeds of crime.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Ottawa Hospital requested leave at a case conference to bring a summary judgment motion to be heard alongside the University's scheduled anti-SLAPP and Rule 21 motions.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the request.

The court denied the hospital's request, finding that the proposed summary judgment motion was a 'step in the proceeding' and was therefore barred by the non-discretionary automatic stay under section 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also found that hearing the motions together would not improve efficiency and that the hospital would not suffer prejudice by waiting.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to properly name the defendants, who were previously identified as John Doe and James Doe, while seeking to use initials to protect their identities.

The defendants included a young person dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and his father.

The court held that section 110 of the YCJA applies to civil proceedings, prohibiting the publication of information that would identify a young person dealt with under the Act.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings using initials for the young person and his father, and ordered that the unredacted motion materials be sealed from the public record.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after severely beating a sex worker and stealing her car.

The Crown sought 3.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence order.

The court found a conditional sentence order unavailable due to the severity of the offence, which warranted a penitentiary term.

After weighing the offender's significant rehabilitation efforts and lack of prior record against the viciousness of the unprovoked attack, the court imposed a sentence of 34.5 months imprisonment, accounting for pre-sentence custody credit.

Following a judgment awarding the applicants $1,628,666.66 in damages, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of their Rule 49 offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, as the judgment exceeded their offer.

The respondents argued the claimed amounts were disproportionate.

The court found the applicants' claimed costs reasonable given the stakes and the respondents' vigorous defence, awarding $226,920.44 in fees plus HST and $2,411.56 in disbursements.

The applicant, TD Waterhouse, brought a motion seeking to appoint an implementation monitor to oversee the repatriation of its data from the respondent, EIS, and to amend a prior mandatory injunction.

TD Waterhouse alleged that EIS breached their agreement by commingling backup data and failing to report an attempted data breach.

The court found a technical breach regarding the commingled backup CDs but no breach regarding the thwarted cyberattack.

The court declined to appoint an implementation monitor or reduce the applicant's costs for data repatriation, finding such remedies unwarranted.

However, the court amended the injunction to require the respondent to continue providing transition services until 12 months after the data repatriation is complete.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a unanimous shareholders agreement for a family-owned steel distribution business.

The applicant argued the agreement required the board of directors to consist of the registered holders of voting shares, while the respondent argued the board was to be elected by a resolution of those shareholders.

Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the court found the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the provision, read in context with the surrounding circumstances, supported the respondent's interpretation.

The application was dismissed.