Court File and Parties
CITATION: McIntosh v. Kim, 2026 ONSC 2779
COURT FILE NO.: FS-20-00016188-0001
DATE: 20260515
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ADAN McINTOSH, Applicant
AND:
ANITA KIM, Respondent
BEFORE: JUSTICE K. SAH
COUNSEL: Both parties, self-represented
HEARD: April 23, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Overview
[1] In his notice of motion dated April 15, 2026, Mr. McIntosh (“the father”), seeks an order that I be recused from any matters that he may be involved in.
[2] This is the second time the father has brought a motion for my recusal.
[3] In his notice of motion dated November 4, 2025, a similar request was made. That motion was argued on January 16, 2026. On February 9, 2026, I released my endorsement dismissing the father's motion and my decision applied equally to six other court files to which he is a party.
[4] As set out below, I also dismiss this motion for my recusal.
Issues
[5] The issue to be determined is as follows:
Has the father met his onus of establishing that uninformed person, viewing the matter realistically, and practically, and having thought the matter through, think it is more likely than not that I, whether unconsciously or consciously, would not decide the matter fairly?
Legal Principles
[6] I repeat and rely on the legal principles to set out in my February 9, 2026 endorsement, 2026 ONSC 775, at paragraphs 5 to 15.
[7] Additional legal principles are set out in my analysis below.
Analysis
[8] The father now raises new two issues he claims should result in my recusal.
[9] First, he claims the lawsuit he initiated against me personally makes it impossible for me to maintain any impartiality.
[10] Second, he claims that because, on the court’s own initiative, I initiated a Form 2.2C - Registrar's Notice Proposing Consideration of a Vexatious Litigant Order pursuant to Rule 2.2.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”), there is a real likelihood of bias on my part.
[11] Each one of these concerns will be addressed below.
The Father’s Civil Action Against Me Personally
[12] The father commenced an action under court file CV-26-6115 against me personally.
[13] In his claim, the father seeks nominal damages in the amount of one dollar and an order that I be granted a leave of absence for a period of six months.
[14] The father alleges that I acted without jurisdiction and deliberately acted in a manner to cause him and his children harm. He claims relief for emotional and mental stress.
[15] A Statement of Defence has been issued on my behalf, denying all allegations of wrongdoing as set out in the father's Statement of Claim and requesting that the action be dismissed.
[16] The father submits that because he named me as a defendant in his action, there is an impression that a relationship exists between him and me, outside my adjudicating duties.
[17] The father further submits that our alleged outside relationship created through the lawsuit he commenced is more than enough for an informed person to conclude the matter cannot be adjudicated fairly, and a conflict of interest exists.
[18] Lastly, the father claimed that I cannot determine any matters involving him because a financial relationship exists between us and, as such, I cannot be impartial.
[19] Impartiality is a foundational principle of the Canadian Judicial Council’s (CJC) Ethical Principles for Judges. Judges must be impartial, and must appear to be impartial, in the performance of their duties. The Ethical Principles, at p. 38 require that:
a. Judges ensure that their conduct at all times maintains and enhances confidence in their impartiality and that of the judiciary;
b. Judges avoid conduct which could reasonably cause others to question their impartiality; and
c. Judges conduct their affairs to avoid real or apparent conflicts of interest between their private interests and their judicial duties.
[20] The common law test for reasonable apprehension of bias is set out on the previous recusal motion endorsement and is further summarized below.
[21] Judicial impartiality is presumed. Accordingly, any inquiry into whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arises faces a high burden, which is inherently contextual and fact-specific: Yukon Francophone School Board v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 SCR 282, at para. 26, citing R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484.
[22] There is a “strong presumption” of judicial impartiality: Bailey v. Barbour, 2012 ONCA 325, 110 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 19.
[23] The fact that the father has commenced a civil action against me does not rebut the strong presumption of judicial impartiality. The evidence presented on this motion is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed objectively.
[24] The father has led no evidence to corroborate his allegations that I would be biased. His action against me does not create a conflict of interest. I was assigned by Regional Senior Justice Firestone to hear all motions in the parties’ proceedings. Judicial continuity, particularly in family law matters, is recognized as promoting both efficiency and fairness: Aldahleh v. Zayed, 2023 ONSC 6553, at para. 29.
[25] I am tasked with hearing all motions. The father’s disagreement with my decisions does not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. Nor does the mere fact that he has sued me automatically create extraneous influence or prevent me from exercising my judicial function independently.
[26] There is no evidence on this motion demonstrating that I have expressed views evidencing bias toward the father. He has failed to establish any actual, potential, or perceived compromise in my ability to act impartially.
[27] My judicial function requires me to uphold the orders of the Regional Senior Justice Firestone, to safeguard the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary, and to continue to hear motions involving these parties as directed.
[28] The father, through his civil action, attempted to create a pecuniary relationship. The father sent an offer to settle offering to the withdraw civil action and pay me $10,000 in costs, but only if I do not recuse myself in this matter. He claims it is impossible for me to maintain any partiality when I have the opportunity to gain $10,000 based on my decision. The offer to settle was rejected and no pecuniary relationship as been established.
[29] His decision to sue me is not sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias from the perspective of a reasonable, informed person.
[30] A reasonable person, understanding the judicial process, the nature of judging, and a judge’s jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, would not conclude that being sued automatically impairs a judge’s impartiality. Allowing such a tactic would amount to impermissible judge shopping. His request for recusal on this basis constitutes an abuse of process and undermines the administration of justice.
[31] This conclusion is consistent with the jurisprudence. In Sapusak v. 9706151 Canada, 2023 ONSC 5122, the court rejected a recusal motion based on allegations of bias and a complaint to the CJC, noting that if litigants could disqualify judges simply by commencing proceedings against them, it would encourage improper litigation tactics, create scheduling chaos, and bring the administration of justice into disrepute: at para. 49.
[32] Similarly, in Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1544, the court held that a complaint to the CJC does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, observing that otherwise a litigant could engage in judge shopping by filing complaints until they obtained a judge of their choosing: at paras. 42-43.
[33] The father’s initiation of an action against me does not equate to cogent or compelling evidence upon which a reasonably informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, could conclude that I lack objectivity toward the father or the issues in this litigation.
Vexatious Litigant Proceeding under Rule 2.2
[34] The 2024 amendments to the Rules now empower the court, on its own initiative, to commence a vexatious litigant proceeding. I have initiated such a proceeding against the father, and it remains ongoing.
[35] The father argues that under Rule 2.2, I have the authority to stay any ongoing proceeding, including the civil action he commenced against me personally. A Form 2.2F – Order Following Initial Review Under Rule 2.2 was issued. I did not stay any proceedings, and the civil action can still be determined in the ordinary course by another judge.
[36] The father further submits that the notice I issued under Rule 2.2 might result in the use of my “personal evidence.” He does not elaborate on what personal evidence he is referring to, nor does he identify any basis upon which such evidence would be required or relevant.
[37] The fact I initiated a vexatious litigant proceeding against the father does not rebut the strong presumption of judicial impartiality. The evidence presented on this motion is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed objectively.
[38] The father has not led evidence to corroborate his allegations that I would be biased based on the Rule 2.2 proceeding.
[39] The initiation of the Rule 2.2 proceeding does not create a conflict of interest. It is a separate proceeding intended to protect judicial resources and prevent misuse of the court process.
[40] The Rule 2.2 proceeding does not require me to act in a personal capacity, nor does it result in me advancing a private interest. Rather, I am performing a judicial function assigned by the Rules.
[41] The procedural and systematic process set out in the Rules does not give rise to an actual, potential, or perceived conflict of interest. A reasonable and informed person would understand that a judge acting under Rule 2.2 is fulfilling the court’s established authority to control vexatious litigation, rather than pursuing any personal interest in the matter.
[42] For the reasons above, the father’s second motion to seek my recusal is dismissed.
JUSTICE K. SAH
Date: May 15, 2026

