Superior Court of Justice

In NOI proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the debtors sought approval of interim financing, a forbearance arrangement, a CRO engagement, an employee retention plan, court-ordered charges, a stalking horse SISP, administrative consolidation, a stay extension, and limited sealing relief.

The court held that the proposed restructuring steps were appropriate and supported by the proposal trustee, the secured lender, and the evidentiary record, and that the debtors required the DIP facility and sale process to preserve operations and maximize stakeholder recoveries.

The court also approved a customer accommodation agreement and related intellectual property transfer as value-maximizing transactions outside the ordinary course.

Applying the statutory extension criteria and the Sherman Estate sealing framework, the court extended the stay and sealed confidential employee compensation information.

In a CCAA restructuring involving a remote iron ore mining operation facing an immediate cash crisis before a narrow seasonal shipping window, the applicants sought approval of interim debtor-in-possession financing and a super-priority charge.

Competing secured creditor groups proposed rival DIP facilities, but the court approved the Crown lender’s DIP for the interim bridge period only, emphasizing the urgent need for operational stability, the monitor’s support, and the limited prejudice given the de novo rehearing scheduled within weeks.

The court added consultation, consent, and information protections to preserve a level playing field for the competing DIP proponents before the full return motion.

The stay of proceedings was extended, authority was granted to pay certain critical pre-filing suppliers with the monitor’s consent, and the sealing request was adjourned.

The offender was convicted of unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order following a shootout in a café.

The court dismissed a Charter application alleging that correctional staff improperly disseminated the offender's disclosure to other inmates, finding insufficient evidence.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 7 years imprisonment, but deducted 18 months to account for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan credit).

After applying Summers credit for time served, the remaining sentence was 23 months.

The moving party creditor sought to lift the stay of proceedings under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue two civil actions against the bankrupt.

The creditor alleged the bankrupt owed fiduciary obligations, that the loaned funds were subject to a constructive trust, and that the bankrupt made fraudulent misrepresentations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the civil actions had little prospect of success as the debt was a standard unsecured loan governed by a promissory note.

The court also found that lifting the stay would prejudice other unsecured creditors and delay the administration of the estate.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the self-represented defendant's statement of defence for failing to pay two prior costs awards totaling $22,250.

The defendant claimed impecuniosity, citing health issues and limited income.

The court found the defendant's evidence of impecuniosity insufficient and inconsistent with his social media posts depicting a lavish lifestyle, including frequent casino visits and dining out.

The court ordered the defendant to pay the outstanding costs within 60 days, failing which the plaintiff may move without notice to strike the defence.

In a family law motion to change, both parties sought amendments to a prior final order governing parenting, child support, therapy, and section 7 expenses.

The court refused retroactive changes to the parties' support incomes because the earlier order had adopted a detailed three-year income-imputation plan, but it fixed prospective incomes at $90,000 for the applicant and $30,000 for the respondent.

The court replaced reciprocal support obligations with a single set-off payment, fixed arrears after set-off, amended the parenting provisions to preserve a week-about schedule for all three children while deferring added flexibility for the two younger children until age 16, and corrected pickup/drop-off language.

The court also revised the therapy provisions, added terms to permit direct claims against the applicant's benefit plan, awarded $4,500 for unpaid section 7 contributions, and replaced the prior section 7 payment mechanism with monthly payments.

The applicant, a minority shareholder and former director, brought applications alleging oppression and constructive dismissal against the majority shareholder and the respondent corporations.

The court found the constructive dismissal claim was statute-barred and lacked merit, as the change in compensation method did not constitute a substantial breach of an essential term.

While most oppression claims regarding shareholder loans and business decisions were dismissed under the business judgment rule, the court found the majority shareholder unfairly disregarded the applicant's rights by failing to provide timely access to financial information.

The court declined to appoint a receiver-manager, instead ordering the sale of the corporation's primary real estate asset and an accounting of the proceeds.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought to abandon his summary judgment motion following extensive new documentary disclosure by the defendants, and instead proceed to trial.

The plaintiff also indicated an intention to amend his statement of claim and file a jury notice.

The defendants argued that the motion judge should remain seized as the trial judge or at least determine the costs of the abandoned motion.

The court held that the summary judgment motion would not proceed, directed further examinations on the newly produced documents, and deferred the issues of costs and whether the motion judge should be seized as the trial judge to a later formal motion.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action on behalf of over 350,000 Ontario residents whose personal health information was allegedly accessed without authorization from the COVaxON system by an employee of the defendant.

The parties consented to certification for settlement purposes and a $600,000 all-inclusive settlement fund.

Due to the infeasibility of individual distributions, the net settlement funds were to be distributed cy-près to MediaSmarts, a digital literacy charity.

The court certified the class action for settlement purposes, approved the settlement as fair and reasonable, and approved class counsel's fees of 25% of the gross recovery.

Sentencing for a youthful offender who pleaded guilty to possessing approximately 609 grams of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, and breaching three weapons prohibition orders.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as paramount, finding the offender to be at the high end of a mid-level fentanyl trafficking hierarchy and emphasizing the dangerous combination of large quantities of lethal drugs and a loaded handgun.

After imposing consecutive sentences totalling 14.5 years, the court reduced the sentence to 12 years under the totality principle, then further mitigated the sentence by six months for harsh pre-sentence detention conditions.

After Summers credit for 428 days of pre-sentence custody, the net sentence was 117 months in a federal penitentiary, together with lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA, and forfeiture orders.

The applicants, an anti-abortion organization and its youth coordinator, sought to display graphic images of fetuses during a protest on Parliament Hill.

Officers from the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS) prohibited the display, citing rules against obscene or hateful messages.

The applicants brought an application arguing this violated their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the PPS's operational decision breached the applicants' Charter rights and was not justified under s. 1, as the specific prohibition on graphic images was not yet published at the time.

The court granted a declaration that the rights were infringed but declined to strike down the rules governing Parliament Hill, as the rule-making committee was not a party to the proceeding.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from an alleged touching during a private appointment with a 12-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued, among other things, that the trial judge misapprehended the timing and content of text messages that were central to the defence theory that the complainant had a motive to fabricate in order to avoid further treatment.

The appeal court held that the trial judge repeatedly and materially misstated that the complainant disclosed the sexual touching to her friend while still at the appointment, when the actual allegation was disclosed later while driving home.

Because that error was essential to the rejection of the motive-to-lie theory and therefore central to the conviction, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of physical and sexual violence in the complainant's apartment, the court admitted the complainant's police statement and preliminary inquiry testimony after she failed to complete cross-examination because of a mental health crisis.

The court found the complainant's evidence sufficient, together with corroborative circumstantial evidence from responding officers and scene photographs, to prove that the accused assaulted the complainant, removed her underclothes in a sexual context without consent, and confined her in the apartment.

However, the court was left with a reasonable doubt about alleged vaginal and oral penetration, choking, and death threats, in part because of leading police questioning, evidentiary frailties, and alternative reasonable inferences.

The accused was acquitted of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault via choking, and uttering a threat, but convicted of sexual assault, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm as a lesser included offence.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial, the complainant completed examination-in-chief but refused to complete cross-examination, later left the jurisdictional area, and subsequently attempted suicide after a mental health crisis associated with testifying.

The Crown sought admission of the complainant’s preliminary inquiry evidence, her videotaped police statement, her immediate post-incident statements to housing constables, and the accused’s later utterances captured on police body-worn camera.

Applying the Hart framework for incomplete cross-examination, the principled hearsay approach, and s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, the court found the complainant was too ill to continue, that necessity and threshold reliability were established, and that admitting the prior evidence was a meaningful ameliorative measure preserving trial fairness.

The court also admitted the complainant’s spontaneous statements as res gestae and admitted the accused’s utterances as constituting the actus reus of the uttering threat charge.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion to restore his parenting time after the respondent mother withheld the children, alleging the paternal grandmother attacked their son with scissors and a knife.

The mother sought supervised parenting time.

The court found insufficient evidence to substantiate the mother's allegations of the attack and noted the mother improperly exercised self-help remedies by withholding the children.

The court ordered the restoration of the father's parenting time in accordance with the parties' Minutes of Settlement, with temporary safeguards including that the children not be left in the sole care of the grandmother, and granted the father make-up parenting time.

The self-represented plaintiff sought to set aside an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a farm property, arguing it was executed after the irrevocability date had expired or, alternatively, under duress.

The court found the plaintiff's testimony unreliable and concluded that the irrevocability date had been validly extended and initialled before she signed the counteroffer.

The court also dismissed the duress claim, finding that while the plaintiff faced economic and time pressure due to a court order to sell the property, the pressure was lawful and did not deprive her of her free will.

The action was dismissed.

Tricor and Premier entered into a three-year agreement in 2014 for Premier to administer automotive warranty and service contracts.

In 2018, Tricor informed Premier of its intention to transition to a new service platform, Allegiance, without providing 12 months' notice of termination, as Tricor believed the agreement was non-exclusive.

Premier treated this as an anticipatory repudiation, withheld commissions owed to Tricor, and abruptly shut down the service portal.

The court found that the agreement was not exclusive and that Premier breached the contract by withdrawing services without proper notice.

Premier's claims for breach of contract and proprietary rights were dismissed.

Tricor was awarded $1,265,274 in damages for business losses and withheld commissions.

In the context of CCAA proceedings, the Monitor sought directions on the interpretation of a litigation funding agreement and the approved Plan of Arrangement regarding the distribution of funds released from security for costs.

The successful defendants in related litigation argued the funds should be paid to them to satisfy outstanding costs awards.

The court rejected this interpretation, finding the plain wording of the agreements required the funds to be treated as Subsequent Cash on Hand for the benefit of Secured Noteholders.

The court also declined to approve the Monitor's historical activities, noting the expiry of limitation periods rendered such approval unnecessary, but granted the Monitor's discharge.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle accident case, the non-settling defendant was found 100% liable for the plaintiff's damages.

The non-settling defendant sought to deduct the $150,000 settlement paid by the settling defendant under a Pierringer agreement from the jury's damages award to prevent double recovery.

The court held that while the settlement amount must be deducted to prevent overcompensation, the plaintiff is entitled to first deduct her full indemnity costs of pursuing the settling defendant from the settlement funds, ensuring she is not undercompensated.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and possessing a loaded firearm after police stopped the rental vehicle in which he was a passenger.

The officers claimed they stopped the vehicle to check licensing and insurance under the Highway Traffic Act.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The court found that the officers concocted a reason to approach the vehicle and that the decision to detain was informed by the race of the occupants.

The court concluded that the stop was an unlawful pretext and a serious violation of section 9 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the accused was acquitted.