Spencer Jones

The defendants were successful on their motions for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action.

They sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the plaintiff made unsubstantiated allegations of intentional wrongdoing.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct did not rise to the egregious level required for substantial indemnity costs and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the costs should be reduced because there were two defendants, noting the plaintiff chose to sue both.

The court awarded $32,000 to one defendant and $30,000 to the other.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim alleging professional negligence in his representation of the plaintiff dentist during a regulatory discipline proceeding.

The defendant argued the claim was incapable of proof due to the absolute prohibition on admitting discipline proceeding records in civil actions under s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant required leave to bring the motion due to delay and having taken a fresh step by filing a statement of defence, and denied leave.

The court further noted that even if leave were granted, the claim would not be struck as the plaintiffs might prove their case using other admissible evidence, such as patient records and admissions in the pleadings.

The plaintiff corporation sued its former in-house counsel for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and conspiracy to injure, alleging they improperly withdrew as counsel of record in an ongoing litigation and disparaged the plaintiff's principal in internal emails.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions and dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court held that the defendants did not breach any duties, as one defendant was medically required to withdraw following a stroke, and the other properly resigned due to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to prove any damages or conspiracy.

The plaintiff sued his former solicitor and law firm for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty regarding the preparation of a marriage contract.

The marriage contract was previously set aside in a divorce proceeding because the plaintiff's former spouse did not understand its nature and consequences, largely due to the solicitor's failure to ensure proper independent legal advice and his conflict of interest.

The court found the solicitor breached the standard of care and his fiduciary duties.

The court held that 'but for' the solicitor's negligence, the marriage contract would have been enforceable, and awarded the plaintiff damages for the equalization payment, legal costs, and financing interest incurred.

The applicant mortgagee brought an application for possession of a mortgaged property, judgment for the outstanding debt, and leave to issue a writ of possession following the respondent mortgagor's default.

The court held that a mortgagee may proceed by way of application rather than an action under Rule 64 where there are no material facts in dispute.

The court granted judgment for the debt and an order for possession, but denied leave to issue a writ of possession because the applicant failed to prove it had given notice to all persons in actual possession of the property as required by Rule 60.10(2).

The plaintiffs sued the defendant lawyer and accountant for professional negligence, alleging they failed to protect the plaintiffs' ownership interest in a corporation.

The defendants brought third-party claims against the corporation and its principals.

The defendants and third parties moved for summary judgment to stay the action, relying on a general release previously signed by the plaintiffs in a settlement with the corporation.

The court granted the motions, finding that although the defendants were not parties to the release, allowing the action to proceed would trigger third-party claims against the released parties, violating the no-claims-over provision.

The main action and third-party proceedings were permanently stayed as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff law firm moved for leave nunc pro tunc to commence an action for unpaid fees after the defendant clients had already initiated an assessment of the accounts under the Solicitors Act.

The plaintiff argued the case was not ripe for assessment because the clients disputed the retainer.

The court denied leave, emphasizing the legislative policy that fee disputes should be diverted to the speedy and inexpensive assessment process, and held that pandemic-related delays in the Assessment Office do not justify bypassing this statutory framework.