Ryder Gilliland

The defendants brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as an impermissible SLAPP suit.

The plaintiff, a former municipal councillor, sued the defendants over a newspaper column that suggested he had a conflict of interest regarding a municipal development project.

The court found that while the defamation claim had substantial merit and the defences of fair comment and responsible communication lacked a real prospect of success, the plaintiff failed to prove that the harm he suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the political expression.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

Following the approval of a Plan of Arrangement under the Canada Business Corporations Act, the successful applicant sought costs against the objecting creditors.

The objectors argued the applicant was disentitled to costs for failing to request them initially and that the quantum sought was excessive.

The court rejected the disentitlement argument, finding the objectors had notice that costs would be addressed in writing.

The court awarded $100,000 in costs, reducing the requested amount for proportionality, and ordered the costs payable jointly and severally by the objectors as they had pursued a common strategy.

The applicant mining company sought a final order approving a Plan of Arrangement under the Canada Business Corporations Act to sever ties with the Kyrgyz Republic following the state's seizure of its flagship mine.

Two unsecured judgment creditors of the Republic objected, seeking to enforce their arbitral awards against the Republic's shares in the applicant or garnish payments under the Arrangement.

The court approved the Arrangement, finding it met the statutory requirements, had a valid business purpose, and was fair and reasonable.

The court held the creditors lacked standing to oppose the Arrangement and that garnishment was inappropriate as it would result in double jeopardy.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought two defamation actions against several defendants regarding statements made on social media and at a town council meeting.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1).

The court found that the expressions related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to satisfy the merits-based hurdle, as the defendants had valid defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed the public interest hurdle, as she could not demonstrate that the harm she suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions.

Both actions were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation action, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $61,000.

The court considered section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which presumes no costs are awarded to a responding party unless appropriate in the circumstances.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest and the motion was not frivolous or brought for a strategic purpose.

Consequently, the plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption, and no costs were ordered.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, sued the defendant over articles and comments posted on WeChat regarding the defendant's dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's services during a 2014 home purchase.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that her claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defence.

Furthermore, the court held that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a sealing order and publication ban regarding her family law file following the highly public suicide of the respondent father, who died in a car explosion outside the courthouse.

Several media outlets intervened to oppose a broad ban.

The court applied the Dagenais-Mentuck-Sierra Club test, balancing the open court principle against the risk of harm to the children.

The court denied a complete sealing order but granted a tailored publication ban protecting the identities and personal information of the children, the mother, and extended family, and ordered the file to be initialized.

The defendant, acting as the Integrity Commissioner for the Township of Scugog, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss an action commenced by the plaintiff, a municipal councillor.

The action related to reports prepared by the defendant investigating a complaint against the plaintiff.

The court found that the reports were expressions relating to a matter of public interest.

Because the plaintiff failed to file materials or establish that the claim had substantial merit, that there were no valid defences, or that the public interest in continuing the proceeding outweighed the public interest in the expression, the court dismissed the action and awarded costs on a full indemnity basis.

Two competing class actions were commenced following a cyberattack and privacy breach at Casino Rama.

The plaintiffs in the Kaplan Action and the plaintiff in the Harman Action both sought carriage of the proceeding.

The court applied the seven non-exhaustive factors for determining carriage, noting that the Kaplan Action counsel had more class action experience, a better class definition, and a more refined theory of the case.

The Harman Action counsel argued that their action would proceed faster in the Oshawa court, providing speedier access to justice.

The court rejected the speed argument as determinative on the facts and granted carriage to the Kaplan Action, staying the Harman Action.

The plaintiff invested in a limited partnership that purchased shares of a private corporation.

The investment failed, and the plaintiff sued the promoters, a minority shareholder who sold his shares, and the valuators who appraised the shares.

The minority shareholder and the valuators brought motions for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions, finding no evidence that the minority shareholder participated in any conspiracy or breached securities laws.

The court also found that the valuators owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not rely on the valuation, and any claim for negligent valuation belonged to the limited partnership under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The defendants brought a motion under r. 24.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a libel action for delay.

The action arose from allegedly defamatory statements published during a 1997 municipal election campaign.

Although the action was commenced in 1998, little progress occurred beyond limited discoveries in 1998, and no steps were taken after the Court of Appeal dismissed a related appeal in 2005.

The court held that the plaintiffs were responsible for inordinate and inexcusable delay and that a presumption of prejudice arose, reinforced by the death of witnesses and the unavailability of key participants.

The plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and the action was dismissed for delay; the defendant’s counterclaim was also dismissed by consent.