Alan Merskey

The appellant challenged a bankruptcy order and a related post-judgment Mareva order granted at the request of a court-appointed monitor holding a substantial judgment debt.

The court held the bankruptcy order was appealable as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and treated the Mareva order as a final order appealable under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act in the circumstances.

On the merits, the court found no reversible legal or discretionary error in rejecting objections to the monitor’s authority, rejecting allegations of collateral purpose, and refusing dismissal or adjournment under ss. 43(7) and 43(10) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court also upheld continuation of the Mareva relief as complementary to bankruptcy administration and dismissed the appeal with agreed costs.

The appellant challenged orders in bankruptcy proceedings including standing rulings, estate consolidation, and treatment of approved claims.

The court found no right of appeal under s. 193(a) or (c) of the BIA, declined leave under s. 193(e), and held the appellant had not timely invoked available statutory claim-challenge mechanisms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, including the directing mind of two family-owned construction companies, participated in a false invoicing scheme that drained tens of millions of dollars from the debtor companies prior to insolvency.

The trustee in bankruptcy and monitor applied under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to recover the false invoice payments as transfers at undervalue on the basis that the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors.

The Supreme Court held that insolvency is not a prerequisite to establishing fraudulent intent under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B), and that the directing mind's fraudulent intent was properly attributed to the debtor corporations.

The Court confirmed that the corporate attribution doctrine must be applied purposively, contextually, and pragmatically, and that the fraud and no benefit exceptions to corporate attribution do not apply in the context of s. 96 of the BIA because applying them would undermine the creditor protection purpose of that provision.

Appeal dismissed.

The respondent sought costs on a partial indemnity scale after successfully defending an application to wind up the company.

The applicant argued for no costs or reduced costs, citing the respondent's failure to upload a Bill of Costs in advance and claiming the fees were excessive.

The court found the respondent's claimed costs to be fair and reasonable, noting the application's importance and moderate complexity, and that the applicant's own costs were comparable.

The court fixed costs payable by the applicant to the respondent in the amount of $142,890.01.

In the receivership of the Stateview entities, Tarion Warranty Corporation brought a motion seeking declaratory relief on behalf of purchasers who had paid deposits for pre-construction homes.

Tarion argued that the deposits were subject to an express or constructive trust and sought a remedial constructive trust to elevate the purchasers' priority.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the purchasers had contractually subordinated their interests to secured lenders.

While an express trust existed for contracts with early termination provisions, the funds were not segregated.

The court declined to impose a remedial constructive trust, as doing so would improperly upset the priority scheme under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

In a CCAA proceeding, the court considered supplementary written submissions regarding the appropriateness of differential consideration offered to unsecured creditors in the proposed Plan.

The court accepted the applicants' submission that the fairness of the differential consideration, which involves providing shares to Term Loan Lenders and cash to General Unsecured Creditors, should be determined at the Sanction Hearing rather than at the Meetings Order stage, given the low threshold for a Meetings Order and the presence of conflicting expert reports.

The Applicants sought an Authorization Order and Meetings Order under the CCAA.

The primary issues in dispute concerned the voting rights and classification of Litigation Claimants, which included uncertified U.S. class actions, a certified Ontario class action, and Texas mass tort claims.

The court held that the Litigation Claimants are creditors entitled to vote, but restricted them to one vote per action to prevent them from overriding other stakeholders on numerosity grounds.

The court also ordered summary proceedings to value their claims rather than accepting the Applicants' proposal to value them at $1.

Finally, the court declined to place the Term Loan Lenders in a separate class from other unsecured creditors, finding sufficient commonality of legal interests.

Zurich, the surety for the insolvent general contractor Bondfield, brought a motion to intervene as a party in a construction lien reference.

Zurich sought to participate in a vetting committee for the distribution of the owner's holdback among the timely lien claimants.

The court granted the motion, finding that Zurich had a direct interest in the holdback because it had made significant holdback advances to the major electrical and mechanical trades and had taken partial assignments of their lien rights.

The court ordered the timely claimants to pay Zurich's costs of $30,000.

The Monitor of Bondfield Construction Company Limited and the Trustee in Bankruptcy of Forma-Con Construction brought applications under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to recover tens of millions of dollars transferred out of the debtor companies through a false invoicing scheme and an alleged fund cycling scheme.

The court found that the payments made under the false invoicing scheme were transfers at undervalue made with the intent to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors, and held the participating respondents jointly and severally liable.

The court declined to apply the strict corporate attribution doctrine from Canadian Dredge, instead imputing the directing mind's fraudulent intent to the corporate debtors to fulfill the remedial purpose of s. 96.

The Monitor's claim regarding the fund cycling scheme was dismissed for lack of evidence that the transfers lacked consideration.

In the context of CCAA proceedings for Sears Canada, the Monitor brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement with several former landlords regarding the valuation of their claims.

The landlords disputed the Monitor's calculation of their claims under the agreed Landlord Claim Formula and sought disclosure of the underlying calculations.

The court held that the landlords were entitled to the disclosure and could dispute the calculations, but only using the sources permitted by the formula.

Additionally, the court ordered one landlord, Primaris, to repay $10,000 it had unilaterally withheld for legal fees when returning a mistaken payment.

The plaintiffs and a defendant by counterclaim, Mr. Sauro, brought motions to strike portions of the statement of defence and counterclaim.

The plaintiffs sought to strike paragraphs alleging ulterior motive and financial mismanagement.

The court struck the paragraphs pleading motive as frivolous and vexatious, but retained those pleading causation.

Mr. Sauro sought to strike the counterclaim against him, arguing it was improperly constituted as a counterclaim rather than a third-party claim.

The court agreed, finding Mr. Sauro was not a necessary and proper party to the counterclaim against the plaintiffs, and struck the counterclaim against him.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the defendant law firm, Aylesworth LLP, was vicariously liable for the alleged professional negligence of a solicitor, Welsh.

Welsh had a 'counsel' relationship with Aylesworth but operated his own independent practice in Oakville, through which he provided legal services to the plaintiffs regarding a fraudulent investment scheme.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court held that Aylesworth was not vicariously liable because it did not materially enhance the risk of wrongdoing, had no knowledge or control over Welsh's independent files, and did not hold Welsh out as its agent to the plaintiffs.

The Applicants, operating a network of alternative financial services branches across Canada, sought initial protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) due to a severe liquidity crisis and regulatory challenges.

The court found the Applicants to be insolvent and granted a stay of proceedings to provide breathing space for restructuring.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the matter in Ontario, as the Applicants' chief place of business is located there.

However, the court deferred the request for a DIP financing charge to allow other stakeholders time to respond.

In ongoing Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings, the applicants sought advice and directions regarding the application of a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policy issued by the insurer.

The dispute concerned whether a US$10 million retention applied to defence costs incurred by executives facing claims arising from alleged pre‑filing misconduct.

The applicants argued that the CCAA stay prevented the company from indemnifying the executives, thereby triggering the policy’s non‑indemnifiable loss provisions and eliminating the retention requirement.

The court held that the indemnity obligation was a pre‑filing obligation and that the stay prevented payment, rendering the loss non‑indemnifiable within the meaning of the policy.

As a result, the insurer was required to respond to the executives’ losses without reference to the retention.