Human Rights - SCJ

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion claiming unreasonable delay and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm in relation to his ex-wife.

The total delay from the date of formal charges to the anticipated completion of trial was 1,179 days (approximately 38 months and 22 days).

The Crown failed to disclose critical evidence—video-recorded statements of the complainant and accused taken in Punjabi by police—and their translations for nearly two years.

The court found that the Crown's disclosure failures were unexplained and constituted a serious breach of its disclosure obligations.

After deducting legitimate defence delay periods, the net delay was 949 days (31.2 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The Crown did not establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings.

This sentencing decision addresses whether strip searches of the accused in pre-sentence custody breached section 8 of the Charter and, if not, whether the frequency and manner of those searches should mitigate sentence.

The court finds no Charter breach but considers the conditions as mitigating.

The court also reviews the appropriate sentencing range for serious gun-related offences, ultimately imposing a nine-year sentence, below the Crown’s request, in light of mitigating factors including the accused’s background, lack of record, and harsh pretrial conditions.

The accused, Anden Alexander, applied under section 24(2) of the Charter to exclude firearm evidence, alleging that his initial traffic stop was the result of racial profiling and constituted arbitrary detention.

He further argued that his subsequent arrest for flight from police and the warrantless searches of his person and vehicle were unlawful.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the police officers had valid Highway Traffic Act grounds for the stop based on database searches conducted prior to the detention.

Consequently, the court held that there was no racial profiling or arbitrary detention, the subsequent arrest and searches were lawful, and the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, a tenant, sought declarations that the Town of Milton's Short-Term Rental (STR) by-law was ultra vires and inapplicable to his property, and that its enforcement infringed his Charter rights (Sections 7 and 15).

He also sought substantial monetary damages for emotional distress and lost income from operating an STR.

The court dismissed the application in its entirety, finding no legal or factual basis for claims against the landlords, no conflict between the STR by-law and the Residential Tenancies Act, and no Charter breaches.

The court confirmed the Town's authority to regulate STRs and that the applicant's Airbnb operation constituted an STR business subject to the by-law and fire safety regulations.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion to dismiss Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu's application to the Superior Court, in which he sought to reinstate his law license after it was revoked by the Law Society Tribunal and all subsequent appeals, including to the Supreme Court of Canada, were exhausted.

Chijindu invoked the Superior Court's jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unequal treatment and systemic anti-Black racism.

The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to overturn the Tribunal's revocation or compel the Law Society to reinstate the license, as these remedies are not within the Superior Court's purview, which is limited to appellate or judicial review roles allocated to the Divisional Court.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and Chijindu's application was dismissed with costs awarded to the Law Society.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order restricting a unit owner from harassing the board, contractors, and other residents, and compelling him to allow access to his unit for repairs.

The respondent, who suffers from severe disabilities, requested an adjournment to file evidence and argued his actions were requests for accommodation.

The court denied the adjournment, finding it would cause undue hardship to the applicant.

As the respondent had moved out and agreed to most of the relief sought, the court granted the order, restricting his communications with the corporation to his real estate lawyer for the purpose of selling his unit, finding his previous volume of emails oppressive under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The self-represented plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion for the production of documents from the defendant Police Services Board and the non-party Canadian Human Rights Commission.

The plaintiff alleged a decade-long campaign of police harassment and sought an unredacted occurrence report.

The Superior Court granted an extension of time to appeal and allowed the appeal in part.

The Court found the Master made a palpable and overriding error by requiring the plaintiff to wait until after a pending Rule 21 motion to obtain relevant documents from the Board, noting this unjustly hindered the self-represented litigant.

However, the Court upheld the Master's decision denying production from the CHRC based on privilege, directing the plaintiff to seek production directly from the originating police forces.

The applicants sought a declaration that a liver transplant waiting list rule adopted by Trillium Gift of Life Network, which requires a six-month wait for patients whose liver failure is caused by alcohol consumption, is unconstitutional.

The Province moved to dismiss the application against it, arguing that the application challenges the rule of the delegate, not the delegating legislation or any act of the Minister.

The court agreed, holding that under civil procedure rules, a challenge to the constitutionality of delegated legislation must be brought against the rule-making authority, not Her Majesty the Queen.

The application was dismissed against the Province without costs.

The defendant university brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged wrongful expulsion, assault, and discrimination occurring in and around 2000.

The court dismissed the action, finding it was barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Furthermore, the court noted it lacked jurisdiction over academic disputes and human rights claims, which must be directed to the university's internal processes and the Human Rights Tribunal, respectively.

The defendant Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought $500,000 from the co-defendants for their alleged failure to respond to an application before the HRTO.

The court found that the notice of application lacked clarity, particularity, and a legal basis, failing to plead a cause of action against any of the defendants.

The court concluded the application was frivolous and vexatious and dismissed it.

The applicant, a former police officer, brought an application under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss an application brought by the respondent Police Services Board before the Human Rights Tribunal for Ontario.

The respondent's tribunal application sought to enforce a confidentiality provision in a resignation agreement.

The Superior Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the tribunal proceeding, as the term 'proceeding' in section 137.1(3) is limited to civil proceedings before a court and does not extend to proceedings before administrative tribunals.

The application was dismissed.

This application concerned the legal definition of death and the withdrawal of life support for Shalom Ouanounou, a devout Orthodox Jew, who was declared brain dead but whose family believed he was alive under Jewish law.

The applicant sought an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of life support, rescission of the initial death certificate, and a declaration that the Consent and Capacity Board had jurisdiction over such disputes.

Following Ouanounou's natural death, the court considered whether the application was moot.

Citing a recent decision in *McKitty v. Hayani*, which addressed similar issues, the court found the application moot as there was no longer a live controversy and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the academic issues.

This application, involving a constitutional challenge to parts of the Human Rights Code, was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01(6) as an abuse of process.

The applicant had previously brought a similar constitutional challenge that was dismissed for lack of standing.

The court affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to review the prior decision and that commencing a second proceeding for the same relief constituted an abuse of process.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, challenged the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing it violated their ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights due to inadequate inclusion of on-reserve Aboriginal residents.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Kokopenace, focusing on whether the state made reasonable efforts to provide a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the province, including pilot projects, increased questionnaires, and follow-ups, and concluded that the state had met its constitutional obligation.

The application was dismissed.

Lawyers under investigation by their professional regulator sought constitutional declarations and procedural protections concerning potential disclosure of client confidential information during disciplinary proceedings.

They argued provisions of the governing statute violated ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter by failing to adequately protect solicitor‑client privilege and requested public interest standing to advance broader constitutional relief.

The court held the application was premature because the administrative process before the regulator’s tribunal had not yet been completed.

The tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the constitutional arguments and grant most requested remedies, with courts reviewing the matter only after the administrative process concluded.

The application was dismissed and public interest standing refused.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to s. 753(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which creates a rebuttable presumption that an offender is a dangerous offender where certain predicate convictions exist.

The provision shifts the burden to the offender to disprove dangerous offender criteria on a balance of probabilities once the Crown proves specified prior convictions.

The court held that the reverse onus violates s. 7 of the Charter because it requires an offender to disprove aggravating sentencing factors that traditionally must be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.

Applying the Oakes test, the court found the provision was not rationally connected to the legislative objective and did not minimally impair Charter rights.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

The applicants, who had been found unfit to stand trial, sought habeas corpus with mandamus compelling their transfer from jail to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to orders made under s. 672.46(2) of the Criminal Code.

They argued that continued detention in jail while awaiting a hospital bed violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter and that the responsible authorities had failed to comply with the underlying court orders.

The court held that the detention was lawful because the original orders expressly authorized custody in jail until a hospital bed became reasonably available.

The applicants had also been returned to court as required when no bed was available, meaning the orders had largely been complied with.

As a result, neither habeas corpus nor mandamus was available, and the Charter claims were rejected.

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian citizenship oath under s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, alleging it infringed rights under ss. 2 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by compelling allegiance to the monarch.

After certification of the proposed class proceeding was denied and appeals were dismissed, the plaintiffs sought an order under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue the matter as an individual proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held that although the litigation had progressed slowly, the delay was not intentional, contumelious, or such as to create a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The motion to dismiss for delay was denied and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action individually seeking declaratory relief.

The moving party sought certification of a class action alleging systemic physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of visually impaired students at a provincially operated residential school.

The claim alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the province’s operation and supervision of the institution over several decades.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, including claims predating 1963.

It found an identifiable class, common issues relating to systemic misconduct, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure for resolving the claims.

The proposed representative plaintiff and litigation plan were found adequate, and the action was certified as a class proceeding.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, arguing that his continued detention as an involuntary psychiatric patient following completion of a criminal sentence was unlawful and violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged the practice of “psychiatric gating” and argued that his detention constituted double jeopardy.

The court held that the detention was authorized under the Mental Health Act following lawful execution of a Form 1 and Form 3 and repeated confirmation by the Consent and Capacity Board that the statutory criteria for involuntary admission remained satisfied.

The court also found that civil committal following a completed criminal sentence does not breach Charter protections against arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment.

The proper remedy for disagreement with the board’s decisions was an appeal, not habeas corpus.