Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The applicant, a dangerous offender serving an indeterminate sentence, brought a habeas corpus application alleging that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) failed to provide him with sufficient rehabilitation opportunities, thereby violating his liberty by depriving him of the chance to obtain a lower security level or parole.

He sought unconditional release or, alternatively, transfer to a minimum-security institution.

The court dismissed the application, finding that many of the applicant's arguments challenged the Parole Board's decisions, which fall within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Furthermore, even if CSC programming issues were outside the Parole Board's jurisdiction, the applicant failed to demonstrate a deprivation of residual liberty, as merely losing an opportunity for greater liberty or a transfer to a less restrictive environment does not constitute such a deprivation for habeas corpus purposes.

The court concluded there was no basis to find his detention unlawful.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude cellphone evidence seized during a traffic stop, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a delay in filing a Report to Justice.

The court found that while the traffic stop was legitimate, the seizure of the cellphones by the London police officer was unlawful as he lacked independent reasonable grounds, acting solely on direction from another officer.

However, the court determined that the Charter breach was not serious, the impact on the accused was minimal, and the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence, especially given the seriousness of the murder charge and the subsequent judicial authorization for the search.

This is a sentencing decision for S.D.C., who was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference involving his 7-year-old daughter.

The sexual assault conviction was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's young age, the offender's position of trust, and the victim's vulnerability, and mitigating factors such as the offender's work history and commitment to parenting.

Emphasizing the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen regarding the gravity of child sexual offences, the court rejected the defence's reliance on older precedents.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day of detention, followed by three years of probation, along with various ancillary orders including DNA, firearms prohibition, non-communication, SOIRA registration, and a 5-year s. 161 prohibition.

During a trial for multiple counts of first-degree murder and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application for the disclosure of audio and video recordings made by defence psychiatric experts during their interviews with the accused and his family.

The accused had raised a defence of not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the recordings were protected by litigation privilege, but that this privilege would be waived if the experts were called to testify or if the recordings were used by a witness to refresh their memory.

The court ordered that the recordings must be disclosed to the Crown immediately upon any of the experts being called to testify.

The applicants, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the firearm would be located at the specified addresses.

The court found the ITO lacked any case-specific evidence linking the firearm to the residences, rendering the search a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious state conduct of searching a private residence based on mere speculation outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

During a re-trial for second-degree murder, the accused brothers sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The principal shooter, John, argued he was provoked by the victim's threats.

The court found an air of reality to John's claim, despite evidence of prior threats and preparation.

However, the court ruled that provocation is not available in law to an aider, Mato, as it only applies to the person who committed the murder.

Furthermore, there was no air of reality to provocation for Mato based on the evidence.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought an application for the disclosure of police disciplinary records relating to two officers involved in the investigation.

The court held that the disciplinary file of an officer who would not be called as a Crown witness was not first party disclosure and did not meet the 'likely relevant' threshold for third party records.

For the undercover officer who would testify, the court ordered the police to ascertain whether specific additional disciplinary records existed, but otherwise dismissed the application.

The offender, a youthful first offender with a traumatic background, was convicted of sexual assault after having unprotected intercourse with the complainant based on an unreasonable mistaken belief in consent.

The court found his moral blameworthiness to be lower than typical major sexual assaults, noting his intoxication and immediate cessation upon realizing the complainant's distress.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, the court sentenced the offender to one year of incarceration followed by one year of probation, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with stabbing the victim at a house party.

The victim, who was highly intoxicated, identified the accused as the stabber.

The defence called a third-party suspect who denied involvement.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the defence witness and the party host lacked credibility.

However, the court also found the victim's evidence unreliable due to his extreme intoxication (blood alcohol over 0.240) and inconsistencies in his testimony.

The Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charge was dismissed.

Babak Rajaei-Mehrabadi was convicted by a jury of importing 6.45 kilograms of opium into Canada.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, the significant quantity and value of the opium, and the accused's lack of criminal record, good rehabilitation prospects, and history of depression and anxiety.

The court established a sentencing range of three to seven years for commercial importation of multiple kilograms of opium, distinguishing it from more addictive drugs like heroin or cocaine.

A sentence of four years four months and 22 days imprisonment was imposed, along with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

In a criminal prosecution for robbery, the Crown brought a voir dire application seeking to admit recognition evidence from two civilian witnesses who identified the accused in surveillance video.

The defence conceded the admissibility of one witness but objected to the other on the basis that the probative value was low and the prejudicial effect outweighed it.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test articulated in Berhe and Brown, the court found the witness had sufficient prior familiarity with the accused from frequent interactions as a store customer.

The court concluded the witness was in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused on the video and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice.

The recognition evidence was admitted on a threshold basis, with issues of reliability left for the jury’s assessment of weight.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for failing to provide a breath sample, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The alleged deficiencies were counsel’s abandonment of a Charter s. 11(b) delay application and the failure to call medical expert evidence supporting the defence that anxiety prevented the appellant from providing a breath sample.

Applying the test from R. v. G.D.B., the court held the appellant failed to establish either unreasonable professional conduct or resulting prejudice.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant’s factual account, meaning any expert opinion based on that account would not have altered the outcome.

The court dismissed the appeal and lifted the stay of the driving prohibition.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on firearms offences, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by finding evidence of knowledge and control.

The underlying evidence included a submachine gun and ammunition concealed in a barrel in a bedroom, along with documents bearing the accused’s name and the address of the residence.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the accused on a drug trafficking charge but committed him on the firearms offences.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge properly applied the limited weighing approach required for circumstantial cases and correctly assessed whether the evidence was capable of supporting the Crown’s inferences.

There was some evidence linking the accused to the bedroom and residence sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and control.

The certiorari application was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle by drug under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a toxicology report detecting only a cannabis metabolite (CO‑THC) and not the psychoactive component THC established that he could not have been impaired at the relevant time.

The court held that urine analysis was not determinative and did not necessarily exclude impairment, particularly where other evidence—including erratic driving, police observations, admissions of marijuana use, and a drug recognition expert’s evaluation—supported impairment.

The trial judge had properly weighed the toxicology evidence and was entitled to rely on the drug recognition evaluation and other observations.

No reversible error was found in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking exclusion of heroin, cash, and a digital scale discovered during a warrantless arrest and vehicle search, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Police had acted on a confidential informant’s tip alleging heroin trafficking from a vehicle and conducted two days of surveillance documenting multiple brief stops, short interactions with individuals, and what an officer described as a hand‑to‑hand exchange at a residence associated with a heroin user.

The court assessed the reliability of the tip and the police observations under the totality of the circumstances and the reasonable grounds standard under s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code.

Although individual observations might have been consistent with innocent conduct, the pattern of repeated brief stops and interactions corroborated the tip and provided objectively reasonable grounds for arrest.

Because the arrest was lawful, the search incident to arrest was also lawful and the evidence was admissible.

Application under s. 29 of the Extradition Act seeking committal of the respondent for surrender to the United States to face prosecution for conspiracy to traffic marijuana.

The court considered whether the record of the case established a prima facie case and whether the respondent was the person sought.

The evidence consisted primarily of a certified record including information from a cooperating witness involved in the trafficking organization and corroborating investigative details.

The court found the informant evidence sufficiently reliable at the committal stage and concluded there was evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could convict.

The court also found on a balance of probabilities that the respondent was the individual identified in the record.

Committal for extradition was ordered pending the Minister’s surrender decision.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for refusing to provide a breath sample causing death and bodily harm, two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm, and driving while disqualified after a fatal collision.

The incident resulted in the death of a passenger and serious injuries to a child.

The court reviewed sentencing principles for alcohol‑related driving offences and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, while also considering the offender’s driving history, criminal record, and conduct in attempting to leave the scene.

A global sentence of six years’ imprisonment was imposed.

The court granted enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre‑sentence custody based on the conditions of remand and loss of remission eligibility.

The accused brought a pretrial application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay of approximately 22¾ months between arrest and the start of trial.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Much of the delay was attributed to neutral intake periods, inherent time requirements of the case, and systemic delay within accepted administrative guidelines.

Although the accused remained in pretrial custody for nearly 22 months, the court found the delays adequately explained and largely unavoidable.

Balancing the accused’s liberty interests against the strong societal interest in adjudicating serious firearms and drug trafficking charges, the court held that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was not breached.

The applicant sought to adjourn a family law custody and access trial until after the resolution of related criminal charges, arguing that proceeding with the family trial first would prejudice his criminal defence by requiring disclosure of facts relevant to the allegations.

The respondent opposed the adjournment, asserting that delay would prejudice both her and the parties’ child.

The court considered statutory protections under the Ontario Evidence Act, the Canada Evidence Act, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that protect witnesses from self‑incrimination in subsequent proceedings.

Applying the discretionary principles governing adjournments and emphasizing the best interests of the child, the court held that an indefinite delay pending completion of criminal proceedings would not serve the child’s interests.

The request to adjourn the trial pending the criminal trial was therefore dismissed, though other potential adjournment issues were left to the trial management judge.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to sexual interference involving a child under 16.

The trial judge had imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 14 days' imprisonment and probation.

The appeal court found multiple errors in principle, including misapprehension of a psychiatric report, failure to properly consider aggravating factors, and improper characterization of the offence as being at the low end of seriousness.

Although the appellate court concluded that the sentence was manifestly unfit and that a range of six to twelve months would ordinarily be appropriate, it declined to intervene due to significant delays and the respondent’s completion of the custodial portion of the sentence and substantial compliance with probation.

The Crown appeal was therefore dismissed.