COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-191-00 DATE: 02 17 21

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent Jelena Vlacic for the Crown Respondent

• and –

BRANDON REGO Applicant Brian Crothers for the Applicant

HEARD: February 3, 2021 by Zoom video conference

PUBLICATION IS BANNED PURSUANT TO S. 517(1) AND 520(9) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCE AND ITS DETAILS, IDENTIFYING INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEFENDANT AND DETAILS OF HIS PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

JUDGMENT ON SECTION 520 BAIL REVIEW

D.E HARRIS J.

[1] The Applicant, Brandon Rego, applies under Section 520 of the Criminal Code to review my order dated September 20, 2020 (reasons reported at R v. R., 2020 ONSC 5843) allowing a Crown Section 521 review and detaining the Applicant on the secondary and tertiary grounds. He argues that there has been a material change of circumstances which should ultimately lead to his release on a strict home arrest high surety bail.

[2] I will not go through all the circumstances of the allegations in detail again; they are summarized in the earlier decision. The Applicant is charged with two sets of charges. The first is an attempt murder count for allegedly shooting the victim Mr. Alves with a handgun in the chest outside a bar. Second, the Applicant is also charged with threatening and intimidation of a justice system participant. It is alleged that the Applicant threatened Alves’ cousin, Barreira, that if Avles were to testify against the Applicant, Alves, Barreira and the mother of Barreira’s child would be killed. As a result, Barreira kidnapped Alves and held him for several weeks before the police tactical squad burst in, finding Alves chained to a bed.

[3] This is the fourth review proceeding. While strictly speaking, this review is from my prior review (see R. v. Saracino, (1989), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 185 (Ont. H.C.) at pp.190-191; Justice G. Trotter, “The Law of Bail in Canada”, 3rd ed. (Toronto, Ontario: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2017), at Section 8.4 (b) and (c)), that review examined whether the prior review judge had erred in law in finding a material change. I agreed with the Crown’s argument and, having found legal error, the original detention decision was reinstituted. A full review was not conducted and the merits were not considered.

[4] With this history, in practical terms, since none of the previous three reviews properly engaged the merits, it is best to conceptualize this as a review of the original bail decision. That original decision was of Justice K. Wells given on March 12, 2020 in which she detained the Application on both secondary and tertiary grounds. Justice Wells presided over the Applicant’s attempted murder preliminary hearing in early March 2020. After committing him to trial, she was asked to conduct a bail hearing. The bail hearing, in light of the revocation of bail under Section 524 of the Code on the attempt murder, encompassed both sets of charges. It was a reverse onus by virtue of three separate circumstances: the intimidation and threatening were allegedly committed while on bail for the attempted murder (Section 515(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code); the use of a firearm in the commission of attempted murder (Section 515(6)(a)(vii)) and the use of a firearm while prohibited from being in possession of one (Section 515(6)(a)(viii)).

[5] Justice Wells, as summarized in my last review, did not find major fault with the Applicant’s sureties. Rather, she held,

In my view, the Crown has a very strong case on both the attempted murder charges as well as the witness intimidation and threatening case. Shooting a human being at close range is a pathetic and cowardly act that is intolerable in a civilized society. Tampering with a witness strikes at the heart of our democracy and signals a belief that one is above the law. If convicted, Mr. Rego faces a significant period of incarceration in the penitentiary.

In my view, a well-informed member of the public would completely lose confidence in the administration of justice if Mr. Rego were released on bail. He is therefore detained on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

HAS THERE BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE?

[6] Three circumstances are relied upon as material changes opening up this proceeding to a full review: 1. The case on the intimidating and threatening has weakened as the alleged victim has expressed an unwillingness to testify for “personal reasons” and is unreliable; 2. The Applicant is incarcerated at Maplehurst Correctional Complex in which there is a large outbreak of the Covid-19 virus; and 3. The Applicant’s trial on the attempt murder, like jury trials generally, has been postponed.

[7] I need not comment on this last argument as I agree the first two developments amount to a change of circumstances: R. v. St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328, at paras. 122-138. Justice Doherty recently wrote in R. v. Jaser, 2020 ONCA 606, [2020] O.J. No. 4423, 152 O.R. (3d) 673 (C.A.),

52 … Circumstances relevant to bail are dynamic and can change significantly as a case progresses and time passes: see R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) at para. 92. Bail orders are inherently more interim in nature than final…

53 St. Cloud adopts a flexible, more receptive approach to fresh evidence on bail reviews under s. 520 and s. 521. That approach reflects the inherently interim nature of bail decisions and accommodates Charter principles underlying the presumption of innocence and access to reasonable bail.

[8] Also see R. v. Saracino, [1989] O.J. No. 28, 47 C.C.C. (3d) 185, 6 W.C.B. (2d) 236 (S,C,J.) at para. 17; St. Cloud at para. 130.

[9] Given the profoundly detrimental impact of detention on an accused person, both the deprivation of liberty itself and the fact that it is bound to have negative implications on the ability to mount an effective defence (R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 509 (S.C.C.) at para. 66; R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18, 375 C.C.C. (3d) 293 (S.C.C.) at paras. 22, 27, R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14. (2020), 2020 SCC 14, 388 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at paras. 64, 104; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. R., 2010 SCC 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.) at para. 11; Friedland, Detention before Trial, at p. 172), a high degree of sensitivity to a change in circumstances is appropriate.

[10] A strong Crown case is virtually a lynchpin to the bail decision under both secondary and tertiary grounds. On the tertiary ground, if the prosecution case is weak, the three other statutory conditions in Section 515(10)(c) do not gather much force towards detention: Justice G. Trotter, “The Law of Bail in Canada” (3rd ed, 2017) at 3.4(f)(i). With respect to the impact on the secondary ground, the secondary ground mandates a risk assessment based on the accused’s antecedents and the offences before the court. If evidence of the commission of the subject matter offence is strong, it will lead to a stronger propensity inference. If it is weak, it will generate a weaker propensity inference. Strength of the case is an important factor on the secondary ground.

[11] I will delve into the factual circumstances and legal implications of Alves’ reluctance to testify more fully below. For now it is enough to say that his reluctance weakens the Crown’s case and makes it less likely that the Applicant will be found guilty. I accept as well that there may be reliability and credibility concerns with his evidence. It can no longer be said, as Justice Wells did, that the case on the intimidation is “very strong.” The diminution in the Crown’s case “could have affected” the detention decision and therefore constitutes a material change: St. Cloud at para. 137.

[12] On the second change of circumstances relied upon, the Covid infection plaguing the Maplehurst Correctional Complex where the Applicant is incarcerated is obviously a matter of the utmost concern. In Justice Wells’ bail hearing in March of 2020, the pandemic had just recently reared its head and was not a factor. However, that has now changed. As of February 2, 2021, there were 106 inmate infections and 52 staff infected at Maplehurst. Those numbers are almost certainly an underestimate. A number of unsafe work orders have been issued by the Ministry of Labour for allegedly inadequate safety measures taken against the virus. The prison has not been accepting new inmates for some time now.

[13] I take judicial notice of the deadly threat the virus poses to human life. I also note the increased danger created by the forced congregation of people in jail and the impossibility of full and effective social distancing: R. v. Kazman, 2020 ONCA 251, 386 C.C.C. (3d) 424 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 17-18, leave to appeal to S.C.C. requested, 39077 [2020 CarswellOnt 5554]. In view of those realities, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that there is a material change of circumstance on the tertiary ground.

[14] The Court of Appeal has held that the emergence of Covid does not necessarily lead to a change of circumstances: R. v. J.A., 2020 ONCA 660, [2020] O.J. No. 4760 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. filed 2020 CarswellOnt 19432 at paras. 55-56, 63-85. In that case, Covid was not found to be a material change. But there were no Covid confirmed cases in the institution in which the accused was an inmate. The risk was hypothetical.

[15] In the current situation, the risk is tangible. There are a large number of confirmed cases at the Maplehurst Complex. There is a real threat to the Applicant as an inmate in the institution. That is enough in itself to lead to a material change of circumstances.

[16] In short, at least on the tertiary ground, a reasonable and informed member of the public could not help but be concerned with the health and well-being of inmates and staff in Maplehurst. The knowledge that the virus is rampant in the confines of the institution would naturally alter the attitude of a right-minded member of the public to detention in that facility.

[17] Based on the weakening of the Crown’s case and the Covid crisis at Maplehurst, a material change of circumstances has been shown. This new evidence “could have affected” the detention decision. Of course, at this stage, the material change of circumstances inquiry does not ask whether I, as the reviewing judge, would have actually reached a different conclusion than the decision under review. The material change question is a threshold issue of law. Are the new circumstances responsive to the original reasons for detention and “could” they have made a difference, viewed objectively, in the decision? The answer to this question is yes. What follows is a revisiting of the issue of whether bail should be granted.

SUMMARY OF THE INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS/THREATENING CHARGES

[18] The Applicant was originally released on the attempt murder allegations. The bail was a strict house arrest. The central issue on this review is the subsequent intimidate witness/threatening allegations against the Applicant. The attempt murder allegations serve as background, albeit important background.

[19] To review the evidence with respect to the intimidate witness and threatening allegations, following the attempt murder offence against him, Alves was a reluctant witness from the start. But he had a change of heart over a year subsequent to the shooting. On December 23, 2019, two weeks before the Applicant’s trial, he gave the police a written statement in which he identified the Respondent as the man who shot him on September 22, 2018. Following disclosure of Alves’s statement, the January 6, 2020 trial was converted to a preliminary inquiry. In the days leading up to the January preliminary hearing date, Alves expressed fear of retaliation and asked to be placed in a witness protection program. Soon after, he disappeared and could not be found for the preliminary hearing. A material witness warrant was granted and the matter adjourned several times for the Crown to locate Alves.

[20] On February 16, 2020, the officer-in-charge of the attempt murder prosecution received a social media message from Alves saying that he was being held captive and asking for help. He gave an address. The police tactical squad found Alves chained and padlocked to a bed. He had been fed canned food and bread during his several weeks of captivity. The apartment was occupied by Alves’s cousin, Alex Barreira and Barreira’s mother. When interviewed by the police, Alves said that Barreira had chained him up and held him captive for many days. Alves advised the police that he had been told by Barreira that the Applicant had threatened to kill them both as well as the mother of Barreira’s child and Barreira’s whole family if Alves attended court and testified against the Applicant.

[21] When the police entered his residence, Barreira was found sitting next to a firearm in plain view. Two other firearms were found in another residence. The key to the padlock securing the chain to Alves was on a lanyard around Barreira’s neck. Barreira is charged with kidnapping as well as firearm charges.

[22] Justice Wells described some of Alves’ evidence concerning his kidnapping,

Mr. Alves described going to visit his cousin, Mr. Barreira, a few days before the scheduled preliminary inquiry. He said it was at that point that he was grabbed by his cousin and told he could not to go to court or Mr. Rego would kill them all. From that point forward, Mr. Alves was chained up in three different locations and held against his will. When Detective King believed he was exchanging messages with Jason Alves, it was actually Alex Barreira posing as Mr. Alves. Those messages make clear that Alex Barreira has intimate knowledge of what has transpired on each occasion in court when the Crown sought adjournments in the hopes of finding Jason Alves.

[23] A preliminary hearing on the attempt murder proceeded before Justice Wells on March 2 and 3, 2020. Alves testified that the Applicant was the person who shot him on September 22, 2018. There was substantial cross-examination on the kidnapping and threatening as well. After the subsequent bail hearing, Justice Wells detained the Applicant on secondary and tertiary grounds.

THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE CROWN’S CASE ON THE TWO SETS OF CHARGES

[24] I defer to Justice Wells’ conclusion that the Crown’s case on the attempt murder shooting of Alves is “very strong.” She was in an optimal position to assess this as the preliminary hearing and bail judge. The Applicant was shown on video to have a gun while outside the bar just before the shooting. The video stills were also shown by the Crown upon my reviews. The Applicant assumed the driver’s seat of the Durango vehicle; there were two other men in the vehicle. The evidence proves that the Applicant was involved in renting the vehicle. Avles approached the vehicle to engage with the Applicant. Soon after, Avles falls to the ground having been shot. The bullet went into the right side of his chest, just below the nipple with the bullet exiting his lower back. The vehicle drove away, found within 24 hours burned downed to the frame in Mulmur Township.

[25] I have been given no cogent reason to deviate from Justice Wells’ finding that the attempt murder case is strong. In assessing the status of the intimidation case, it is important to keep in perspective Alves’s recently expressed reluctance to testify against the Applicant. Just before he was shot at the bar, one of the Applicant’s companions came up to Alves and accused his family of being “rats.” After being shot point blank range by the Applicant and left for dead, it could reasonably be expected that having been accused of being an informant Alves might be reluctant to testify. By the act of shooting Alves, the Applicant had shown himself to be a dangerous person and not one to be taken lightly. The threat against Alves’ life and against his cousin and his family upped the ante still further. It is no surprise that a once reluctant witness has, after the intimidation and threatening allegations and his own kidnapping, again expressed reluctance. It would have been a much bigger surprise if this had not occurred.

[26] Although the case against the Applicant has been weakened by Alves reluctance, the Crown nonetheless has effective tools at its disposal to present a substantial case to prove the Applicant’s guilt. If Alves deviates from his statement, the Crown can use Section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to confront him and push him back to his previous statement and preliminary hearing testimony inculpating the Applicant. Failing success on that line of attack, the Crown can apply to admit Alves’ prior statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule: R. v. B. (K.G.), 1993 SCC 116, 19 C.R. (4th) 1, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 257, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (S.C.C.). The preliminary hearing evidence is almost certainly admissible under the principled exception: R. v. Hawkins and Morin, 1996 SCC 154, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).

[27] There are other evidentiary obstacles for the Crown, however. It is important evidence for the Crown that Alves states that during his captivity, he heard on one occasion the Applicant’s voice on the phone in a conversation with Barreira concerning the threats against him. When Mr. Carothers asked Alves at the preliminary inquiry how he could recognize the Applicant’s voice not having known him prior, Alves said that he recognized the voice from a few words the Applicant uttered during the confrontation between them outside the bar. I agree with Mr. Carothers that this voice recognition evidence rests on a weak foundation. But the evidence could potentially be shored up based on the content of what he heard the other person on the line saying in the conversation with Barreira, even if he could not reliably identify the voice.

[28] More significantly, Ms. Vlacic argued that the Crown would be relying on Barreira’s statements to Alves conveying the Applicant’s death threats against Barreira and Alves under the co-conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule. To be admissible, these utterances must be in active furtherance of the conspiracy and not merely passive narrative: McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 5th Edition, 7:170.20.40 — Stage Three: Use of Acts and Declarations “In Furtherance”; Watt’s Manual Crim. Evid. §27.11— Declarations in Furtherance of a Common Unlawful Design. It is arguable that informing Alves of the Applicant’s threats materially advanced the agreement between the Applicant and Barreira to hold Alves captive and to prevent him from testifying. The statements to Alves could be argued to be for the purpose of deterring Alves from escaping. Knowing his life was in danger would have made Alves think twice before attempting an escape. Barreira’s statements to Alves were not mere narrative.

[29] Mr. Carothers, as he did on the last review, argues that this was a very unusual kidnapping. He says that Alves was likely in on the scheme and used it as an excuse not to attend the preliminary hearing. There is evidence that Alves was concerned about being charged with fail to appear. The whole thing was a ruse. Mr. Carothers notes that Alves admitted going with Barreira to Home Depot to purchase the chain which was used to secure him in Barreira’s apartment.

[30] I agree that the situation is certainly strange. But two things must be remembered. First, Barreira was armed. When the police tactical squad burst into his apartment, a handgun was found within arms reach of Barreira. If Alves did not acquiesce in being held captive, he could have been shot. Furthermore, why if Alves was in on it, would he have asked the police for emergency help knowing that his cousin possessed an illegal firearm and would inevitably be found in possession of it by the police?

[31] Second, Alves and Barreira are very close. They are cousins. The Applicant’s death threat if Alves testified intertwined their fates. Both of their lives were threatened. Alves’ kidnapping and preventing him from testifying, from this perspective, benefited both of them. The mutual benefit could potentially explain the unusual aspects of the kidnapping. At least at the outset of Alves’ captivity, there may well have been an element of acquiescence. Alves said that eventually he became “fed up” and that is why he reached out in desperation to the officer-in-charge.

[32] I do not believe it is likely that this kidnapping was a ruse. The evidence that it was is unconvincing. Hovering over the allegations and cementing the Crown’s case was an aspect which Justice Wells was alive to and identified in her reasons. In finding that the case on the intimidation was strong, she said,

I cannot help but conclude that the only person who stood to benefit from the absence of Mr. Alves at Mr. Rego's preliminary hearing was Mr. Rego himself. This leads to the overwhelming inference that he was indeed the impetus for the kidnapping of Jason Alves to prevent him from testifying.

[33] I agree. On the question of the current strength of the Crown’s case, although it is weakened by Alves’ reluctance and issues with respect to his reliability, it remains substantial, albeit with several potential factual and evidentiary vulnerabilities.

THE SECONDARY GROUND

[34] The secondary ground authorizes detention if necessary to protect the public from a substantial likelihood that an accused will commit further offences. Both the prospect of further offences and their likely seriousness must be taken into account. It is necessary to examine what crimes the Applicant has been found to have committed in the past and what he is now alleged to have done. It is only then that a projection predicting the Applicant’s future behaviour can be made.

[35] There is strong evidence to prove that the Applicant shot Alves at point blank range with a handgun. It is a reasonable inference that a person who shoots someone in the chest with a gun intends to kill them. The Applicant could be facing a double-digit penitentiary sentence for this crime.

[36] The major problem for the Applicant as was expressed at the last review, remains the ramifications stemming from the intimidation allegation: see R. v. R. at paras. 34-36. It is alleged that to evade being held responsible and punished for shooting and attempting to kill Alves, the Applicant threatened Alves as well as his cousin Barreira with death if Alves testified against him. The Applicant had already demonstrated his ruthlessness. The death threat was not empty, it carried real menace. The threats led directly to Alves’ kidnapping and lengthy captivity under the domination of a man in possession of a deadly firearm himself. This was outrageous and brazen, something one would expect to see in a Quentin Tarantino movie.

[37] Witness tampering strikes directly at the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. What happened in this case is particularly outrageous. The system of justice has come under attack and must defend itself against the Applicant. The specific allusion to offences against the administration of justice at the end of the text of the secondary ground in Section 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code underscores the careful scrutiny required of these types of allegations on the question of bail.

[38] The Applicant has shown himself to be capable of going to extreme lengths to prevent a fair adjudication of his guilt. Furthermore, this shocking behavior does not seem out of character. The Applicant is only 26 years old but has a lengthy and continuous criminal record. He has two break and enter offences on his record, one as a youth and one from 2017. On this latter conviction he received 4 months in jail on top of credit for 342 days of pre-trial custody. He also has an unlawfully in dwelling house conviction. In terms of violence against the person he has an aggravated assault as a youth in 2012 and an assault in 2013. Importantly, he has two threatening convictions, one from 2011 and one from 2016. He has two convictions for drug possession. He also has two convictions for failing to comply with bail orders and one for failing to comply with probation. At the time of shooting Alves, he was bound by two separate weapons prohibitions.

[39] The violence on his record, including the past threatening convictions, the fail to respect bail orders and the unbroken and consistent criminality correlate with both the violence and the behaviour while on bail charged against him now. It is also not insignificant that the Applicant was in possession of a cell phone while arrested, contrary to his bail. The threatening and intimidation allegations and similar offences can be committed by a short text, a call, or word of mouth conveyed through a lengthy chain of people.

[40] While I defer to the review judge’s view in the August 19, 2020 decision that the new sureties tendered since the original bail hearing presided over by Justice Wells are an improvement and tend to assuage concerns on both second and tertiary grounds, bail depends primarily on the accused, not on his sureties. In light of his conduct while on bail for the attempted murder, he is not someone who can be trusted. He was able to surreptitiously commit extremely serious offences against the administration of justice despite his sureties’ supervision. In light of his antecedents, there is no guarantee he would not do so again to drive home to Alves the danger to his life if he testifies against the Applicant.

[41] There are only two specific offences referred to in the three grounds in bail contained in Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code. As alluded to above, the last words of the text of the secondary ground in ss. (b) specifically refer to an accused who might “interfere with the administration of justice.” The tertiary ground directed at maintaining the confidence of the public refers in ss. c.(iii) as part of the circumstances of the offence to the use of a firearm in adjudging what is necessary to maintain the confidence of the public and in c.(iv) in the context of whether lengthy imprisonment will be imposed, to the mandatory minimums for offences involving firearms. This case features both of these elements, each of which powerfully align against the Applicant’s release.

[42] While the threat posed by Covid can have a part to play on the secondary ground, the presence of it in Maplehurst does not significantly alter the secondary ground analysis in this case. He is a young man. The Applicant has asthma but there have been no medical reports to link this condition to increased susceptibility to the virus. He is not currently infected. The risk he poses to the safety of the public is not overborne by the danger the virus poses to him. His detention is not disproportionate to the threat of the virus to his health: R. v. J.A. at paras. 56, 65.

[43] In the final analysis, I agree with Justice Wells’ assessment that the Applicant, having so egregiously betrayed the trust reposed in him by attempting to manipulate and destroy the Crown’s case against him on the attempt murder, is for all intents and purposes, un-releasable.

THE TERTIARY GROUND

[44] My assessment of the tertiary ground is not dissimilar from the secondary ground. The intimidation and threatening allegations would be shocking to an informed member of the public. The importance of protecting the administration of justice from those attacking its foundations hangs over the tertiary ground analysis.

[45] The first statutory factor, the strength of the prosecution’s case, has already been discussed. There is a strong case on the attempted murder. The case on the intimidation and threatening is not as strong but it is not weak either. A reasonable and informed member of the public, in evaluating Alves, would appreciate the likely reason why this has come about. Alves, a vulnerable and fragile witness from the beginning, has allegedly been threatened with death by the Applicant. The weakening of the Crown’s case is a direct result of the Applicant’s actions. He cannot be permitted to profit from his own criminality. This aggravates the tertiary ground as opposed to diminishing it.

[46] The second factor, the gravity of the offences, has also already been discussed. Both sets of offences are at the top echelon of seriousness. The circumstances of the offences, the third factor, include the use of a firearm in the attempt murder, and the lengthy captivity of Alves with the purpose of subverting the prosecution. On the fourth factor, there is a likelihood of a lengthy sentence on the attempt murder, particularly given the mandatory minimum of five years for the offence while committed with a firearm under Section 239(1)(a)(i). In fact, a five year sentence would be substantially outside the appropriate range for the attempt murder with a person of the Applicant’s criminal history. If convicted of the intimidation and threatening, the total sentence would be very substantially increased. The delay in bringing the Applicant to trial is not a major consideration, given the lengthy sentence he is facing.

[47] If that was all, tertiary ground detention would be unavoidable. But the Covid threat to the Applicant’s health must be incorporated into the analysis. It is a direct counterweight to the factors favouring detention: R. v. Jaser, at paras. 99-103.

[48] However, when the Applicant’s age and good health are taken into account, despite the prevalence of Covid in the institution, in my view, the tertiary ground still requires detention in order to maintain the confidence of the public. The Applicant’s misconduct, seen from the public’s perspective, is a direct attack on the integrity of the process. Witnesses cannot be allowed to be intimidated by an accused for the purpose of ensuring the accused will not be convicted of serious offences against him. It is to protect the integrity of the process and the public’s perception of it that the Applicant cannot be released on bail. The presence of Covid in the institution is haunting but in all the circumstances, it is an insufficient reason to grant release to the Applicant.

[49] Detention is ordered on the secondary and tertiary grounds. The application is dismissed.

D.E HARRIS J.

Released: February 17, 2021

COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-191-00 DATE: 02 17 21

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

Her Majesty the Queen Applicant

• and – Brandon Rego Respondent

JUDGMENT

D.E HARRIS J.

Released: February 17, 2021