Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer the action from Ottawa to Toronto.

The court dismissed the motion without costs, noting that a prior order had already transferred the action to Toronto and there was no evidence the order had been set aside or varied.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for default judgment against a corporate borrower and its directing mind for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The defendants obtained a $350,000 small business loan by submitting a false invoice for equipment and subsequently misappropriated the funds.

The court granted default judgment for the outstanding loan balance of $432,323.41, pierced the corporate veil to hold the individual defendant personally liable for the fraud, and awarded $50,000 in punitive damages against each defendant.

The court declined to impose a constructive trust at this stage but granted a tracing order to allow the bank to follow the misappropriated funds.

Following a summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff developer regarding a defaulted agreement of purchase and sale, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court noted the defendants pursued a defence and counterclaim identical to one recently dismissed by the Court of Appeal in a related case.

Despite this, the plaintiff only sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $49,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The defendant was wholly successful on a motion requiring the plaintiff to post security for costs and sought partial indemnity costs of $14,518.73.

The plaintiff argued for $5,000 to $6,000 but filed its bill of costs late, which the court declined to consider.

The court disallowed time claimed for legal assistants but noted the plaintiff had filed voluminous unnecessary materials, justifying the defendant's time spent reviewing them.

The court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $10,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff purchased an auto parts business from two of the defendants and sought an interlocutory injunction to enforce non-competition and non-solicitation clauses.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants established a competing business just outside the restricted radius and used a related company and former employees to solicit customers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the restrictive covenants were breached, failed to prove irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's claim based on the expiry of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period had not expired or, in the alternative, that there were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court found that the plaintiff's decision to forebear from suing earlier, based on promises of payment and a long-standing business relationship, was reasonable.

The court also determined that there were serious credibility issues and disputed facts regarding the nature of the contracts and payments, making it impossible to dispose of the matter summarily.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, requiring a full trial on the merits.

Following a decision in an estate litigation matter regarding the ownership of a painting, the successful respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against the applicant co-estate trustees personally.

The court found that the applicants had acted unreasonably by commencing the application instead of accepting the respondent's pre-litigation offer to pay the appraised value of the painting.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $203,589 for fees and $12,493 for disbursements, and ordered the applicants to pay these costs personally rather than out of the estate.

The moving parties (Peel Housing Corporation and The Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Peel) sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Jacqueline Barrett) action for damages due to alleged arsenic fume exposure.

The plaintiff failed to provide admissible medical evidence to support her claim, specifically an affidavit from her family doctor despite court orders, leading to an adverse inference.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment, dismissing the action.

The alternative motion for security for costs was not addressed.

The court reviewed the plaintiff's statement of claim on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim, which alleged mistreatment by the plaintiff's union, appeared on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and bore the hallmarks of a querulant litigant.

The court noted that the bulk of the complaints would fall within the jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice that it was considering dismissing the action, stayed the action pending the outcome of the written hearing, and prohibited further filings other than the plaintiff's written submissions.

The court reviewed the plaintiff's statement of claim on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01.

The claim, which stemmed from the termination of the plaintiff's employment and the failure of the Queen to intervene, appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice that it was considering dismissing the action and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of a written hearing.

The defendant Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff, who was previously acquitted of fraud charges, sued for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches.

The court found the claim was replete with unnecessary assumptions and failed to plead material facts supporting the absence of reasonable and probable cause and the presence of malice.

The motion to strike was granted, but the plaintiff was given 90 days leave to amend the claim.

The court considered whether an action should be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff failed to provide written submissions after receiving notice that the court was considering dismissal.

The statement of claim sought to re‑litigate matters previously determined in other proceedings and improperly named opposing counsel, court staff, and a tribunal member as defendants.

Finding the claim plainly abusive on its face, the court dismissed the action and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs to the defendants following assessment.

The defendant moved to strike the claim based on repeated failure to comply with discovery undertakings and prior consent costs orders.

The court held that striking a claim is a last resort reserved for abusive non-compliance that threatens the integrity of the justice system.

Although the delay was inexcusable and the motion was necessary to prompt compliance, the defendant failed to establish actual or potential prejudice amounting to a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.

The motion to strike was dismissed, but motion costs were awarded to the moving party.

The plaintiff sued over an online political message board post describing him as one of the Taliban’s more vocal supporters.

The court held that the words referred to the plaintiff, were published by both the original poster and the forum operators, and were prima facie defamatory in the context of an active armed conflict involving Canadian forces.

However, applying the modern fair comment framework, the court found the statement was recognizable as comment on a matter of public interest, grounded in the plaintiff’s well-known public advocacy concerning Omar Khadr and Afghanistan, and capable of being honestly expressed by a prejudiced or exaggerated commentator.

Allegations of malice and spoliation were rejected.

The action was dismissed, with each side bearing its own costs.

On a summary judgment motion in an employment compensation dispute, the court interpreted an unsigned compensation amendment governing commissions and bonuses for an executive recruiter.

Applying commercial contract interpretation principles and, alternatively, contra proferentem, the court held that a 5% admin fee requirement was not a precondition to bonus eligibility.

After crediting a further payment received on an outstanding client receivable, the court found the moving party’s 2013 net billings exceeded the $1 million threshold, triggering a 3% bonus.

The court also held that equitable set-off was unavailable to justify withholding commissions based on a counterclaim for damages arising from the moving party’s resignation and alleged solicitation of a client.

Summary judgment was granted on the compensation claim, subject to recalculation.

The applicant subtenant sought a permanent or interlocutory injunction to enforce an exclusivity clause in its commercial sublease, which granted it the exclusive right to operate a karaoke club.

The respondent sublandlord had leased another unit to a co-respondent for a restaurant with karaoke.

Finding material facts in dispute, the court ordered the application to proceed to trial.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the co-respondent from providing karaoke services pending trial, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the applicant's business, and the balance of convenience favouring the applicant.

Neighbouring homeowners sued after a residential fire originating in the defendant’s semi‑detached house damaged their property.

One defendant, who was alleged to have caused the fire by careless smoking, did not defend and was noted in default.

The court held that the alleged admission by that defendant to his father was inadmissible hearsay against the co‑defendant homeowner and could not be relied upon to prove causation.

Without admissible evidence establishing how the fire began, the plaintiffs failed to prove negligence on a balance of probabilities, and the fire was characterized as “accidental” under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997.

The homeowner was neither directly negligent nor vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of his adult son.

The moving parties sought partial summary judgment to enforce payment obligations under a promissory note issued pursuant to a settlement agreement resolving a joint venture development dispute.

The responding parties argued the note was security for the broader agreement and alleged misrepresentations concerning project budgets, indicating they intended to commence an action in deceit.

The court held that the note could not be considered independently of the settlement agreement and that the allegations raised potential issues requiring a fuller evidentiary record.

Applying the principles in Combined Air regarding premature summary judgment motions, the court found it appropriate to stay the motion to permit the responding parties to commence a deceit action and develop the record.

The stay was granted subject to strict timelines, with partial costs awarded to the moving parties for delay attributable to the responding parties.

A dispute arose over the valuation of a retiring shareholder’s single common share under a share purchase agreement following the sale of an insurance brokerage business.

The plaintiff claimed the contractual formula yielded a payment of approximately $385,552, while the defendants argued the share had no value and sought rectification of the agreement to alter the valuation methodology.

The court interpreted the contractual formula using established principles of commercial contract interpretation and considered expert accounting evidence regarding whether fee income and sub‑brokerage commissions formed part of “annual commission income.” The court held that fee income generated from a brokerage acquisition constituted part of the recurring revenue stream and must be included in the formula, while sub‑brokerage commissions were properly excluded as pass‑through commissions.

Applying the formula accordingly, the court valued the share at $254,430 and rejected the defendants’ claim for rectification, finding no mutual mistake in the written agreements.

The plaintiff was involved in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for chronic pain and psychological impairments.

Following a nine-day jury trial, the defendant brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory requirement of a permanent serious impairment under the Insurance Act.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence and found the plaintiff lacked credibility, having concealed her pre-accident medical history and exaggerated her symptoms.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that her injuries were permanent, noting she had voluntarily stopped treatment and had significant pre-existing conditions.

The defendant's motion was granted and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.