Cavarzan J.

The applicant mortgagee took possession of a residential property under a power of sale.

Prior to possession, an air conditioner subject to a registered Notice of Security Interest by the respondent was removed by an unknown party.

The respondent refused to discharge its notice without payment from the sale proceeds, arguing a priority dispute under the Personal Property Security Act.

The court held that the PPSA establishes rights for fixtures that exist on properties, and since the fixture was removed, no priority dispute existed.

The respondent was ordered to bear the loss and discharge its interest.

The plaintiff was involved in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for chronic pain and psychological impairments.

Following a nine-day jury trial, the defendant brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory requirement of a permanent serious impairment under the Insurance Act.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence and found the plaintiff lacked credibility, having concealed her pre-accident medical history and exaggerated her symptoms.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that her injuries were permanent, noting she had voluntarily stopped treatment and had significant pre-existing conditions.

The defendant's motion was granted and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assaults against three young girls.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference against the credibility of one appellant's testimony because the defence failed to cross-examine a complainant on alleged written consent documents, invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the adverse inference was a proper part of the trial judge's fact-finding and weighing of evidence, not a penalty for a tactical error.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended evidence or failed to give separate consideration to the co-appellant's case.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society applied for a finding that a 9-year-old child was in need of protection and sought an order for Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother opposed the application, seeking return of the child, access if wardship was ordered, or a kinship placement with a relative.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's history of substance abuse, violent behavior, and failure to provide adequate care, including exposing the child to squalid living conditions and domestic violence.

The court rejected the proposed kinship placement, finding the relative not credible.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, concluding that access would not be beneficial and would impair the child's opportunities for adoption.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage sued a former producer for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference, claiming damages for commissions earned by the defendant after she joined a competing firm.

The defendant counterclaimed for reimbursement of unpaid premiums that the plaintiff had deducted from her earnings.

The court found that the plaintiff's unilateral imposition of a charge-back policy for unpaid premiums was a breach of contract, entitling the defendant to reimbursement.

However, the court also found that the defendant breached a valid non-solicitation clause by accepting business from the plaintiff's former clients, requiring her to disgorge the commissions earned.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty, finding the defendant was not a key employee.

The moving party mother sought an order extending the time to file a notice of appeal from a final order granting Crown wardship of her two children to the children's aid society.

The mother had been deported to the United States but had secretly resided in Canada during the proceedings, deliberately avoiding participation.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found no bona fide intention to appeal, no merit to the proposed appeal, and significant prejudice to the children's need for permanency.

The motion to extend time was dismissed.

The accused, a tax protestor, was charged with making a false statement on his tax return and tax evasion after failing to report income and pay taxes based on his belief that the federal government lacked the constitutional power to impose income tax.

At trial, the jury convicted him of making a false statement but acquitted him of tax evasion.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, and the accused appealed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on both counts.

The Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that an honest belief in the unconstitutionality of the Income Tax Act could negate the mens rea for tax evasion.

Furthermore, the Court found the jury's verdicts to be irreconcilably inconsistent, as the same defence was advanced for both charges.