SCJ 2023

The plaintiff, a retired teacher, brought an action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional suffering against a school board and its chairman after she was stopped from presenting at a board meeting and the chairman subsequently made public comments characterizing her presentation as transphobic and hateful.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the defamation claim, finding it had substantial merit, there were no valid defences, and the harm to the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the chairman's expression.

The claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found over 280 grams of cocaine and crack cocaine in his residence.

The Crown sought a 3.5-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day, citing collateral immigration consequences.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding the commercial nature and large quantity of drugs warranted a penitentiary term to address denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to two years in a federal penitentiary.

The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) brought contempt proceedings against Melissa Hart and Patricia Hart for failing to attend court-ordered examinations in aid of execution.

Both defendants were found in contempt.

Patricia Hart's penalty phase was adjourned as she demonstrated an intention to purge her contempt.

Melissa Hart, however, repeatedly failed to comply with court orders, continued to file frivolous motions, and had been declared a vexatious litigant.

The court imposed a 60-day conditional sentence (house arrest) on Melissa Hart, with specific terms for purging contempt, and ordered her to pay $9,000.00 in substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant sought summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation with her common-law partner.

The respondent denied a binding agreement, claiming lack of understanding, duress, and unconscionability.

The court found a binding agreement based on objective evidence, counsel's ostensible authority, and the parties' post-mediation conduct, dismissing the respondent's claims of duress and unconscionability.

The settlement, which included the sale of a farm and division of proceeds, was enforced.

The defendants brought motions for leave to file a jury notice and to compel answers to undertakings, while the plaintiff brought a motion for answers to refusals.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident and was initially commenced under the ordinary procedure, moved to the simplified procedure, and then moved back to the ordinary procedure due to the anticipated length of the trial.

The court granted the defendants leave to file a jury notice, finding the change in procedure constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to answer an outstanding undertaking regarding her EI file but dismissed the plaintiff's motion regarding refusals.

Costs of $9,000 on a substantial indemnity basis were awarded to the defendants.

This motion sought court approval for a class action settlement concerning systemic abuse at Grenville Christian College.

The plaintiffs requested approval of the $10.875 million settlement agreement, Class Counsel's fees of $3,122,187.50, payment of the Class Proceedings Fund's levy, and honoraria for the five representative plaintiffs.

The court approved the settlement and Class Counsel's fees, finding them fair and reasonable given the significant litigation risks, particularly the erratic and limited insurance coverage available to the judgment-proof defendants.

However, the court denied the request for honoraria, emphasizing that such awards should be rare and exceptional, despite acknowledging the representative plaintiffs' valuable contributions.

The applicants sought to strike down sections 2(1), 24(1), and 313(1) of the Canada Elections Act, arguing they infringed sections 3 (right to vote) and 15(1) (equality rights) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The challenge contended that Canada's single member plurality (SMP) electoral system resulted in disproportionate translation of votes to seats and underrepresentation of small national parties, women, and racial minorities.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the SMP system is constitutionally valid, does not violate Charter rights, and that the Constitution does not mandate proportional representation.

The court emphasized that voting rights focus on electoral process, not specific outcomes, and that political affiliation is not an analogous ground for discrimination under section 15.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for refusing an approved screening device sample.

The trial judge found a s. 9 Charter breach due to the respondent being arbitrarily detained for 74 minutes after arrest while the officer continued investigating Highway Traffic Act offences.

The appeal court upheld the finding of arbitrary detention, clarifying that placing a suspect in a police cruiser, of itself, requires reasonable necessity, and that the trial judge's reliance on *R. v. Aucoin* was correct.

However, the court remitted the matter to the trial judge to reconsider the appropriate remedy, as the Crown had not fully advanced arguments for alternative remedies at trial.

This decision concerns a 90-day review of a detention order under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Mohammad Khodadad, previously denied bail, sought release.

The court, applying R. v. Myers, confirmed that the onus is not on the accused at this stage, even if a reverse onus applied initially.

Despite this, the court found the accused's continued detention justified on both secondary (public safety due to substantial likelihood of re-offending, strong Crown case, and unreliable surety) and tertiary grounds (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the firearm-related charges, strong Crown case, and significant criminal record).

The application for release was dismissed.

The plaintiff in a civil rescission action sought an order compelling the defendants to produce the Crown disclosure brief they received in related criminal proceedings concerning the same alleged fraud in a hospital procurement process.

The Attorney General opposed immediate production, arguing it could taint witnesses before they testified in the criminal trial.

The court balanced the interests under the Wagg framework and adjourned the motion sine die, accepting the Attorney General's undertaking to conduct a Wagg review and produce the documents within eight weeks after a verdict in the criminal proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 21.01(3)(b) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was duplicative of an existing proceeding (CV-22-544) regarding the same private mortgage agreement.

The court found that the factual issues in this action went to the heart of interpreting the private mortgage contract, creating a clear risk of abuse of process through inconsistent findings.

The court dismissed the action as entirely duplicative and awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, noting the plaintiff could seek to be added as a third party in the parallel proceeding.

The defendants brought a motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) regarding four commercial units they had agreed to purchase from the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had previously failed in an application to terminate the agreements of purchase and sale, and the matter was converted to an action.

The court applied the two-step test for a CPL, finding the defendants had a reasonable claim to an interest in the land and that the equities favoured granting the CPL, as the property was unique and intended for a medical practice.

The motion was granted with costs awarded to the defendants.

The accused was charged with failing to stop after an accident resulting in death under s. 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused had the requisite mens rea, specifically if he knew or was reckless as to whether his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the subjective knowledge or recklessness, concluding that the evidence supported the inference that he believed he hit a "construction thingy" rather than a person.

The accused's conduct immediately after the accident was not indicative of someone trying to avoid detection.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted.

The plaintiffs, Qi Sen Li and Li Jin, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) or, alternatively, damages for breach of contract and return of a deposit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to discharge their initial evidentiary burden to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The decision highlighted deficiencies in the plaintiffs' evidence, particularly the reliance on an affidavit from a non-party to the contract (Li Jin) and the absence of evidence from the actual purchaser (Qi Sen Li) regarding key contractual elements such as deposit payment, waiver of conditions, and readiness to tender.

The applicant challenged his deceased mother's new will, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence by his sister, the estate trustee.

The litigation settled, with the applicant accepting the new will's terms after extensive document production.

The court then addressed costs, finding the applicant's claims lacked initial evidentiary support and constituted "scorched earth litigation." The court ordered the applicant to pay the respondents' costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $74,000, emphasizing the need to protect estates from unwarranted depletion by disgruntled beneficiaries.

The offender, a 23-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon after attempting to remove his girlfriend from her home using a pellet gun and utility knife.

The incident occurred while the offender was suffering from severe mental health issues and suicidal ideation, and he was motivated by a misguided desire to get the victim into rehabilitation.

The court balanced the competing sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence against the offender's rehabilitation, mental illness, and strict bail conditions.

Finding the circumstances highly unusual, the court granted a conditional discharge with two years of probation.

The applicant, an unsuccessful candidate for mayor of the City of Toronto, brought an application to invalidate the election results, alleging unfair media coverage and polling practices.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

The court found that the Municipal Elections Act does not regulate media or pollsters, and the application lacked any legal basis.

The court dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicant sought recognition and enforcement of a Chinese arbitral award under the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.

The respondent requested an adjournment to gather evidence to oppose enforcement, alleging procedural irregularities and denial of natural justice during the arbitration.

The court denied the adjournment, citing the respondent's lack of diligence, the insufficient evidentiary basis for the alleged grounds, and the apparent lack of merit in the proposed arguments, which often sought to re-argue the arbitration's merits.

The court then granted the application, recognizing and enforcing the award, and ordered the respondent to pay costs to the applicant.

The plaintiff, a former General Manager, brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the defendant employer's counterclaim for damages related to alleged misconduct and breach of contract.

The court found that the plaintiff's statements in his statement of claim, which formed the basis of the motion, did not relate to a matter of public interest, as the dispute was purely private.

Although the counterclaim was found to arise from the plaintiff's expression, the court determined that the public interest in allowing the counterclaim to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, given the private nature of the dispute and the substantial merit of the counterclaim.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendants, including CTV and several journalists, brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from a W5 investigative report on dog sledding operations.

The court granted the motion, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to establish that its defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned broadcasts did not identify the plaintiff or lacked essential elements of defamation.

Furthermore, the plaintiff could not show that the defendants lacked valid defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication, nor that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.