SCJ 2014

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings after pleading guilty to assault against his spouse, breach of recognizance, and theft under $5000.

He sought to withdraw the guilty pleas and obtain a new trial, alleging the pleas were not voluntary and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court reviewed the legal requirements for valid guilty pleas under s. 606 of the Criminal Code and the framework governing claims of ineffective representation.

It found the appellant’s evidence unreliable and determined the pleas were voluntary, informed, and unequivocal.

The court also concluded that counsel’s performance was competent and that no prejudice or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The defendant, the lead driver in a three-car rear-end collision, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against her.

The court reviewed the competing versions of the accident and found that under any scenario, the moving party was rear-ended after stopping for a turning vehicle.

Applying the presumption of fault for following vehicles, the court found no evidence of negligence by the moving party.

The motion was granted, the claim against the moving party was dismissed, and costs of $17,000 were awarded.

The insurer brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to limit the plaintiff’s recovery to $200,000 on the basis that the plaintiff failed to provide the corroborative “other material evidence” required under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage Endorsement for unidentified motorist claims.

The accident involved a motorcyclist who alleged he was cut off by an unidentified vehicle without physical contact.

The court considered whether medical evidence describing the mechanism of injury could constitute “physical evidence indicating the involvement of an unidentified automobile” under ss. 1.5(C) and 1.5(D)(ii) of the endorsement.

The court held that corroborative evidence need not be limited to skid marks or scene evidence and may include medical evidence extrinsic to the plaintiff’s self-report.

Because the consultation report describing an axial-load leg injury was consistent with the plaintiff’s account of evasive braking, a genuine issue requiring trial existed.

On an adjournment appearance following a prior order, the court was asked to resolve two disputed terms of a draft order pending the return of a motion.

The first issue concerned whether defendants could withdraw $500 each or $500 in total per week for living expenses from a corporate bank account subject to court supervision.

The court interpreted the prior order and determined the permitted withdrawal was $500 per week in total for the named individuals.

The second issue concerned a proposed requirement that certain defendants produce monthly bank account statements; the court ordered that provision deleted pending further proceedings.

Costs of the attendance were reserved to the judge hearing the motion on the return date.

The defendant brokerage firm brought a motion to strike a supplementary affidavit filed by one of the plaintiffs in response to a pending summary judgment motion.

The defendant argued the affidavit contained impermissible expert opinion evidence, hearsay, and irrelevant material, and was not compliant with Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the affidavit was not expert evidence but rather the plaintiff’s explanation of how he calculated alleged investment losses based on publicly available information and personal assumptions.

The court found the evidence could potentially affect the outcome of the proceeding and that questions regarding admissibility and weight were better left to the judge hearing the summary judgment motion.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside or vary a prior consent order requiring her to vacate a property by a specified date.

She argued the responding parties had failed to comply with disclosure obligations, that the consent order should be interpreted alongside earlier family law orders, and that circumstances had materially changed.

The court reviewed the principles governing the finality of settlements and consent judgments and held that such orders may only be set aside for limited grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, common mistake, or a material change in circumstances.

The evidence did not establish any of these grounds.

The court concluded the consent order was clear, voluntarily agreed to after negotiations, and remained binding.

The offender was convicted of breaching his Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by consuming alcohol and cocaine.

The Crown sought a sentence of four to five years, while the defence sought a non-carceral sentence.

The court noted the offender's significant rehabilitation efforts, including maintaining steady employment, establishing a stable family life, and avoiding violent behaviour for over a decade.

Applying the principles from R. v. Ipeelee, the court found that a further prison term would be detrimental to the offender's rehabilitation and that he did not pose a current danger to the community.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation.

The payor spouse brought a motion to change seeking termination of indefinite spousal support following early retirement at age 55 due to alleged depression and reduced income.

The court held that voluntary retirement and a decrease in income do not automatically constitute a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

The evidence did not establish that the retirement was medically necessary or that the payor lacked continued earning capacity.

The court also found deficiencies and inconsistencies in the payor’s financial disclosure.

The motion to terminate support was dismissed and support of $1,000 per month was ordered to continue until the recipient reaches age 64.

The Crown sought estreatment of a recognizance after the accused failed to appear in court while released on bail secured by a $5,000 recognizance consisting of a $2,500 cash deposit and a $2,500 no‑deposit pledge by a surety.

The surety had personally deposited the $2,500 cash but sought its return after attempting to be relieved as surety and reporting the accused’s breach to police.

The court considered the statutory framework governing recognizances and forfeiture under the Criminal Code and authorities addressing standing and ownership of bail deposits.

While recognizing that a surety may deposit bail money and may have standing to seek its return, the court held that in this case the recognizance and receipt clearly recorded the cash deposit in the accused’s name.

As a result, the deposit could not be returned to the surety and was forfeited upon the accused’s default.

The father brought a motion to vary a final consent order to expand his access to his two children.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing it should not be heard because the father was in arrears of child support and costs, and denying she had breached the access order.

The court held that the father's arrears did not preclude his motion because he had reduced them and provided a reasonable explanation.

The court found the mother had intentionally breached the access order by prioritizing the children's hockey commitments over the father's access.

Finding a material change in circumstances, the court expanded the father's access to at least 35%, rescinded a prior restraining order against him, and changed the access exchange location to reduce conflict.

A commercial landlord applied for a declaration that a lease with its tenant gym operator was terminated and sought an order for possession due to alleged nuisance caused by excessive noise.

The evidentiary record consisted largely of hearsay and minimal firsthand evidence, and the landlord had not complied with procedural requirements for expert evidence regarding acoustics.

The tenant’s responding materials were also procedurally deficient and attempted to seek relief, including an interlocutory injunction, without proper originating process or motion materials.

The court found the pleadings and evidentiary record insufficient to permit an intelligible adjudication of the parties’ rights and obligations.

The application was adjourned to allow the parties to clarify issues, consider proper procedures, and potentially pursue settlement.

The applicant beneficiary brought an application against estate trustees alleging they improperly caused estate funds to pay legal fees incurred in litigation that primarily advanced their personal beneficiary interests.

The dispute arose from prior litigation concerning ownership of a family home that had vested in estate beneficiaries under the Estates Administration Act.

The court held that estate trustees are not entitled to indemnification from estate assets for legal costs incurred to protect their own personal interests, and where both personal and estate interests are engaged, trustees must segregate the costs.

The court found the impugned legal fees were incurred in the respondents’ personal capacities and ordered reimbursement of the applicant’s proportionate share.

The court also held that trustee compensation taken without court approval or beneficiary consent was improper and required repayment of the applicant’s share.

The regulator sought a permanent injunction prohibiting an individual from providing legal services and holding himself out as entitled to practise law despite not being licensed.

The evidence showed that the respondent prepared documents, conducted legal research, advised on strategy, and sold materials and videos intended to assist clients in legal proceedings, particularly in family law matters.

The court held that these activities constituted the provision of legal services within the meaning of the Law Society Act and that contractual disclaimers and characterizations of the work as educational or intellectual property could not avoid statutory prohibitions.

Applying the statutory framework for injunctions under the Act, the court concluded that the respondent was contravening the prohibition on unlicensed legal practice.

A permanent injunction was granted prohibiting the respondent from providing legal services, advertising such services, or operating a website offering them.

The husband brought a motion seeking increased access to the children and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The wife sought exclusive possession of the home and interim child and spousal support based on imputed income.

The court ordered the matrimonial home sold, finding that maintaining the property was economically unsustainable regardless of the husband’s income and that the wife failed to establish a compelling reason to prevent sale.

Interim spousal and child support were ordered based on an imputed income of $60,000 for the self‑employed husband, and structured access was granted with exchanges occurring at a police station due to bail conditions arising from pending assault charges.

The parties achieved mixed success and no costs were ordered.

A self‑represented employee brought a motion seeking determinations relating to issue estoppel arising from an Employment Insurance decision, the applicability of the Occupational Health and Safety Act reprisal provisions, and production of asbestos-related records.

The moving party argued that a Service Canada determination that he had not engaged in misconduct precluded the employer from asserting just cause for dismissal.

The court held that the requirements for issue estoppel were not met because the EI determination addressed a different legal question and the employer was not a party to the administrative process.

The court also confirmed that complaints of reprisal under s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and declined to compel production of asbestos records outside the normal discovery process.

The motion was dismissed.

The insured sought recovery under an aircraft insurance policy after a twin‑engine aircraft crashed during an attempted takeoff using only one functioning engine.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the occurrence was not an “accident” and alternatively that the insured breached a policy condition requiring protection of the aircraft from further loss.

Applying Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence defining an accident as an “unlooked‑for mishap or occurrence,” the court held that negligent conduct may still constitute an accident unless the insured deliberately assumed a known risk.

Although the pilot’s decision to attempt a single‑engine takeoff was negligent and ill‑advised, the evidence did not establish recklessness or deliberate risk assumption sufficient to remove the occurrence from coverage.

The court also found no breach of the policy’s aircraft protection condition.

Judgment was granted for the insured.

Following a summary judgment motion concerning a limitation period defence in a slip and fall personal injury action, the court had previously granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff dismissing the defendants’ limitation period defence and allowing the action to proceed to trial on negligence and damages.

The present decision addressed the plaintiff’s request for partial indemnity costs of $6,168.71 arising from that motion.

The defendants argued only that the claimed amount was excessive and unreasonable.

The court found no merit in that objection and awarded the plaintiff the costs as claimed.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.

The applicants and respondents entered into joint venture agreements to invest in commercial real estate projects through jointly owned companies.

The applicants discovered that the respondents were commingling funds, failing to make their required equity contributions, and diverting the applicants' funds to their own personal benefit and to companies they solely owned.

The court found that the respondents breached their contractual and fiduciary duties and were unjustly enriched.

The court imposed constructive trusts over several properties owned by the respondents, appointed a receiver over the respondents' assets, and cancelled the respondents' shares in the jointly owned companies where they had not contributed equity.

In additional reasons following a wrongful dismissal judgment, the court determined the appropriate rate for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for reasonable notice and pension losses.

The parties agreed on the quantum of damages and the method of calculating interest but disputed the applicable interest rate under the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff argued for a higher rate corresponding to the quarter when the cause of action arose, while the defendant argued the statutory rate applicable when the claim was issued should apply.

Exercising discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court held that applying an averaged interest rate over the relevant period better reflected fairness in the circumstances.

Prejudgment interest was therefore calculated using an average rate of 1.11%.