ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
CLAIRE COSSETTE
Applicant
– and –
ROBERT COSSETTE
Respondent
Pam MacEachern, for the Applicant
Wade L. Smith, for the Respondent
HEARD: July 24, 2014 at Ottawa
REASONS FOR DECISION
KERSHMAN J.
Introduction
1The Respondent (“Husband”) brings a motion to change the order of Madam Justice Catherine D. Aitken dated February 10, 2006. He seeks to terminate spousal support payable to the Applicant (“Wife”) after November 30, 2013.
Factual Background
2The parties were married on August 11, 1979. At that time, the Husband was 20 years old and the Wife was 21 years old. The parties separated on August 28, 2001, after a 22 year marriage.
3There are two children of the marriage, Raymond Cossette, born June 6, 1981, and Brigitte Cossette, born June 8, 1983. Raymond lives independently. Brigitte is cognitively impaired and is on the Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”) receiving approximately $13,000 tax free.
4Subsequent to separation the parties began litigation, which resulted in two separate court orders. Property was divided pursuant to a consent order of Gauthier J. dated September 8, 2003. The Husband’s pension was valued and divided pursuant to the Pension Benefits Division Act, S.C. 1992, c.46, Sch. III.
5The second court order is that of Aitken J. dated February 10, 2006, which was also made on consent and which provided among other things for the payment of spousal support of $1,000 per month for an indefinite period of time.
6The Husband has a history of depression as far back as 1983 for which he has been treated with medication.
7The Husband was scheduled to retire in November of 2013. Three months prior to his retirement, on Dr. Lane’s orders, he was off work due to depression. Dr. Lane recommended that Mr. Cossette retire as soon as possible.
8The Husband retired at the earliest possible date when he became 55 with 33 years of service. Prior to his retirement his income was approximately $104,000. His pension income is $48,715.
Issues
9The issues are as follows:
Has there been a material change in circumstances such that the spousal support being paid by Mr. Cossette should be terminated as of November 2013 when he retired?
Should the insurance that has been provided as security for the payments of spousal support be terminated?
Husband’s Position
10The Husband argues that there has been a material change in circumstances for the following reasons:
(a) he retired in November 2013, which reduced his income from approximately $104,000 per year to approximately $48,000 per year;
(b) the Wife is double dipping because in 2003 she received one half of his pension value and is now receiving spousal support at the rate of $1,000 per month even though Mr. Cossette’s income has been reduced to less than 50% of his former earnings. He relies on the case of Boston v. Boston, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 413, 2001 SCC 43 (“Boston”);
(c) both the Husband and the Wife now earn approximately the same amount of money;
(d) the Husband argues that the Wife can use her share of his pension, now being approximately $229,000 to fund the shortfall after the termination of spousal support; and
(e) Brigitte lives with the Wife; she is on ODSP and earns approximately $13,000 tax‑free, which is money that could be used to deal with Mrs. Cossette’s shortfall in income due to the termination of spousal support.
Wife’s Position
11The Wife argues the following:
(a) even though Mr. Cossette has retired and is earning less money, while it is a change in circumstances, it is not a material change in circumstances;
(b) the Wife does not have a pension plan with her employer, notwithstanding that she has been working for the same employer for a long period of time. She is presently 56 years of age and is still working;
(c) the Wife will need the Applicant’s pension benefits to supplement her income when she actually retires, which is expected to be at age 65;
(d) the Wife argues that Brigitte’s monies are being used for other things and that Brigitte needs the Wife’s support due to her cognitive impairment; and
(e) the Wife argues that Mr. Cossette should have applied for long‑term disability due to his depression and that, had he done so, he would have received 70% of his salary to age 65 or approximately $72,000 per annum instead of the current $48,000 per annum.
1. Financial Statements Filed by Mr. Cossette
12Throughout these proceedings, Mr. Cossette filed three sets of financial statements dated September 16, 2013, February 26, 2014 and June 7, 2014. The following table summarizes certain aspects of those financial statements.
September 16, 2013 February 26, 2014 June 7, 2014
Income
$48,715
$48, 715
$48,715
Expenses
$54,986
$109,065
$104,044
Net
($6,281)
($60,350)
($55,329)
Assets
$15,149
$63,377
$164,453
Liabilities
$238,000
$220,043
$206,500
Net Worth
($221,851)
($144,670)
($42,046)
13The Court has reviewed the three sets of financial statements and notes the following items that are of concern to the Court:
(1) Based on the evidence, Mr. Cossette’s 2013 actual income was $193,541 and not $104,781, as originally reported. This would include his income of $104,781, a retirement allowance of $62,001 and a retroactive salary increase of $26,758:
(2) In addition, he received a tax credit of $12,024 in 2013;
(3) Mr. Cossette received $33,900 from the sale of his interest in a house sold prior to his move to Alberta;
(4) On the September 2013 financial statement, Mr. Cossette shows the value of his real estate as 0. This is so even though the evidence shows that he received $33,900 from the sale of real estate as set out above;
(5) The September 2013 financial statement does not reflect an ING, RRSP of $4,700, which is subsequently shown in the February 2014 financial statement. This RRSP no longer appears on his June 2014 financial statement; however, that statement does reflect a TFSA with the Royal Bank of Canada for $500;
(6) In the February 2014 financial statement, Mr. Cossette shows a 2013 Ford F-150 with a value of $49,000 and a corresponding debt of $42,000. In his June 2014 financial statement he said that vehicle was written off. He does not say why the vehicle was written off; however, he states that he still has to make the loan payments. The financial statement does not say whether he is entitled to any insurance proceeds for the vehicle;
(7) Since his move to Alberta his financial statements of February and June 2014 show a loan to his father for $100,000. The loan was originally payable at the rate of $1,000 per month, and then in the June 2014 financial statement the payments have increased to $1,200 per month with no explanation;
(8) According to the June 2014 financial statement, Mr. Cossette will be getting married as he is putting away $300 a month for wedding expenses;
(9) His debt payments have increased from $500 per month to $1,200 per month;
(10) Mr. Cossette’s vacation expenses have increased from $200 per month to $400 per month;
(11) His grocery and eating out expenses have increased from $400 per month to $750 per month;
(12) The three financial statements show that after retirement Mr. Cossette’s yearly expenses increased from $54,996 per year in September 2013 to $109,065 on the February 2014 financial statement to $104,044 on the June 2014 financial statement. This in turn leads to an increase in his yearly deficit from $6,281 to $60,350 to $55,329 per year based on each of those three statements;
(13) In the first two financial statements a schedule B is included, which indicates that he lives alone. In the June 2014 statement, schedule B is omitted. The relevance of this is that the Court does not know how many people are living with Mr. Cossette and contributing to the household; and
(14) Based on Mr. Cossette’s reduced income his expenses are greater than his income yet his net worth improves in each of three financial statements from ($221,851) to ($144,670) and to ($42,046).
14The Court finds that the numbers set out in Mr. Cossette’s financial statements do not make sense or reflect his true financial picture. The expenses and subsequent deficits are unrealistic and unsustainable. On that basis, the Court finds that Mr. Cossette has not provided full and proper financial disclosure of his financial affairs.
Analysis
2. Mr. Cossette’s Medical Situation
15Mr. Cossette argues that he has been suffering from depression since shortly after his marriage. The Wife says that Mr. Cossette’s depression began after the birth of their second child and that the depression continued to increase and subside approximately every five years through the marriage.
16When Mr. Cossette commenced his Motion to Change, the reasons set out at p. 6 of the Change of Information - Form 15A dated September 16, 2013, read as follows:
- I am asking to change the following spousal support in the order/agreement because the following change in circumstances has taken place:
The respondent, Robert Cossette is retiring as of September 13, 2013.
As of the date of retirement, the respondent’s income will be reduced from $104,781to $48,716 per year – see attached pension documents.
Despite numerous requests the applicant has failed to provide proof of income, tax returns and/or notices of assessment since 2007.
Spousal support should no longer be paid as of September 13, 2013 for the following reasons:
The respondent is now earning an equal or lesser amount than the applicant as of September 13, 2013.
In the Order of Justice Gauthier, dated September 8, 2003, the respondent was ordered to transfer 50% of his pension credit to the applicant. As a result of this, the Applicant is not entitled to an additional portion of the respondent’s pension. – see attached Order of Justice Gauthier.
17The aforesaid are all of the reasons for the termination of spousal support. No mention is made of Mr. Cossette’s suffering from depression. The Court notes that Mr. Cossette claims in this document that he had retired as of September 13, 2013. The evidence shows that he did not retire until approximately November 15, 2013. The Motion to Change was prepared by a lawyer on Mr. Cossette’s behalf. The Court notes that the Motion for Change is dated the first day that Mr. Cossette was off of work pursuant to the medical records from Dr. Lane.
18In a case conference before Master MacLeod in March, 2014, Mr. Cossette was ordered to produce his medical records for the last five years, which he did. Master MacLeod also ordered Mr. Cossette to provide an affidavit and any backup documentation within 30 days.
19In his May 30, 2014 affidavit, Mr. Cossette, for the first time, says that he was diagnosed with “major depression” and was prescribed a number of medications to assist with this, mostly Zoloft (para. 11 of the Affidavit).
20In that Affidavit, Mr. Cossette deposes that he has produced all of his medical records.
21At questioning on July 18, 2014, which Mr. Cossette attended virtually as he was living in Alberta, he deposed that he had been treated by medical professionals other than Dr. Lane, and that he had on several occasions attempted suicide and was treated in hospitals. Mr. Cossette would not provide the dates with respect to these events or particulars as to the hospitals and/or the physicians who treated him other than Dr. Lane.
22According to the evidence, Mr. Cossette refused to provide medical records from the Ottawa General Hospital or the Royal Ottawa Hospital or Dr. Lane’s complete medical records from the time that he began treating Mr. Cossette. The Court acknowledges that Mr. Cossette did provide Dr. Lane’s medical records for the last five years as ordered by Master MacLeod; however, when requested to provide the balance, he refused to do so. The argument was made that there was not enough time between the questioning and the hearing of the motion to obtain the medical records. The Court does not find this argument to be persuasive. The motion could have been adjourned until such time as those reports could have been released. Mr. Cossette chose to proceed.
23The Court acknowledges that Mr. Cossette’s evidence is that he had been speaking with the Employee Services in the government since 2003 with respect to depression; however, no information or documentation was provided with respect to it other than the aforesaid statement. The Court does not find that contacting Employee Services without any backup documentation constitutes evidence of treatment from a qualified medical professional.
24The only medical information provided was from Dr. Lane. There were no medical reports provided from either a psychiatrist or a psychologist in relation to his depression. The medical records of Dr. Lane include two letters, dated November 7, 2013 and November 14, 2013. These are medical letters, they are not medical reports. Both of the letters are very short.
25In the first letter dated November 7, 2013, Dr. Lane indicates that he saw Mr. Cossette on September 13, 2013. In that letter he says:
I have known Mr. Cossette since July, 2001 when I became his family physician. Over the last 12 years he has consulted me on several occasions due to the severe impact of financial stress and loss of contact with his daughter has had on him. To clarify, I have no factual knowledge of details of his divorce other than what he has told me but his version of events has been very consistent over the past years and if presumed true understandably would cause distress. The impact has been severe enough to lead to time away from work and also to the need to prescribe antidepressant medication to help him function better day to day.
My understanding is that he has recently retired. I believe this is a positive development and am hopeful it will reduce his overall stress levels to help him continue to function better. The next best development will be if his divorce could somehow be finalized so that he can truly move on without having to revisit this issue over and over as has happened over the past 10 years.
26The November 14, 2013 letter is very short:
I have been this man’s family doctor for the past 10 years. I recommend it is in his best interest to retire from work at this time to minimize negative impact on his health. He has suffered with clinical depression as a result of a very stressful divorce and cannot tolerate any added stress that his employment has been contributing. I feel it is best he retire to maximize his chances of avoiding chronic depression. Please feel free to contact me should you require any further information.
27A review of Dr. Lane’s medical records indicates that he has been prescribing Zoloft for Mr. Cossette since at least 2009 if not earlier. Notations in the medical records with respect to prescribing Zoloft are as follows:
Date renewal
Quantity of Zoloft
June 2, 2009
50mgs
September 28, 2009
50mgs
May 19, 2010
50mgs
October 17, 2011
50mgs
October 17, 2011
50mgs
December 5, 2012
Increase to 100mgs
April 15, 2013
Reduction to 50mgs
September 13, 2013
50mgs
28The Court notes certain comments made in the doctor’s notes, which in part are as follows:
June 2, 2009:
Due to start a new job next week which he is looking forward to.
October 17, 2011:
Work and family life ok. Hopes to retire in two years. Tried to climb Mount Robson this summer with son. In good shape.
May 15, 2012:
Has lost weight, training to hike with son. Much aerobic workout.
November 24, 2012:
Intentional weight loss through running and eating better.
December 5, 2012:
Biggest issue remains stress with divorce and at work. Trip to Cuba was ok but still feeling very irritable and sad regarding financial possible implications of retiring and divorce.
Partner has much stress over her daughter who underwent divorce and has a young child. Patient frustrated not agreeing with her approach and not knowing how to approach with her. Not drinking, no drugs, not smoking. Still getting exercise.
Tearful discussing situation. No homicidal or suicidal thoughts. Sleep fractured, still tired, acute stress in personal life and also work conflict. Pending retirement.
This patient was seen on Wednesday, December 5, 2012. This patient was totally disabled on Monday, December 10, 2012 and I estimate through to Friday, January 11, 2013. Return to regular work on Monday, January 14, 2013.
January 7, 2013:
Still much stress with more financial follow out from divorce and some differing views on how new partner should handle her child.
Physically still well, will be hiking more with child.
April 15, 2013:
Since seen has had more stress. Looks like relationship with partner is ending. They have different views on how to spend time in retirement. He wants to travel and get more active. She wants to nest and be a more active grandmother. They are selling the house now.
Will be retiring next year and thinks of moving west to be active and a bit closer to son.
Many stressors these days, pending divorce. Now a new breakup with a new partner of several years. No big fights just different ideas of what to do in retirement. Financial worries. Hard to plan for income until retires and then lawyers divvy up his pension.
September 13, 2013:
Patient struggling with multiple stressors. Pending court date again to finalize financial arrangements with ex. Still no access to daughter. Seeking medical leave until retirement date in November.
Not drinking, no suicidal thoughts. Sleep still fractured.
Medical leave patient will be moving to Calgary.
This patient was seen on Friday, September 13, 2013. This patient was totally disabled on Monday, September 16, 2013 and I estimate through to Monday, November 11, 2013. Return to regular work on Tuesday, November 12, 2013.
29It appears from reviewing the notes that Mr. Cossette’s Zoloft dosage was increased from 50mgs to 100mgs in December, 2012. At that time according to the notes, one of the biggest issues had to do with Mr. Cossette’s partner having stress over her daughter who was going through a divorce and had a young child. Based on the notes, the Court finds, in part, that Mr. Cossette was frustrated with his partner’s approach on how to deal with this situation.
30While Mr. Cossette was suffering from stress and depression, the evidence is that he did not apply for long-term disability. The Court notes that he had been suffering from depression since approximately 1983. The Court does not see any reason why he did not apply for long-term disability. Had he done so, according to the evidence he would have been entitled to 70% of $104,780 or approximately $72,800 versus his retirement income of $48,000. The Court cannot find any logical reason why Mr. Cossette did not go to see either a psychologist or psychiatrist with respect to the issue of depression and retire on a long-term disability.
31Based on the evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Cossette was having stress and depression related to dealing with a number of factors including: 1) the ending of his second relationship; 2) dealing with his partner’s daughter’s marital breakdown; 3) selling his real property; 4) his move to Alberta; 5) payment of spousal support; and 6) having no contact with his daughter.
32In terms of case law, in the case of Willick v. Willick, 1994 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, Justice Sopinka says at para. 22:
In deciding whether the conditions for variation exist, it is common ground that the change must be a material change of circumstances. This means a change, such that, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms. The corollary to this is that if the matter which is relied on as constituting a change was known at the relevant time, it cannot be relied on as the basis for variation…
33The matter was reviewed in the case of Innes v. Innes, (2013) ONSC 2254 () (“Innes”) by Mulligan, J. At para. 27-29 of Innes he cites Bruce, J. from the case of Chalmers v. Chalmers, 2009 BCSC 517, [2009] B.C.J. No. 765, which says in part:
27In my view, the principles derived from these passages are as follows:
The change must be a material one; such that if known at the time it would have likely resulted in a different order.
What is a material change will in each case be determined on the particular facts. The court should not endeavour to divide into categories those changes that are material and those that fail to satisfy this standard.
What is a sufficient change must be measured against the parties’ overall financial situation.
The fact that a change was objectively foreseeable does not mean that it was contemplated by the parties and forms part of the underlying basis for the original order.
The onus rests with the applicant to prove a material change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances warranting a review of spousal support; however, the court should maintain a flexible approach to the exercise of this discretion to ensure all of the relevant facts in a given case are considered.
34At para. 28 of Innes, he says:
28In the context of retirement, Beaulieu J. provided the following helpful summary in Doe v. Doe, [1999] O.J. No. 733 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) at para. 13:
I now sum up the legal principles that emerge from the cases which have considered what constitutes a material change in circumstances. First, while an applicant’s decreased income due to retirement must be taken into account, retirement alone does not necessarily constitute a material change in circumstances. Voluntary retirement has been recognized as a material change in circumstances which justifies a reduction in child support. Facts relative to a change which were known at the time of the prior order cannot be relied upon to prove a material change in circumstances. [Citations omitted]
35At para. 29 of Innes, he says:
29In Bullock v. Bullock, 2004 16949 (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 909, Corbett J. reviewed an application to vary by a 62-year old man who the court found had retired voluntarily. The parties had a 23-year marriage and three children. On the facts of the case before him, the court found that the payor had voluntarily retired and was living comfortably on a second wife’s income. As Corbett J. stated at paras. 8, 9 and 10:
He has chosen not to do so (earn an income post retirement) because he does not need to work anymore to enjoy a comfortable lifestyle. Many people dream of retiring “early”, although there is not a set age at which people today expect to cease working. Many successful people find that they can afford to stop work before they reach the age of 65. Others continue well into their 70s and even longer. The legal question for this case then is not whether Ronald should retire at age 62, but whether this personal choice should be viewed as a “material change of circumstances” for the purpose of payment of spousal support.
In my view it should not.
36The Court acknowledges that Mr. Cossette’s retirement was a change in circumstance, but the question becomes whether retirement and a reduction in income constitute a material change in circumstance.
37The Court finds that Mr. Cossette assumed that just because he was retiring and would have less income, that he could terminate spousal support. This is an erroneous assumption. The Court does not accept the fact that the stresses in relation to his payment of spousal support were enough to stop him from working. He wanted to retire.
38The Court finds that there was no evidence from his employer or otherwise to satisfy the Court that he could not continue in his former employment or that his work performance was insufficient. Mr. Cossette’s evidence reveals a self-engineered method to withdraw from the labour force.
39In the present case, both parties have made reference to Boston in relation to double dipping with respect to pension income post-retirement. The same argument was dealt with by Corbett, J. in Bullock v. Bullock, 2004 16949 (ONSC) (“Bullock”). At para. 13 he says:
There is no suggestion in Boston that the payor spouse had chosen to retire early. There was no argument that the payor spouse had continued earning capacity and that income ought to be imputed to him. In my view, voluntary retirement at age 62 is not a basis for finding a material change in circumstances. A support payor cannot choose to be voluntarily under-employed whether by retirement or otherwise, and thereby avoid his or her spousal support payment obligations.
40While the argument can be made that there is double dipping, the Court finds that it is justified in these circumstances. Spousal support commenced in 2005 or 2006, approximately five years after the parties separated. In 2006 Mr. Cossette knew that he could retire in 2013. Mr. Cossette continued to be bothered by the fact that he was paying spousal support. Just because he was bothered by that fact is not a sufficient reason to terminate his spousal support obligation by him retiring at the earliest possible age (i.e. 55), moving to Alberta, buying a home, getting engaged, and starting a new life.
41While Mr. Cossette may have been stressed and/or depressed that he was paying spousal support, that is an unfortunate reality of life. The Court realizes that his reality is that he retired at 55 and moved across the country, is staying in shape, is mountain climbing, has purchased a new house and is engaged to be married. Given these facts there may be a change of circumstances, but it is not considered enough to be a material change in circumstances warranting the termination of spousal support.
42On the evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Cossette has not provided satisfactory evidence of depression that would justify retiring when he did and that would justify terminating his spousal support.
43On a balance of probabilities, the Court does not find that his retirement based on his medical issue is considered to be a material change in circumstances such that spousal support should be terminated.
3. Mr. Cossette’s Retirement
44The Minutes of Settlement in relation to spousal support were signed in late 2005 and incorporated into an Order in 2006. In 2005, Mr. Cossette’s salary was approximately $82,641 per year. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”) had only been released in draft form in 2005 and came into force subsequent thereto.
45Mr. Cossette’s income continued to increase after 2005 until by 2013 he was earning approximately $104,781 per year. Notwithstanding this, spousal support remained at the rate of $1,000 per month.
46The evidence before the Court was that had the SSAG been in their final form based on the Husband’s income of $82,641 with the Wife’s income of $35,214 in a 22 year marriage, the range of spousal support would have been from $1,304 to $1,522 to $1,739.
47Mr. Cossette only paid spousal support on an after-tax basis to the end of 2013 of $54,336 - $62,688.
48In Bullock at para. 1, Corbett, J. has said:
[A]s a general proposition, a payor of spousal support should make his or her retirement plans on the basis that support will continue until aggregate retirement savings can be expected to keep both former spouses at reasonable standards of living. Otherwise, our regime of spousal support will tend to leave payee spouses in positions of financial need, often dire need, at a time in their lives when they cannot take meaningful steps to ameliorate their own condition.
49In the case of Hesketh v. Brooker, 2013 ONSC 1122 (“Hesketh”), Turnbull, J. deals with the issue of a payor’s health problems. At paras. 31-33 he says:
I have no doubt that Mr. Hesketh has experienced significant health problems in the past five years. However, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he has satisfied the court that there has been a material change of circumstances such as to warrant a variation of the order of Heeney J. There is no doubt that there has been a change in his circumstances. The issue is whether it is a material change as recognized in law.
The change in circumstances he relies on is his voluntary retirement from his job at the first possible date he could do so without any reduction in his pension benefits. In circumstances such as these, the applicant has a positive duty to provide evidence that his decision was made in good faith and on appropriate grounds. The voluntary, unilateral retirement from his job was his decision which he made knowing very well that his decision would significantly impact Ms. Brooker. Mr. Hesketh clearly knew that the spousal support order made by Heeney J. was an indeterminate one based on him working full time and at least to age 60.2.
He cannot sidestep the obligations imposed by the court at that time by a retirement which is not corroborated by medical or vocational experts and/or representatives from his employer who could independently corroborate his claim that he was medically unable to continue his work or that he could not be accommodated in less stressful work by his employer.
50The Court has no doubt that Mr. Cossette suffers from depression to a certain extent. Notwithstanding this, the Court follows the reasoning set out in Hesketh and finds that Mr. Cossette voluntarily resigned from his position at the first possible date claiming that his depression was so bad that he was unable to work. Notwithstanding this, the Court does not find that his retirement due to his condition is a material change in circumstance.
4. Should the Insurance provided as security for the payments of Spousal Support be terminated?
51Since the motion to terminate spousal support has failed, the Court finds that the insurance shall remain in place.
Divorce Act s. 17(7)
52In accordance with the objectives of s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), the Court orders that payment of spousal support at the rate of $1,000 per month shall continue until the Wife reaches 64 years of age, at which time, it will automatically terminate.
Conclusion
53The Court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there has been no material change in circumstances such as to warrant a variation of the Order of Aitken J. The Court is aware that there has been a change in the Husband’s circumstances; however, the Court finds that it is not a material change as recognized in law.
54For the aforesaid reasons, that spousal support shall not be terminated and should continue at a rate of $1,000 per month. In addition, the insurance policies shall be maintained.
Costs
55The Court strongly urges the parties to resolve the issue of costs within 14 days of the release of this decision. If they are unable to do so, they are to contact the Superior Court of Justice Trial Coordinator and set up a time at 9:30 a.m. to argue the issue of costs. Each party should provide a Costs Outline. Each party will be provided with 10 minutes to argue the issue of costs.
56Order accordingly.
Mr. Justice Stanley J. Kershman
Released: August 15, 2014
COURT FILE NO.: FC-01-2528-1
DATE: 2014/08/15
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
CLAIRE COSSETTE
Applicant
– and –
ROBERT COSSETTE
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
Kershman J.
Released: August 15, 2014