Saman Wickramasinghe

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over the legal limit, arguing that his statements to police at the accident scene were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and violated his section 7 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the smell of alcohol alone justified the approved screening device demand and the police had established the driver's identity without relying on the appellant's statements.

The proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice beyond the case.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing in an apartment building.

On appeal, he argued that the eyewitness identification was irredeemably flawed and tainted by the witness's own investigation and improper police video identification procedures, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

He also challenged the jury instructions on identification evidence, the lack of a W. (D.) instruction regarding a witness's testimony, and the instruction on the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the identification evidence, when combined with strong circumstantial evidence including elevator security footage and phone records, reasonably supported the conviction.

The court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

A young person convicted of first‑degree murder for causing the death of a police officer while fleeing a traffic stop was sentenced under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The accused, who was 15 at the time of the offence, survived the crash but was rendered a quadriplegic with profound lifelong medical needs.

The Crown sought the maximum youth sentence of 10 years with five years of open custody followed by four years of community supervision.

The court found the offender’s catastrophic disability, lack of prior record, demonstrated remorse, and low risk to reoffend constituted exceptional circumstances.

The judge concluded that incarceration would not meaningfully enhance accountability and that the correctional system had not demonstrated an ability to meet the offender’s extensive medical needs.

A one‑day custody component with credit for pre‑trial custody and a nine‑year conditional supervision order was imposed.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences related to their involvement in a large-scale clandestine drug lab producing MDMA, ketamine, and methamphetamine.

They appealed their convictions, arguing insufficient evidence of production and identification, and their sentences of 14 and 16 years, arguing the trial judge erred by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample circumstantial and identification evidence.

While the Court agreed the trial judge erred in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, it upheld the sentences as proportionate given the massive scale of the operation and the danger of the drugs produced.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had acquitted after finding reasonable doubt as to whether the accused actually had alcohol in her system.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred by conflating the requirement of reasonable suspicion for a roadside demand with proof that alcohol was actually present.

The proper inquiry was whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect alcohol in the accused’s body at the time of the demand.

Because the officer testified that he smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath and the trial judge accepted that evidence, the reasonable suspicion threshold was met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

During a murder jury trial, the Crown applied to admit a witness’s videotaped police statement and prior preliminary inquiry testimony as substantive evidence under the K.G.B. framework after the witness recanted portions of his earlier account and repeatedly claimed memory loss while testifying before the jury.

The court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness adopted an obstructive stance and attempted to shield the true events despite earlier detailed accounts of the shooting.

Reliability was established through procedural safeguards including a videotaped interview, oath, warnings regarding penal consequences for false statements, and the witness’s availability for cross‑examination.

Additional corroborative circumstances, including forensic evidence and the witness’s belief that surveillance cameras captured the event, further supported reliability.

The court admitted both the videotaped statement and the preliminary hearing evidence as substantive evidence before the jury.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a mistrial application after concerns were raised that some jurors appeared to have difficulty staying awake during lengthy testimony related to a successful K.G.B. application involving a recanting eyewitness.

Following an inquiry of the jury, one juror acknowledged momentarily nodding off while others reported occasional difficulty maintaining focus.

The court held that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort requiring proof of concrete prejudice to the trial process.

The evidence did not establish that jurors missed significant evidence or that the integrity of the proceedings had been fatally compromised.

The application for a mistrial was therefore dismissed.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a lengthy videotaped police interrogation of the accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics and further alleged a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter based on a police comment suggesting consulting counsel would be a mistake.

Applying the confessions rule and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court found that statements made during the first portion of the interview were voluntary but that later portions raised concerns about potential oppression after repeated assertions of the right to silence and fatigue.

The court also found no Charter breach arising from the officer’s comment.

Only the portion of the statement up to 1:05 a.m. was ruled admissible.

Sentencing of three offenders following a jury trial for a planned home invasion robbery.

The offenders entered a residence during the day, masked and armed with a loaded firearm.

They unlawfully confined one victim and shot another victim in the leg during a struggle.

They fled in a getaway vehicle and engaged in a high-speed police chase.

The court sentenced the getaway driver to 7 years, the offender who encouraged the shooting to 10 years, and the third offender to 8.5 years, with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including robbery and firearm offences arising from a home invasion, brought an application arguing that the objective mens rea component of section 21(2) of the Criminal Code violates section 7 of the Charter.

The accused argued that a constitutionally protected minimum subjective mens rea is required for these offences due to their social stigma and mandatory minimum sentences.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither robbery nor the firearm offences carry the requisite level of social stigma to mandate a constitutionally protected minimum subjective mens rea.

During a criminal proceeding involving charges of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy, the accused requested interpretation in the Ibo language.

A voir dire was conducted to determine whether two proposed interpreters were competent to interpret for the accused during the upcoming jury trial.

The court considered the constitutional right to interpretation under s. 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reviewed guidance from appellate authority concerning interpreter competency.

After examining the interpreters’ accreditation status, training, testing results, and courtroom experience, the court found that neither candidate met the required standard of competency for a Superior Court criminal trial.

The court held that the presumption of incompetence for non‑accredited interpreters had not been rebutted and directed that other qualified interpreters be sought.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry on firearms possession charges.

The committal was based on circumstantial evidence that a handgun found in a bedroom closet belonged to or was controlled by the applicant.

The court held that the preliminary inquiry judge relied on speculative opinion evidence from a police officer regarding clothing size in the bedroom to infer occupancy and control.

Because the remaining evidence merely placed the applicant in the apartment and did not link him to the bedroom or firearm, there was no admissible evidence supporting the essential element of possession.

The committal constituted a jurisdictional error and was quashed.

The appellant was stopped for speeding.

During the stop, an officer noticed a box in the vehicle and suspected it contained contraband cigarettes.

The officer asked the appellant about the box without advising him of his right to counsel.

A subsequent authorized search under the Tobacco Tax Act revealed unmarked cigarettes and marijuana.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when the questioning shifted from the traffic stop to a regulatory investigation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault arising from allegations that he touched the complainant’s vagina during a therapeutic massage.

He argued that the verdict was unreasonable due to the trial judge’s misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge applied a higher level of scrutiny to the defence evidence than to the complainant’s evidence.

The appeal court held that several minor misapprehensions of evidence identified in the record were peripheral and did not affect the core credibility findings or reasoning process leading to conviction.

The court also found no basis to conclude that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the parties’ evidence.

The conviction was upheld.