Saman Wickramasinghe

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing in an apartment building.

On appeal, he argued that the eyewitness identification was irredeemably flawed and tainted by the witness's own investigation and improper police video identification procedures, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

He also challenged the jury instructions on identification evidence, the lack of a W. (D.) instruction regarding a witness's testimony, and the instruction on the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the identification evidence, when combined with strong circumstantial evidence including elevator security footage and phone records, reasonably supported the conviction.

The court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences related to their involvement in a large-scale clandestine drug lab producing MDMA, ketamine, and methamphetamine.

They appealed their convictions, arguing insufficient evidence of production and identification, and their sentences of 14 and 16 years, arguing the trial judge erred by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample circumstantial and identification evidence.

While the Court agreed the trial judge erred in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, it upheld the sentences as proportionate given the massive scale of the operation and the danger of the drugs produced.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had acquitted after finding reasonable doubt as to whether the accused actually had alcohol in her system.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred by conflating the requirement of reasonable suspicion for a roadside demand with proof that alcohol was actually present.

The proper inquiry was whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect alcohol in the accused’s body at the time of the demand.

Because the officer testified that he smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath and the trial judge accepted that evidence, the reasonable suspicion threshold was met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry on firearms possession charges.

The committal was based on circumstantial evidence that a handgun found in a bedroom closet belonged to or was controlled by the applicant.

The court held that the preliminary inquiry judge relied on speculative opinion evidence from a police officer regarding clothing size in the bedroom to infer occupancy and control.

Because the remaining evidence merely placed the applicant in the apartment and did not link him to the bedroom or firearm, there was no admissible evidence supporting the essential element of possession.

The committal constituted a jurisdictional error and was quashed.

The appellant was stopped for speeding.

During the stop, an officer noticed a box in the vehicle and suspected it contained contraband cigarettes.

The officer asked the appellant about the box without advising him of his right to counsel.

A subsequent authorized search under the Tobacco Tax Act revealed unmarked cigarettes and marijuana.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when the questioning shifted from the traffic stop to a regulatory investigation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault arising from allegations that he touched the complainant’s vagina during a therapeutic massage.

He argued that the verdict was unreasonable due to the trial judge’s misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge applied a higher level of scrutiny to the defence evidence than to the complainant’s evidence.

The appeal court held that several minor misapprehensions of evidence identified in the record were peripheral and did not affect the core credibility findings or reasoning process leading to conviction.

The court also found no basis to conclude that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the parties’ evidence.

The conviction was upheld.