Ronald Allan

The appellant, a discharged bankrupt, appealed from an order declaring that a default judgment against him was a debt within the meaning of section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and therefore survived his discharge from bankruptcy.

The default judgment was based on the appellant's failure to comply with mortgage payment obligations.

The respondents sought to rely on extraneous evidence showing that the appellant had misappropriated trust funds paid to him by mistake.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in considering extraneous evidence not grounded in the proceedings that produced the judgment debt.

The court held that characterization of a judgment debt under section 178(1)(d) must be based on the pleadings and evidence before the court that granted the judgment, not on new evidence introduced in the bankruptcy application.

Following a summary judgment finding the defendants liable for breaching a commercial lease, the court held a mini-trial to quantify damages.

The court accepted the plaintiff's expert evidence on the present value of unpaid rent, less mitigation from a new lease and the value of distrained chattels left by the tenant.

The court awarded the plaintiff $408,046 in damages, plus pre-judgment interest, and $49,046.05 in partial indemnity costs against the active defendants.

The vendor mistakenly accepted an agreement of purchase and sale for one of two adjacent properties without a condition tying the sale to the second property.

The purchaser attempted to waive the conditions for its benefit by faxing notice to the vendor's solicitor, rather than delivering it personally to the vendor as required by the agreement.

The vendor refused to close, relying on the strict notice requirements.

The purchaser sued for specific performance or damages and brought a motion for partial summary judgment, which was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the entire agreement clause precluded implied terms regarding notice, and that the vendor had not waived the requirement for personal delivery.

The purchaser sought partial summary judgment declaring an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property enforceable and claiming damages for breach when the vendors refused to close.

The vendors argued the agreement should be rectified to reflect that the sale was conditional on the simultaneous purchase of an adjacent property and further argued the purchaser failed to provide notice of waiver of conditions in accordance with the contract.

The court held that the vendors failed to meet the demanding test for rectification based on unilateral mistake because there was no convincing proof of a prior precise oral agreement and no conduct equivalent to fraud by the purchaser.

However, the purchaser’s waiver of conditions was ineffective because the agreement required personal service of notice and the contract’s entire‑agreement clause precluded waiver by conduct.

As a result, the agreement was never completed according to its terms and could not be enforced.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

This was the third time the action had been dismissed.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiff moved promptly, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence, a reasonable explanation for the litigation delay was provided, and the presumption of prejudice was rebutted.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a noting in default and striking his amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the pleading failed to accord with the rules, failed to plead essential elements, and had no possible chance of success.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in heroin.

The principal evidence against them was the testimony of an accomplice.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the danger of convicting on uncorroborated accomplice evidence and pointed out evidence capable of being corroborative.

The appellants appealed, arguing the supporting evidence was too remote.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, abrogating the strict and highly technical common law rules regarding accomplice corroboration derived from R. v. Baskerville.

The Court held that there is no special category for accomplices and that trial judges should use a common sense approach, giving a clear and sharp warning only when the credit of a particular witness warrants it.