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Applicant designated catastrophically impaired due to marked psychological impairment in activities of daily living.
The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination of catastrophic impairment (CAT) due to psychological injuries, including PTSD and a relapse of Major Depressive Disorder.
The respondent denied the CAT designation based on its assessors' conclusions that the applicant suffered only moderate impairments.
The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the applicant's assessors, finding that the respondent's psychiatric assessment lacked thoroughness and failed to properly consider the applicant's reduced functioning in activities of daily living.
The Tribunal concluded that the applicant sustained a Class 4 (marked) impairment in at least one area of functioning and therefore met the definition of catastrophic impairment under the Schedule.
The Tribunal also granted the applicant's request to anonymize her name and limit public access to the adjudicative records due to the sensitive nature of her mental health information.
The court awarded reduced costs to the successful respondent due to disproportionate and scorched-earth litigation tactics.
This costs endorsement followed a successful application by the Respondent concerning the interpretation of a settlement agreement, entitling the Respondent to a $100,000 holdback.
The Respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $24,050.52.
The Applicants, despite being unsuccessful, sought $7,000.00 in costs, alleging unnecessary steps by the Respondent.
The court, applying Rule 57.01 and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, awarded the Respondent $12,000.00 in fees plus disbursements.
The judge noted that the time and effort expended by both sides was disproportionate to the amount in issue and that both parties adopted a "scorched earth" attitude by raising extraneous issues.
Summary judgment was granted for a defaulted mortgage, but claims for higher contractual interest and possession were dismissed.
The plaintiffs sought summary judgment against the defendant for a defaulted $250,000 mortgage.
The court granted judgment for the principal debt, nine missed payments, and an additional three months of interest under Section 17 of the Mortgages Act, totaling $274,999.96.
Pre-judgment interest was awarded at the statutory rate of 2% per annum, and post-judgment interest at 3% per annum.
The court dismissed claims for higher contractual interest rates, service fees, legal fees without proper proof, a writ of possession, and possession as chargee/mortgagee.
The decision also addressed the problematic nature of lawyer affidavits based on file review in summary judgment motions.
Costs were fixed at $9,000.00 for the plaintiffs.
A mortgagee's sole and absolute discretion to accept collateral security includes assessing the adequacy of the security, not merely its registration.
This application concerned the interpretation of a settlement agreement regarding a $100,000 holdback amount.
The applicants (mortgagors) argued that their registration of additional security was satisfactory, and the respondent (mortgagee) could not unreasonably reject it.
The respondent contended it had sole and absolute discretion to determine satisfaction with the additional security.
The court agreed with the respondent's interpretation, finding that the discretion extended to the adequacy of the security, not just its registration.
The court dismissed the applicants' claims for misrepresentation against the respondent but found no misrepresentations by the applicants.
The holdback amount was ordered to be released to the respondent.
Appeal allowed and dismissal for delay set aside based on fresh evidence of appellant's medical challenges.
The appellant appealed an order of the Master that refused to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his action for delay.
The appellant also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal, detailing severe medical and financial challenges that prevented him from advancing the litigation or retaining counsel earlier.
The Divisional Court granted leave to admit the fresh evidence, finding it credible, relevant, and excusably delayed due to the appellant's circumstances.
Based on the fresh evidence, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal order, concluding that the appellant's interest in pursuing his substantial claims outweighed the respondent's interest in having the claims dismissed, especially given the lack of actual prejudice to the respondent.
