Robert N. Beaudoin

The court issued a notice to the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, indicating it was considering dismissing the action.

The plaintiff failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant father brought a motion to modify his access schedule to his four-year-old daughter following a change in his work schedule.

He also raised concerns about the respondent mother's refusal to communicate and her attempts to alienate him, including making unfounded allegations to the Children's Aid Society.

The court found that the mother's actions were not in the child's best interests and that the father offered a loving and safe home.

The court ordered a progressive parenting schedule that will culminate in a 50/50 shared custody arrangement.

The court also relieved the father from paying daycare arrears due to the mother's failure to cooperate in providing necessary financial information.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's motion for leave to appeal an interim order, the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the motion for leave was substantially and procedurally defective, and the appellant acknowledged it was unlikely to succeed.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $5,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, noting the unnecessary delay and costs forced upon the respondent.

The defendant, Jameson Bank, successfully moved for summary judgment and opposed the plaintiff's motion to amend the statement of claim and add new defendants.

Jameson Bank sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to its offer to settle date (September 11, 2014) and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $132,790.43.

The plaintiff, Yunsheng Du, argued for limited costs of $10,000, citing his partial success on the amendment motion and the defendant's unreasonable conduct and excessive rates.

The court found the plaintiff's litigation approach disproportionate and unnecessarily complicated, noting serious but unfounded allegations.

While the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, it was not egregious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $95,495.91, inclusive of HST and disbursements, finding the claimed rates and time spent reasonable given the complexity caused by the plaintiff's actions and counsel's experience.

The Applicant sought various relief, primarily an order for ongoing and retroactive child and spousal support, a parenting schedule for their son, and full financial disclosure from the Respondent.

The court declined to sanction the Respondent for disclosure issues, finding his pursuit of jurisdiction not in bad faith and sufficient information provided for support issues.

The parenting schedule was adjourned due to insufficient evidence.

The court ordered retroactive child and spousal support from July 1, 2016, calculating amounts based on the parties' incomes and applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, noting the high-income payor principles.

The Respondent's cash flow arguments were rejected, emphasizing support obligations over personal acquisitions.

The defendant, Lanark County, sought the summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for "Dafamation" under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the statement of claim to be extremely brief, lacking material facts, and appearing on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, noting a previous identical action by the plaintiff had already been dismissed.

The court directed the Registrar to notify the plaintiff of the potential dismissal, stayed the action pursuant to section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and restricted further filings to only the plaintiff's written submissions regarding the Rule 2.1 hearing.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

At the hearing, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 39.02 to introduce a late-filed affidavit, after having cross-examined the defendants' witnesses.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and criticized the litigation tactic of tailoring evidence.

However, applying a flexible approach, the court granted leave to file the affidavit, finding that any prejudice to the defendants could be compensated by costs or an adjournment, and that the plaintiff should not be deprived of a trial due to counsel's oversight.

The court remained seized of the matter for the defendants to decide whether to proceed with their summary judgment motion and cross-examine the plaintiff.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The Defendants, as the successful parties on the summary judgment motion, sought costs in the range of $17,000-$19,000.

The Plaintiff argued for deferral of costs to the trial judge or a significantly lower award, citing that some defence materials would be used at trial and the limited value/complexity of the motion.

The court found the Defendants' costs claim reasonable, noting the Plaintiff's own higher costs outline for the original motion and the "pay-as-you-go" principle for interlocutory motions.

The court awarded the Defendants $12,000 in all-inclusive costs, plus an additional $500 for preparing the costs submissions.

The plaintiff's action, initiated in Small Claims Court and "transformed" to Superior Court, contained numerous allegations against Algonquin College and one of its representatives, including claims of racism, enhancing terrorism, and seeking billions in damages and imprisonment for the college president.

The court, acting on requisitions from the defendants under Rule 2.1.01(6), found the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court ordered notice to the plaintiff regarding potential dismissal, stayed the action, and restricted further filings.

The defendant, City of Winnipeg o/a Winnipeg Transit, moved to set aside service, dismiss/stay the action for lack of jurisdiction, or stay on forum non conveniens grounds.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, sued for breach of contract against Pattison Outdoor Advertising LP and for Charter rights breaches against both defendants, arising from refusal to display ads on Winnipeg Transit buses.

The court found no jurisdiction simpliciter over Winnipeg Transit, as no presumptive connecting factors to Ontario existed, and the plaintiff's claim of an agent-principal relationship between Winnipeg Transit and Pattison lacked factual foundation.

Even if jurisdiction were found, Manitoba was deemed the forum non conveniens due to the strong connection of the dispute to Winnipeg, where the contract between the defendants was made and the alleged Charter breach occurred.

The motion was granted, and the action was stayed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted his request to amend his application but vacated the scheduled trial date and awarded $10,000 in costs thrown away to the respondent.

The Divisional Court applied the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4).

Finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, the court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The applicant sought to invalidate a search warrant and exclude evidence obtained through police surveillance, arguing that observations made in a condominium parking garage and common areas constituted warrantless and unreasonable searches under section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas and that the police conduct fell within the implied license doctrine, thus upholding the search warrant's validity.

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a family-owned lumber company, brought an application for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, seeking an order to force the respondents to buy out her shares or liquidate the company.

She alleged that the company's refusal to pay dividends despite being profitable, and its refusal to buy her shares, constituted oppressive conduct.

The respondents argued the claim was statute-barred and that the retention of capital was necessary due to the cyclical nature of the softwood lumber industry and the expiration of the Canada-US softwood lumber agreement.

The court found that while the claim regarding recent non-payment of dividends was not statute-barred, the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of receiving dividends given the industry's challenges.

The court concluded that the company's conservative management style and decision to retain a high working capital were valid business decisions and did not constitute oppression.

The application was dismissed.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's submissions revealed that her underlying claim for wrongful dismissal had been resolved over a decade prior through Minutes of Settlement, which included a full release and indemnity.

The court found no basis for the defamation claim pursued and determined that any potential claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

The Crown sought to stay a Master's order requiring it to file a comprehensive statement of defence to a cross-claim by John Barbro, pending an appeal of that order.

The Crown argued the court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-claim, and that complying with the order would render the appeal moot and potentially breach settlement privilege.

Applying the three-part test for a stay, the court found a serious issue to be tried, that failure to stay would irreparably harm the Crown's appeal by rendering it moot, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the stay.

The motion to stay was granted.

The court issued a notice to the plaintiffs under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, indicating it was considering dismissing the action.

The plaintiffs failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

This endorsement addresses the respondent's request for security for spousal support payments, following the applicant's motion to change.

The respondent sought a collateral mortgage on the applicant's jointly-owned property and additional life insurance, arguing that existing policies would be insufficient by 2026.

The applicant contended that her obligation was limited by the original divorce order, which specified that her support obligation would be a first charge on her estate if employment-based insurance was not in effect, and that a mortgage would adversely affect her sister's interest as a joint tenant.

The court declined to order a collateral mortgage due to the impact on the joint tenant and the pre-existing agreement.

However, it ordered the applicant to designate the respondent as an irrevocable beneficiary of 70% of her declining life insurance policies until age 71, with any shortfall becoming a first charge on her estate.

No costs were awarded.

The defendant sought summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for "Dafamation" under Rule 2.1.01, arguing the Statement of Claim was extremely brief, lacked material facts, and appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the claim deficient and directed the Registrar to notify the plaintiff of the potential dismissal, staying the action pursuant to section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and restricting further filings pending a written hearing.

The plaintiff filed a requisition under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the dismissal of the defendant's summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's request, citing the failure to provide a copy of the Notice of Motion and clarifying that Rule 2.1 is an attenuated process not designed for submitting written arguments to dismiss motions in advance of their scheduled hearing.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a previously dismissed motion brought by Bruce Wallace, who sought a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) or alternative security.

The motion was dismissed because Wallace failed to demonstrate a reasonable claim to the properties.

Stephen Campbell, Pamela F. Campbell, and Gryphon’s Head Properties Limited (the "Campbells") sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motion was meritless and should never have been brought.

Wallace argued for lower costs, citing financial difficulties and the potential future utility of the motion materials for the Campbells.

The court found that while there was no formal offer to settle, the extensive materials prepared by the Campbells should have prompted Wallace to reconsider his motion.

Despite a prior agreement between former counsel regarding the CPL, the court concluded that substantial indemnity costs were not appropriate.

However, given the extensive materials prepared by the Campbells, partial indemnity costs of $10,000 were awarded, payable by Wallace within 30 days, rejecting Wallace's financial hardship claim due to unaccounted funds.