Robert N. Beaudoin

Costs were determined following a successful motion removing the plaintiffs’ solicitors due to a conflict of interest arising from the hiring of a lawyer who previously acted for the defendant and the deceased in related matters.

The court found that the lawyer possessed confidential and privileged information and had disclosed it to the firm representing the plaintiffs, and that the firm failed to implement effective screening measures.

The defendant and a supporting third party sought substantial or full indemnity costs.

The court concluded that the conduct of the plaintiffs’ counsel was sufficiently egregious to warrant full indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded to both the moving defendant and the third party, with a portion ordered to be paid personally by the solicitors under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary a previous judgment to include a declaration that the applicant had abandoned a portion of a right-of-way on the respondents' property.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing the relief was not pleaded at trial.

The court found that the issue of the applicant's use of the right-of-way was fully canvassed at trial and that it was in the interest of justice to provide finality.

The court varied the judgment to declare the right-of-way abandoned, but granted the applicant an easement over a narrow strip to allow for inspection of her garage.

Following earlier reasons granting relief in a dispute involving charitable corporations and trust‑like obligations over charitable assets, the successful applicants sought substantial indemnity costs against the respondent foundation.

The court considered allegations that the respondent had advanced reckless and unfounded accusations of dishonesty, breach of trust, and misappropriation during the proceedings.

It also reviewed the applicants’ unaccepted Rule 49 offer to settle and the complexity and importance of the litigation concerning charitable corporations, fiduciary duties, and the Charities Accounting Act.

The court concluded that the respondent’s conduct, including unsupported allegations and misrepresentations of fact, justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Costs of $454,686.19 were awarded to the applicants, and additional costs were awarded to the Public Guardian and Trustee.

Following the defendant’s successful motion to strike the statement of claim and the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful motion to amend, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs totaling more than $32,000, arguing the action resembled a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) intended to silence complaints made to the Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy.

The court accepted that the defendant was entirely successful but held that the defendant’s original costs outlines represented a reasonable expectation of costs payable by an unsuccessful party.

Costs were therefore fixed partly on a partial indemnity basis and partly on a substantial indemnity basis, with additional costs for the action.

The court declined to add additional amounts for Quebec counsel or expanded claims beyond the original outlines.

The applicants, condominium unit owners, sought costs on a full indemnity basis following a dispute with the condominium board over modifications to the courtyard.

The parties had reached minutes of settlement, which the board subsequently attempted to resile from, necessitating a motion to enforce the settlement.

The court found that the board acted in bad faith in attempting to resile from the agreement.

Costs were awarded to the applicants, with the condominium corporation ordered to pay the costs of the injunction and application, while the board members were ordered to personally pay the costs of the motion to enforce the settlement.

An application sought removal of an estate trustee and appointment of a corporate trustee under s. 37 of the Trustee Act.

The applicant alleged the trustee refused to pay trust income to the life beneficiary, acted in conflict of interest as both trustee and capital beneficiary, and breached settlement terms governing joint management of trust investments.

The court reviewed the governing principles for removal of trustees, emphasizing that the primary consideration is the welfare of the beneficiaries and that removal requires evidence that the trust cannot be properly administered if the trustee remains.

Given ongoing hostility, breaches of the settlement agreement, unilateral investment decisions, and interruption of income payments to the life beneficiary, the court found the conflict impaired the trustee’s ability to exercise discretion impartially.

The trustee was removed and a corporate trustee appointed.

The applicant sought to access funds from his locked-in retirement account (LIRA) and terminate spousal support.

The respondent cross-moved for contempt, payment of arrears, and a lump sum spousal support award from the LIRA.

The court found the applicant had a history of non-disclosure, intentionally depleted assets, and failed to pay support despite having the means.

To ensure future support and satisfy arrears, the court ordered a $200,000 lump sum transfer from the applicant's LIRA to the respondent and directed that $24,150 previously authorized for withdrawal be paid to the respondent for arrears.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim for defamation, arguing the impugned statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The statements were made in letters of complaint to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy regarding the conduct of the plaintiffs in their capacity as bankruptcy trustee and associate.

The court found that the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is a quasi-judicial body and that the complaints were protected by absolute privilege.

The court struck the statement of claim and denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend, finding the proposed amendments were legally untenable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to make decisions regarding admission to a care facility.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence about her medication levels, ignored helpful evidence, and improperly focused on her best interests rather than her capacity.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly applied the statutory test for capacity.

The court held that the appellant's inability to understand the need for medication and supervision, and her lack of insight into her condition, supported the Board's finding of incapacity.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal regarding the calculation of his long-term average earnings.

The applicant, a drywall installer, argued his benefits should be based on his gross earnings.

The Tribunal concluded that, for fairness, his average earnings should be calculated based on the net income he declared for tax purposes, accounting for his business expenses.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.