Robert N. Beaudoin

The moving party, a mechanical subcontractor, sought compensation for storage and handling costs of mechanical equipment retained after a construction project went into receivership.

The court found that the moving party met the broad definition of a 'storer' under the Repair and Storage Liens Act, as there was an understanding it would be paid for reasonable storage costs.

The court awarded storage costs at a rate of $82.19 per day from the date of the receivership appointment, but denied claims for the cost of installing a security gate and legal costs under the Act.

The self-represented plaintiffs commenced an action seeking $939 million in damages, alleging a vast conspiracy involving artificial human reproduction, terrorism fabrication, and high-profile individuals.

The claim named a Superior Court judge who had previously dismissed their claims against a law firm.

The court initiated a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After reviewing the plaintiffs' written submissions, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting it was a collateral attack on previous binding decisions.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a declaration that certain inadvertently disclosed documents were subject to solicitor-client or litigation privilege, their return, and the removal of the plaintiffs' counsel of record.

The plaintiffs, former executives of the defendant organization suing for wrongful dismissal, argued that common interest privilege applied to the legal advice they received alongside the board of directors.

The court found that common interest privilege applied to the majority of the disputed communications and that privilege had been waived for others.

The motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel was dismissed as grossly disproportionate, given that only one minor redaction was required and no prejudice was shown.

The court screened a self-represented plaintiff's action against numerous corporate, individual, and police defendants under rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the guidance in Gao and the jurisprudence defining frivolous and vexatious proceedings, the court found the statement of claim unintelligible, unsupported by any reasonable grounds, and constituting an abuse of process.

The court held that any proposed summary judgment motion would be doomed to fail and that requiring the defendants to respond would waste court resources.

The action was dismissed, the Registrar was directed to accept no further filings from the plaintiff in the action, and no costs were ordered.

The plaintiff tenant sought a declaration and specific performance of an agreement to purchase leased commercial lands from the defendant landlord following a barn collapse and insurance settlement.

The court held that the landlord's long-time property manager had actual or apparent authority to bind the corporation, that an enforceable agreement existed for the sale of the severable six-acre parcel, and that any deficiency under the Statute of Frauds was overcome by part performance.

The court further found the property was sufficiently unique and damages inadequate, particularly given the plaintiff's substantial improvements and the defendant's attempt to renegotiate after receiving the insurance cheque.

Specific performance was granted, the approval authority was directed to accept the severance application without the owner's consent, and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

Les demandeurs ont poursuivi l’exploitant et le propriétaire d’un parc aquatique après une chute ayant causé une fracture du coude.

Le procès portait uniquement sur la responsabilité des occupantes au regard de la Loi sur la responsabilité des occupants.

Le tribunal a conclu que la preuve n’établissait pas, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, l’existence d’une condition dangereuse ayant causé la chute, notamment en raison d’incohérences importantes entre les témoignages au procès et les interrogatoires préalables.

La preuve des défenderesses sur l’entretien continu et l’état impeccable des lieux a été retenue.

L’action a donc été rejetée sur la question de la responsabilité.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, the respondent municipality sought partial indemnity costs of $27,321.55.

The applicant argued for no costs or symbolic costs, asserting he acted as a public interest litigant regarding municipal workplace harassment obligations.

The court applied the criteria for public interest litigants and awarded the respondent symbolic costs fixed at $5,000.

On a motion to vary prior family law orders, the court determined the parties' 2014 incomes, parenting-time consequences for two children, section 7 expense claims, and ongoing child support for a child attending school abroad.

Applying the income-imputation framework under s. 19(1)(a) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court found the applicant unreasonably restricted his employment search after layoff and imputed income of $75,000.

The respondent's income for support purposes was fixed at $600,000, including investment income.

The court found one child spent at least 40% of his time with the applicant during three summer months but not August, found the other child was not in the applicant's care 40% of the time in September, allowed the parties' claimed section 7 expenses including vehicle and cell phone expenses, and held child support should continue for the child attending private school in Switzerland.

Following a defamation judgment awarding general and aggravated damages, the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of $80,724.36.

The court applied the factors in rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held the time claimed was excessive, the damages recovered were significantly lower than the amounts claimed, and the proceeding was a short uncontested trial by default.

The court gave very little weight to the plaintiffs' expert evidence and disallowed amounts for the expert report and an unexplained Westlaw disbursement.

Costs were fixed at $34,288 all-inclusive.

In a child protection costs motion following withdrawal of the protection application, the father sought over $100,000 against the children’s aid society and the mother, alleging the society had failed to investigate properly and had acted unfairly.

The court held that costs against a society arise only in exceptional circumstances and found the society had acted fairly, even-handedly, and in good faith throughout, including by reassessing its position as new information emerged and making repeated reasonable settlement offers.

The father’s allegations of conspiracy, bias, and misconduct were rejected as unsupported and frequently based on misreadings of the record.

The father’s claim for costs was dismissed, the mother was awarded $600, and the society was awarded $6,000 on its cross-motion, with a bar on further proceedings against the society until those costs were paid.

In a bifurcated slip-and-fall trial arising from an incident at a recreational waterpark, the plaintiffs sought to call a mechanical engineer to opine on whether the water filtration system was designed to operate underwater and on contaminants allegedly affecting the surface condition.

After a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan criteria for admissibility of expert evidence and held that the proposed witness lacked specific expertise in commercial pool filtration systems, waterpark operations, and water contamination analysis.

The court further found the opinion evidence did not satisfy the necessity requirement because it was not shown how it would materially assist in proving the alleged hazard at the location of the fall.

The plaintiffs' expert was therefore disqualified.

Following a Rule 21 determination in estate litigation concerning whether trust monies paid to a life tenant could be accumulated, the successful defendants sought costs of the motion on a full indemnity basis.

The court held it was appropriate to fix costs immediately because the plaintiffs intended to appeal and the balance of the trial had been adjourned indefinitely.

Applying ordinary civil costs principles rather than the traditional estate-costs approach, the court found the plaintiffs acted unreasonably by failing to pursue an early interpretation issue and by framing the matter as a damages action rather than seeking directions.

Partial indemnity costs of $15,000 all-inclusive were awarded and charged against assets being held for the plaintiffs in the estates.

On a motion pending an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding incapacity to consent to treatment, the court authorized interim antipsychotic treatment under ss. 19(1)-(2) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The central dispute concerned necessity under s. 19(2)(d), as the responding party conceded the other statutory criteria.

The court accepted evidence that prolonged untreated psychosis would worsen prognosis, increase deterioration, and delay discharge from hospital, while also negatively affecting physical health management.

Treatment pending appeal was therefore found necessary and ordered.

In an uncontested defamation trial arising from anonymous postings on an online investment bulletin board, the court found that statements accusing the chief executive officer of lying, defrauding shareholders, stealing ownership interests, and misusing corporate funds were defamatory of both the individual plaintiff and the corporate plaintiff.

The court held that publication and reference were established, but rejected the corporate plaintiff's claim for special damages based on alleged market capitalization loss because the expert evidence was unreliable and causation was not proven.

The individual plaintiff received $30,000 in general damages and $10,000 in aggravated damages.

The corporate plaintiff received $25,000 in general damages.

Punitive damages were refused.

Le requérant, ancien maire et contribuable municipal, sollicitait un contrôle judiciaire, des déclarations et un mandamus relativement à une résolution municipale ayant maintenu le statu quo face à des plaintes de harcèlement au travail déposées contre un conseiller.

La cour a conclu que le différend n’était pas strictement théorique, mais que les réparations demandées n’auraient aucun effet pratique compte tenu de l’adoption subséquente d’une nouvelle résolution mandatant une enquête indépendante, du départ du conseiller visé du conseil et du litige civil déjà engagé par l’employé plaignant.

En appliquant les conditions du mandamus, la cour a jugé que la forme de l’enquête relevait d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire et que la municipalité n’avait pas agi de mauvaise foi en retenant une enquête confidentielle dans un contexte de litige.

La requête a été rejetée avec dépens à déterminer.

On the return of a civil contempt motion, the plaintiff sought incarceration after the defendant failed to purge an earlier contempt finding by providing complete answers to undertakings.

The court found the defendant continued to mislead the court through repackaged, redacted, and unreliable documents and had not purged his contempt.

Applying the established principles governing civil contempt sentencing, the court held that a further custodial sanction was unnecessary given the prior striking of the defence, partial judgment, and earlier costs award.

The court instead imposed a $7,500 fine, authorized further tracing steps through signed authorizations, and awarded substantial indemnity costs of $12,000.

In an estates motion brought during trial, the court determined a question of law concerning whether a widow holding life interests under two testamentary trusts was prohibited from accumulating trust income in her own name.

Applying ordinary principles of will interpretation, the court held the testator's language conferred broad and unrestricted use of trust income for the widow's sole use and benefit, without any requirement to preserve unused income for remainder beneficiaries.

The court found no express or implied limitation requiring capitalization of unused income and emphasized the testator's stated intention that his wife's well-being and comfort take priority over preserving the estate.

The question posed on the motion was answered in the negative.

The accused applied for a declaration that s. 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which criminalizes organizing the entry of undocumented persons into Canada, was unconstitutionally overbroad contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.

The applicant argued the provision captured humanitarian actors and family members assisting refugees, thereby exceeding Parliament’s intent.

The court held the legislative objective of the provision is border control and immigration system integrity, and that Parliament intentionally enacted a broad offence without exemptions.

Relying heavily on appellate authority, the court found the provision’s scope aligned with its objective and therefore not overbroad.

The constitutional challenge was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a motion to change seeking to terminate or reduce spousal support, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court applied the presumption of costs under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules and considered the factors under Rule 24(11).

The moving party had failed to provide reliable medical evidence supporting his alleged inability to pay support and had unilaterally ceased making support payments, leaving the responding party dependent on limited pension income.

The court found the motion lacked a proper evidentiary foundation and forced the responding party to incur unnecessary legal expenses to defend support that was critical to her livelihood.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking termination of spousal support and retroactive adjustments, alleging the respondent was intentionally underemployed and requesting income be imputed to her.

The respondent sought increased spousal support, sole custody, adjustments to child support, and arrears for s. 7 expenses.

Applying the test from Drygala v. Pauli and s. 19 of the Child Support Guidelines, the court found the respondent had made reasonable efforts to obtain additional employment within the school board and declined to impute full‑time income.

However, the court imputed $10,000 in additional income based on the respondent’s ability to earn supplementary income through tutoring.

The court also limited s. 7 expenses to those specified in the prior consent order and dismissed additional claims for expenses not previously agreed upon.