Robert N. Beaudoin

The court considered dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, following a requisition from a defendant.

The plaintiff sought $16 million against a Canadian Senator, alleging he was a "China Gov. /CCP spy" based on vague observations and a non-existent right to a parliamentary hearing.

The court found no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the Senator.

Consequently, the action was stayed, and the Registrar was directed to issue notice for a written hearing to consider its dismissal.

The court issued a notice to the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, indicating it was considering dismissing the action.

The plaintiff failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child, W.M.J.C., was in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b)(ii) and 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act, and an order of Crown Wardship for adoption.

The mother opposed, seeking the child's return under supervision or an extension of Society wardship.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's continued lack of insight into her parenting deficiencies and the significant risk of future emotional harm, despite some improvements in the home environment.

The mother's plan for care was deemed not viable, and the father was uncooperative.

The court dismissed the mother's request for an extension and ordered Crown Wardship for adoption, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

The applicants' appeal of a decision by the Director of Land Titles was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $26,441.90 on a partial indemnity basis for the appeal, which involved a claim for $420 million in compensation for alleged fraudulent conveyances.

The applicants did not provide costs submissions.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principle that costs awarded to the Crown should not be reduced merely because counsel is a salaried officer.

The court found the requested costs reasonable given the complexity and importance of the issues, and ordered the applicants to pay $26,441.90.

The Applicant successfully moved to take over the parties’ rental property and use its income for her and their children's support.

The Respondent's cross-motion to reduce support to zero was dismissed.

The court found the Respondent behaved unreasonably by refusing to pay court-ordered support, blocking the Applicant’s access to funds, and failing to disclose significant financial information.

Costs were awarded to the Applicant on a substantial indemnity scale.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to amend her pleadings at the outset of trial, the defendants sought costs of the motion and costs thrown away for trial preparation.

The court awarded the defendants costs of the motion on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable in any event of the cause and offset against any award payable to the plaintiff after trial.

The issue of costs thrown away was left to the trial judge.

The defendant was entirely successful on a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim of theft.

The principal of the corporate plaintiff had previously been convicted of extortion and harassment against the defendant but persisted in the civil claim.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a full indemnity basis due to the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct, fixing the total costs at $57,748.20, payable jointly and severally by the corporate plaintiff and its principal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and engaged in speculative reasoning to reconcile conflicting timelines provided by police officers and a tow truck driver.

The appellant contended there was an unexplained 14-minute delay, rendering the breath samples not taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error, properly applied the law, and reasonably concluded that the discrepancies were due to asynchronous timepieces and that the police acted reasonably.

The applicant children's aid society sought an order for Crown wardship without access for a young child with significant special needs, including reactive attachment disorder, PTSD, and ADHD.

The child had been apprehended due to chronic neglect, the mother's prescription drug abuse, and the father's anger management issues and history of sexual offences.

The parents sought the return of the child to their care under supervision or an extension of society wardship.

The court found that the parents lacked insight into the child's complex needs and had failed to follow through with recommended therapeutic and anger management programming.

Concluding that the parents' plan was not viable and that the child required a stable, structured environment, the court ordered Crown wardship.

The court also denied access to the parents, finding they had not met the onus of proving that access would be meaningful and beneficial or that it would not impair the child's future opportunities for adoption.

The borrowers brought a motion to set aside a consent order terminating a receivership, alleging that the Bank and the court-appointed Receiver made misrepresentations during settlement negotiations.

The Bank and the Receiver brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the borrowers' subsequent action for damages.

The court found no evidence of misrepresentation, noting that the borrowers had independent legal advice, received full disclosure, and signed multiple full and final releases.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the consent order, denied retroactive leave to sue the Receiver, and granted summary judgment dismissing the borrowers' action on the basis of res judicata.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's pleadings or, in the alternative, for possession of a jointly held rental property due to the respondent's failure to pay court-ordered child and spousal support.

The respondent sought to reduce his support obligations to zero, claiming an inability to work due to depression.

The court rejected the respondent's evidence of disability as unreliable and noted his failure to disclose significant financial transactions.

Relying on Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, the court granted the applicant possession of the rental property to manage and receive income, ordering the respondent to vacate the premises.

Following the dismissal of the defendant condominium corporation's motion for leave to appeal an order allowing the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff relied on an offer to settle and the financial disparity between the parties.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs in the global amount of $7,000, noting that her offer to settle was reasonable and that the financial disparity between the parties could be considered under Rule 57.01(1)(i).

On the first day of trial, the plaintiff sought to amend her Statement of Claim to advance a $240,000 claim for damages.

The proceeding was originally commenced as an application under the Solicitors Act to assess a solicitor's bill, which was later ordered to be treated as an action.

The court held that an order under Rule 38.10 does not retroactively convert an application into an action for all purposes, and the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action for damages.

Because the plaintiff knew of the potential claim years prior, the amendment was statute-barred under the Limitations Act and the motion was dismissed.

A condominium corporation sought a substantial costs award following an application brought to enforce compliance with the Condominium Act, 1998 and the condominium’s declaration and rules.

The underlying dispute involved alleged misconduct by a unit occupier that resulted in complaints and prior police involvement, but the matter was resolved after a consent order and no further incidents occurred.

The court considered the corporation’s request for full or substantial indemnity costs under s.134 of the Act but found the extensive application record unnecessary and disproportionate.

Emphasizing the court’s discretion over costs and the circumstances of the respondent’s disabilities and the settlement achieved, the court limited recovery to a reduced partial indemnity amount.

The applicant was awarded $5,000 in all‑inclusive costs payable within five years.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their pleadings and join the provincial Crown and several fire investigators to a negligence action arising from a fatal residential fire.

The court held that the proposed claims were statute‑barred because the alleged negligence relating to the fire investigation was discoverable more than two years before the joinder motion was brought.

The court further found the proposed amendments disclosed no viable cause of action because the investigators owed no private duty of care to the plaintiffs when performing statutory investigative functions.

Additional barriers included the deemed undertaking rule arising from discovery evidence and statutory immunity protecting investigators acting in good faith.

The motion to join the Crown and investigators and amend the pleadings was therefore dismissed.

The defendant condominium corporation sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order permitting the plaintiff to amend a statement of claim to include additional water infiltration incidents and claims for breaches of statutory duties and oppression under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The moving party argued the amendments conflicted with authority requiring condominium disputes to proceed through mediation and arbitration under s. 132(4) of the Act.

The court held that the alleged conflicting authority concerned different legal principles and factual circumstances, and therefore did not satisfy the leave test under Rule 62.02(4)(a).

The court also found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision and concluded that oppression claims under s. 135 and certain statutory breach claims are not necessarily subject to the mandatory mediation and arbitration provisions.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The defendant employee brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff employer's action for alleged theft.

The employer's principal had previously been convicted of attempting to extort the employee based on these same theft allegations.

The court found there was no admissible evidence of any theft occurring at the plaintiff's premises, let alone by the defendant.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the claim against the defendant.

The self-represented plaintiff was invited to provide written submissions explaining why her action should not be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff’s submissions challenged earlier tribunal proceedings and alleged bias and misconduct by various participants, including tribunal adjudicators, opposing counsel, and defendants.

The court found that the action attempted to re‑litigate matters previously determined by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and sought relief that no reasonable litigant could expect to obtain.

The court also noted ongoing attacks against counsel and tribunal officials as further indicators of vexatious litigation.

Concluding that the proceeding bore the hallmarks of a vexatious claim, the court dismissed the action.

The accused was prosecuted for multiple offences arising from a scheme involving the private “Group of Five” refugee sponsorship program.

The Crown alleged that the accused submitted large numbers of sponsorship applications supported by forged bank letters, fabricated pay stubs, and identity documents belonging to purported sponsors.

Evidence showed the accused possessed extensive copies of personal identification, draft financial letters, and materials used to fabricate documentation.

The court found the accused lacked credibility and concluded that the documentary and circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he forged documents, used forged documents, possessed identity information for fraudulent purposes, and made misrepresentations under immigration legislation.

The court also found the accused offered a bribe to an immigration officer to expedite applications.

However, the court acquitted the accused on the charge of organizing illegal entry under IRPA because the refugees entered Canada with valid travel documents.

Following a motion to vary in a family law proceeding, the court considered submissions on costs.

Both parties had made offers to settle, but neither offer was more favourable than the result obtained, rendering Rule 18(4) of the Family Law Rules inapplicable.

The court found that success on the motion was divided, with each party prevailing on some issues including income determinations, child residence, retroactive child support, and section 7 expenses.

The court rejected arguments that one party’s financial advantage or alleged aggressive litigation conduct justified a costs award.

In light of the mixed outcome, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.