Robert N. Beaudoin

The plaintiff, Yunsheng Du, sought damages from Jameson Bank after unauthorized wire transfers occurred due to his email account being hacked.

Jameson Bank moved for summary judgment, arguing it acted in accordance with the account agreement, which placed responsibility for email security on Du and contained an exclusion of liability clause for anything less than gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

Du also sought to amend his claim to add new causes of action and parties.

The court dismissed Du's proposed amendments for oppression remedy and breach of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, finding them untenable.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Jameson Bank, concluding that the contractual terms barred Du's claims for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, negligence, gross negligence, and conversion, as Du failed to secure his email account and Jameson Bank had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the instructions.

The plaintiff, G.M. French Construction Co., sought leave to bring a summary judgment motion and summary judgment for unpaid invoices totaling $74,454.79, less a Tarion defect amount, arising from a cost-plus contract to build a new home.

The plaintiff also sought to dismiss or stay the defendants' counterclaim.

The court, applying the test from Hryniak v. Mauldin and s. 67 of the Construction Lien Act, found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including disputes over change orders, the value of unapproved changes, work performance, project delays, and the consultant's payment approvals.

Consequently, leave for the summary judgment motion and the motion for summary judgment were denied.

The defendants Brent Timmons and BrazeauSeller LLP requested an order dismissing the claim against them under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous and vexatious.

The court, following established jurisprudence, found that the abusive nature of the proceeding was not apparent on the face of the pleading, and no Statement of Claim was provided by the moving parties.

The court dismissed the request, stating that recourse to the attenuated process of Rule 2.1 was not appropriate and any argument should be made by way of a formal Notice of Motion.

The self-represented applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed her motion for third-party disclosure and ordered costs against her.

The court applied the Mauldin factors and found that while the applicant had an intention to appeal and an explanation for the delay, granting the extension would cause significant prejudice to the respondent by delaying the scheduled trial.

The court also found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the underlying order.

The motion was dismissed with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The court, on its own motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the Court.

This decision was made after the plaintiff failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period following notice from the Registrar.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, brought a motion for default judgment against two defendants for defamation.

The defendants, co-owners in a Costa Rican condominium, sent emails to other owners alleging theft, dishonesty, and unethical behavior by the plaintiff, who was the HOA President.

Both defendants were noted in default.

The court established jurisdiction based on attornment (for one defendant) and the real and substantial connection test (for both, as defamatory emails were received in Ontario).

The court found the statements defamatory, referring to the plaintiff, and published.

Damages were assessed, considering the plaintiff's professional standing, the seriousness and widespread nature of the allegations, the defendants' lack of retraction or apology, and their malicious conduct, including attempts to deter litigation.

General, aggravated, and punitive damages were awarded against each defendant, along with costs.

The Crown sought to amend count six of the indictment, which initially charged possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, to reflect an unloaded firearm with readily accessible ammunition, and to reopen its case to adduce expert evidence on ammunition capability.

The accused opposed, arguing prejudice.

The court granted the Crown's requests, finding no irreparable prejudice to the accused, noting that the defense of "knowledge and control" would remain unchanged and that the error in the indictment was inadvertent.

The court, on requisition from the Attorney General of Canada, reviewed the plaintiffs' statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim, seeking $250,000,000 in damages, was found to lack material facts and a discernible cause of action, appearing frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court ordered notice to the plaintiffs regarding potential dismissal, stayed the action pursuant to section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and restricted further filings pending a written hearing.

The court, on its own initiative, dismissed the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.

This decision was made after the plaintiff failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period following notice that the court was considering such an order.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases following a preliminary inquiry as per R. v. Jordan.

The court identified 13 months of defence-caused delay, including unavailability of counsel, re-election for a preliminary inquiry, conflict of interest by original counsel, and rejection of earlier trial dates.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that they took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim, Bruce Wallace, sought an order for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on two properties or, alternatively, for $450,000 from property sale proceeds to be deposited with the Court.

Wallace claimed an interest in the properties based on misappropriation of corporate resources and a constructive trust.

The court found that Wallace did not demonstrate a reasonable claim to the properties, noting that one property was sold to the corporation for fair market value and the other was never owned by Wallace.

The court also considered the balance of factors for granting a CPL and found they did not favour Wallace, emphasizing that damages would be a satisfactory remedy.

The motion for a CPL and the alternative relief were dismissed, and the funds held in trust were ordered to be released to Gryphon’s Head Properties Limited.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion to change a spousal support order.

The applicant sought to terminate support or receive credit for overpayments, while the respondent opposed termination.

The court had previously reduced the applicant's support obligation but did not terminate it.

Both parties made offers to settle.

The court found that while the applicant had some success on the substantive motion, the respondent was successful in opposing the termination of support.

The respondent's offer to settle did not meet the requirements for full indemnity costs under Rule 18(4) of the Family Law Rules because it would have necessitated further litigation for the applicant.

Consequently, the respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful summary judgment motion brought by the defendants, the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers, against the plaintiff Deana Rotondo.

Rotondo's action for false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches had been dismissed.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs for the entire action, including the summary judgment motion.

The court found no reason to deviate from the general rule that the successful party on a summary judgment motion is entitled to costs of both the motion and the action.

The plaintiff's arguments regarding unnecessary delay by the defendants and the relevance of a cited case were rejected.

The court awarded the defendants costs in the amount of $16,721.30 plus post-judgment interest.

The court reviewed a 28-page statement of claim seeking $150 million in damages against multiple defendants, including Aubrey Drake Graham and various entertainment and media companies, and the Toronto Police Services.

The plaintiff alleged intellectual property theft, a campaign of abuse and terror, hacking, surveillance, and physical harm, including poisoning.

The court found the allegations to be outrageous and not rooted in demonstrable facts, concluding the action appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The action was stayed, and the Registrar was directed to issue notice for a potential dismissal.

Following a requisition from the defendant, the court considered dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's statement of claim contained broad, unsubstantiated allegations of spying and sought substantial damages without a clear cause of action.

The court noted the plaintiff's history of similar dismissed claims.

The action was stayed, and the Registrar was directed to notify the plaintiff of the court's intent to dismiss the action, pending a written hearing.

The moving defendants brought a motion to strike an expert report served late by the co-defendant, and to prevent the expert from testifying at the upcoming trial.

The responding party argued the motion should be deferred to the trial judge under Rule 53.03(3).

The court held that while deferring to the trial judge is the general rule, a motion judge can rule in advance in rare cases to prevent prejudice and loss of trial time.

The court struck the report, finding it failed the Mohan criteria for admissibility because it relied on an irrelevant statutory framework (the Occupational Health and Safety Act) and assessed an ordinary standard of care that did not require specialized knowledge.

The applicant brought a Motion to Change seeking to terminate spousal support following her retirement from the federal government.

The respondent, who had sacrificed his career to support the applicant's career and care for their child, argued against termination.

The court found a material change in circumstances upon the applicant reaching age 59.92.

Applying the rule against double recovery from Boston v. Boston, the court determined that an appropriate support order could be achieved without resorting to the unequalized portion of the applicant's pension.

Spousal support was reduced but not terminated, set at $2,086 per month until age 67, and $1,304 per month thereafter.

The plaintiff commenced an action for wrongful dismissal and served a Rule 49 offer to settle early in the litigation.

The defendant accepted the offer two years later, shortly before trial, agreeing to pay costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The parties could not agree on the quantum of costs.

The court assessed the plaintiff's bill of costs, noting some excessive time docketed for discovery and pre-trial preparation, and fixed total costs at $119,123.45.

L.C. was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference against his stepdaughter, S.B.M., who was between six and eight years old at the time of the offences.

The charge of sexual interference was conditionally stayed based on the Kineapple principle.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's age, abuse of trust, repeated acts of intercourse over 2.5 years, prior similar convictions, and the long-standing psychological impact on the child.

Mitigating factors included a positive pre-sentence report, steady employment, and family support.

The court sentenced L.C. to 6.5 years' incarceration for sexual assault, along with a DNA order, lifetime sex offender registration, and a communication prohibition with the victim during the custodial period.

The appellant employer appealed a Small Claims Court decision that awarded the respondent employee $5000 in aggravated damages for wrongful dismissal.

The appeal court found that the deputy judge erred in law by awarding aggravated damages without a finding that the employer's conduct during termination was unfair or in bad faith, and without evidence of actual damages suffered by the employee.

The appeal was allowed, and the award of aggravated damages was set aside.