Robert L. Maranger

The applicant sought an order appointing a mediator/arbitrator under a construction contract dispute clause arising from a fire that occurred more than a decade after project completion.

The respondent argued that the dispute was properly before the courts, particularly as the applicant had commenced a multi-party action against numerous defendants not bound by the arbitration clause.

The court held that the arbitration provisions were intended to operate during the course of the construction project and that ordering arbitration would create parallel proceedings and potential prejudice to other parties.

Relying on prior authority addressing similar procedural conflicts, the court found that the applicant could not pursue arbitration against one party while simultaneously litigating broader claims in court.

The application was dismissed.

Following a one‑day family trial, the applicant sought a divorce and equalization of net family property after a long marriage.

The respondent, self‑represented, did not file a net family property statement but alleged that the applicant had stolen approximately $500,000 during the marriage and had sold a beehive business and equipment for an unreasonably low value.

The court found no evidence supporting the allegation of theft and declined to speculate regarding decades‑old financial transactions.

The court also accepted the applicant’s valuation and sale price of the beehive business based on evidence that the enterprise had been declining and the equipment was largely dilapidated.

An equalization payment of $23,134.04 was ordered and a divorce was granted subject to filing the required documentation.

The respondent brought a motion for interim spousal support in a family law proceeding.

The court considered the parties’ income positions and competing Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines calculations.

The judge found the evidence supported the payor spouse’s annual employment income of approximately $56,000–$58,000 and imputed $7,500 annual income to the recipient spouse.

Considering the length of the relationship, the recipient’s modest financial needs, and her interim occupancy of the matrimonial home, the court ordered interim spousal support of $1,500 per month retroactive to May 25, 2014.

Arrears of $3,000 were to be paid from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

The court determined interim child and spousal support pending trial in a family law proceeding.

The parties’ children resided with the respondent in the matrimonial home while the applicant paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance after separation.

The court held that these payments, exceeding the Child Support Guidelines amount, satisfied the applicant’s interim child support obligation.

The court also ordered interim spousal support of $1,250 per month, imputing income to the respondent based on her skills and education despite claims of disability.

The interim order was intended to remain in effect until trial, subject to variation if the trial did not proceed as scheduled.

The responding party brought a motion for security for costs in a family law proceeding where the applicant sought to set aside a comprehensive separation agreement governing child and spousal support.

The agreement had been negotiated with counsel and based on an income assessment provided by the applicant’s own expert.

The court found the applicant’s claim had little chance of success and that the evidence did not support the allegation that the respondent’s conduct caused the applicant’s reduced income.

The court further found that the applicant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a potential costs award.

Security for costs was therefore ordered.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking recognition and enforcement in Ontario of an Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench custody order requiring the return of the child and establishing shared custody.

The respondent opposed recognition and brought a cross‑motion to transfer the proceeding to Haileybury, Ontario, and requested that an Ontario court assume jurisdiction over custody and access.

The court held that a triable issue existed regarding whether the respondent had been given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Alberta order was made, precluding summary judgment under s. 41 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the proceeding was transferred to Haileybury on the balance of convenience.

The court further held that Ontario jurisdiction under s. 22 of the Act required determination after a full hearing with viva voce evidence.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a negligence action arising from an alleged gas leak and installation of a replacement boiler in a condominium unit.

The plaintiff alleged exposure to toxic fumes and off‑gassing from carpeting that caused multiple respiratory and neurological conditions.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to provide admissible expert evidence establishing causation between the defendants’ conduct and the alleged health injuries.

Medical reports relied upon were not in admissible affidavit form and were largely based on the plaintiff’s self‑reports.

The absence of air quality testing or expert engineering evidence linking the installation or maintenance of the boilers to the alleged injuries was fatal to the claim.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

Parents brought an application alleging that the refusal to provide a door‑to‑door school bus stop for their children attending a French-language Catholic elementary school violated their rights under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They sought an order compelling the school transportation consortium to provide a stop directly in front of their residence.

The court held that the consortium’s transportation decisions were subject to Charter scrutiny because the consortium exercised a governmental function delegated by school boards.

However, the applicants failed to demonstrate that the existing bus stops, located approximately 60 metres and 150 metres from the residence, created a meaningful barrier to access to French-language education.

The court concluded that the inconvenience of walking that distance did not constitute a denial of minority-language education rights under s. 23.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking to enforce and expand an existing access order to include overnight weekend parenting time.

The respondent mother brought a cross‑motion seeking to impute income to the father for child support purposes and requested that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer provide an updated report before any change to access.

The court found that the father's inconsistent presence in the children’s lives and concerns raised by the mother warranted obtaining an updated report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer prior to increasing access.

The court ordered that the same investigator who prepared the earlier report prepare the update.

The court also imputed annual income of $25,000 to the father and ordered child support of $387 per month retroactive to January 2012 with arrears payable at $100 per month.

The defendant insurer brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Québec was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The action arose from an Ontario motor vehicle accident that left the plaintiff paraplegic and resulted in a substantial judgment against the insured tortfeasors, which the plaintiff sought to enforce against insurers under s. 258 of the Insurance Act.

The court applied the two‑step jurisdiction analysis and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, including the location of the accident, residence of parties, and application of Ontario law.

The court also held that Québec was not a clearly more convenient forum and noted that transferring the matter would deprive the plaintiff of the right to a jury trial.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The court determined costs following three motions involving the release of real estate trust funds, summary judgment against one party, and the appointment of an interim receiver/manager.

Success on the trust fund release motion was divided and no costs were ordered.

The summary judgment motion and the motion for appointment of an interim receiver were both dismissed, resulting in clear success for the responding parties.

Applying the principles governing costs and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs of $15,000 for each successful party.

The court also directed reimbursement from trust funds for municipal tax arrears previously paid.

The Crown applied for certiorari seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry decision discharging the accused on charges of breaching a prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code and breaching probation under s. 733.1(1).

The preliminary inquiry judge had concluded there was no evidence establishing the mens rea required for the offences and discharged the accused.

On review, the Superior Court considered whether the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error or merely assessed the sufficiency of the evidence.

Applying the principles governing review of committal decisions, the court held that the judge’s determination concerned the sufficiency of the evidence and did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

The certiorari application was therefore dismissed.

The third-party insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' motor vehicle accident claim against the defendant, arguing it was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The central issue was when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that his injuries met the threshold under section 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff's medical prognosis and the untested affidavit evidence precluded a 'full appreciation' of the facts without a trial.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff's life insurance claim was dismissed on a strict application of the law, the defendants sought costs fixed at $45,000.

The plaintiff was self-represented and had already suffered the death of her common-law partner and financial hardship resulting from the unsuccessful claim.

The court held that although the defendants' counsel conducted the case professionally and costs would ordinarily have been awarded, the circumstances were sufficiently tragic to justify departing from the usual rule that the successful party receives costs.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award any costs.

A condominium corporation applied for an order requiring unit owners to comply with condominium bylaws, permit installation of an energy meter, and pay related installation and water charges.

The unit owners resisted installation and advanced a cross‑application alleging non‑compliance with s. 97 of the Condominium Act, 1998 and seeking relief under the oppression remedy in s. 135.

The court found the condominium board acted fairly and reasonably, that replacement of energy meters did not constitute a “change” under s. 97, and that the oppression claim was unsupported.

The court ordered the unit owners to reimburse installation costs, pay outstanding water charges, comply with the condominium bylaws, and pay $15,000 in costs.

Parents with an existing joint custody order brought a motion and cross‑motion regarding custody arrangements once the child reached school age.

The court considered the best interests of the child under s. 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act and reviewed evidence including Children’s Aid Society records, medical records, and affidavit material.

Although the parents previously exercised equal parenting time, the week‑about arrangement became impractical once the child began attending school.

The court found the mother had historically taken the primary role in managing the child’s health, schooling, and day‑to‑day welfare, and that the child’s relationship with siblings in the mother’s household supported stability.

The existing order was varied to provide joint custody with primary residence with the mother and extended parenting time for the father.

The court determined the appropriate costs following motions in which the responding party was entirely successful.

The court applied the discretionary framework for costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that fixing costs is not a purely mechanical calculation based on hours and rates.

The objective is to arrive at an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the proceeding.

After considering the Rule 57.01(1) factors, the court fixed an all-inclusive costs award payable by the moving party defendants.

The plaintiff sought payment of $97,500 under a credit line life insurance policy following the death of her common‑law partner.

The insurers denied coverage on the basis that the insurance application contained material misrepresentations regarding the insured’s medical history and a prior life insurance application within the two‑year contestability period.

The court found the application contained inaccurate answers to clear health and underwriting questions and accepted expert underwriting evidence that the insurance would have been declined had accurate information been disclosed.

Applying s. 184(3) of the Insurance Act and established principles requiring full disclosure and utmost good faith in insurance contracts, the court concluded the insurer was entitled to void the coverage.

The claim was therefore dismissed.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his wife, who died from severe burn injuries and had suffered extensive prior abuse.

During pre-trial motions, the court ruled on the admissibility of two statements the accused made to police and the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

The court found both the December 6 and December 11 statements were voluntary and that the accused's Charter rights were not violated.

The court also ruled that evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including evidence that he had shot the victim with a pellet gun 29 times, was highly probative of his animus, motive, and state of mind, and its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The applicant sought clarification of a prior court order relating to disclosure materials held by defence counsel.

The earlier order required the return of all disclosure and imposed conditions including mentoring and removal of disclosure materials from internet sources.

The issue on the motion was whether the earlier order implicitly required the Crown to provide future disclosure only in hard copy to defence counsel.

The court held that the original order did not address future disclosure and that the court could not compel the Crown regarding disclosure practices not covered by the application that produced the earlier order.

The matter was remanded to be spoken to at a later date.