Robert C. Sheppard

Three appellants appealed their convictions for a September 2015 bank robbery and related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from a witness with bipolar disorder and a permanent brain injury who had given a police statement while in custody.

The appellants challenged the admissibility and reliability of her evidence, arguing she was merely reading from her police statement rather than testifying from refreshed memory, and that a Vetrovec warning should have been given.

The trial judge found her evidence reliable and corroborated by circumstantial evidence including DNA evidence and surveillance footage.

The appellants also sought to introduce the witness's criminal record as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and grounded in evidence.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export ecstasy into the United States and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and corroboration of a co-conspirator who testified for the Crown after receiving a reduced sentence in the U.S. The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including recorded phone calls that demonstrated the appellant's involvement.

The court also upheld the six-year sentence, noting the large quantity of drugs and the appellant's use of a courier to take the cross-border risk.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of seven drug charges and sentenced to three years' imprisonment after police found a substantial quantity of drugs hidden in a garage where he was present.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing the circumstantial evidence of possession and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the test for circumstantial evidence and reasonably inferred the appellant exercised primary control over the drugs for distribution.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the nature and quantity of the drugs.

The appellant, a mature recidivist, appealed a 10-year penitentiary sentence imposed after pleading guilty to seven counts of bank robbery and one count of failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The offences were committed while he was unlawfully at large.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to award credit for pre-sentence custody and by misapplying the principles of proportionality and totality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was not entitled to pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3) because he was serving sentences for other offences during that time, and the trial judge made no error in principle regarding proportionality and totality.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in finding him a party to the offence.

During a concerted beating of the complainant by three men, one of the appellant's co-assailants stabbed the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant was the lead attacker, continued the beating after the co-assailant announced his intention to use the knife, and did nothing to stop the stabbing.

The court held this conduct fell within the scope of party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to undue delay.

The delay included a period following a mistrial caused by a misstep by the trial judge.

The application judge characterized this period as institutional delay, noting the unusual circumstances and the failure of the Crown or the court to canvas earlier trial dates.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusions regarding the characterization of the delay or the finding of prejudice, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed her conviction and 18-month sentence for aggravated assault.

She argued the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons by omitting mention of specific evidence and erred in refusing to reopen the trial based on fresh evidence concerning the complainant's victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the omitted evidence was not prominent and the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing to reopen the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-month sentence was not manifestly excessive.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s final instructions on the basis that no express W.D. instruction was given and that comments about the complainant’s testimonial accommodation under s. 486.2 improperly suggested enhanced credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge, viewed as a whole and in the context of the trial and counsel’s addresses, adequately conveyed the burden and standard of proof.

It also held that the impugned accommodation instruction, while inartfully phrased, would not have led jurors to conclude that the complainant was more truthful.

The appeal was dismissed.

Crown sentence appeal arising from a guilty plea to sexual interference involving repeated digital penetration and one act of unprotected intercourse with a 14-year-old who was a close friend of the offender's daughter.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge misapplied the Gladue framework by failing to connect the offender's Aboriginal background to his moral culpability or the commission of the offence, and by placing undue emphasis on background factors unsupported by the record.

The court further held that the sentence failed to reflect the gravity of repeated, exploitative sexual abuse of a vulnerable child by an adult in a position of trust, and inadequately emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was increased from eight months to three years' imprisonment, less credit for post-conviction custody.

The respondents were acquitted of drug possession charges after the trial judge found a breach of their s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and excluded their statements to police.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law.

The implementational duties under s. 10(b) are only triggered when a detainee indicates a desire to exercise their right to counsel, and there was no evidence that either respondent had requested a lawyer.

The appellant was acquitted of two counts of sexual assault at trial after the judge found identity had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The summary conviction appeal court judge allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the acquittal unreasonable, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, agreeing that no properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably have acquitted the appellant on the ground of identity.

The appellant appealed his 30-month sentence for assault.

The assault involved choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness.

The appellant had a record of 33 previous convictions, including many for assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to appropriately apply the jump principle and erred regarding rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and noting the sentence was fit given the egregious nature of the assault, the appellant's record, and his history of breaching probation.

The appellant appealed the imposition of an $8,000 fine, arguing it was excessive and that the trial judge failed to make sufficient inquiry into his ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in this regard, though it affirmed that a fine reflecting the seriousness of the offence was appropriate.

The appeal was allowed and the fine was reduced to $6,000, with one year to pay.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful confinement, and Mustafa was additionally convicted of uttering death threats and possession of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on confirmatory evidence to support the complainant's testimony and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and reconciliation of verdicts were reasonable.

Lakatos and Mohammad also appealed their conditional sentences.

Mohammad's sentence appeal was dismissed.

Lakatos's sentence appeal was allowed, and his sentence was reduced to time served because the trial judge had incorrectly assumed he would serve his conditional sentence in the community, whereas immigration authorities had detained him for deportation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting a defence witness's testimony and in admitting evidence obtained during a search of his residence that violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

Applying the newly released framework from R. v. Grant, the Court held that although the search was a serious breach of the appellant's privacy, the police acted in good faith and in accordance with the law regarding confidential informants.

The evidence was highly reliable and essential to the Crown's case.

The Court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a convenience store robbery involving a sawed-off shotgun.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating his criminal record and applying the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the appellant's record included a previous penitentiary term and weapons offence, and that the co-accused had pleaded guilty.

The sentence was deemed fit and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition for dangerous driving.

He argued the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the gap principle regarding his 1993 prior conviction for the same offence, and that the sentence and driving prohibition were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately weighed denunciation and deterrence over the gap principle due to the appellant's provincial driving record.

The court held the sentence and driving prohibition were fit given the appellant's record and ongoing disregard for public safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that two search warrants authorizing the seizure of his hospital treatment records and blood samples were invalid.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge correctly applied the Garofoli test and found there was reliable evidence before the issuing justice to support the warrants.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he drugged the complainant, failed to fairly assess his videotaped statement, and failed to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the complainant's testimony amply supported the finding that she was drugged.

The court also held that the trial judge properly assessed the appellant's statement and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent had no air of reality given the finding that the appellant drugged the complainant.

The young person pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death and received a disposition including a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the young person argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on general deterrence and sought a reduction of the prohibition to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disposition fit and supported by the principles of proportionality, meaningful consequences, and protection of the public under section 38 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.