R. Lee Akazaki

The plaintiff, a private mortgage lender, brought a summary judgment motion against its title insurer for an additional $72,000 in losses arising from title fraud.

The dispute centered on whether the $72,000, representing prepaid interest withheld from the loan advance, constituted an "actual monetary loss" covered by the policy.

The defendant insurer argued it was not a loss as the funds were never advanced to the borrower.

The court, applying principles of insurance contract interpretation (broad coverage grant, narrow exclusions/limitations), found that the withholding of interest was an accounting set-off and the plaintiff's actual loss was the full principal amount less recoveries.

The court concluded that the $72,000 interest was part of the insured loss.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for $70,882.21, plus prejudgment interest and costs.

The defendants Valiollah Onsori-Saisan and Skymark Capital Corporation brought a motion to set aside a Mareva injunction, originally obtained ex parte by the plaintiff Maxol Wealth Investments Inc., which arose from a syndicated mortgage fraud.

The moving parties argued the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure, the injunction was overly broad in capturing a non-party business account (Pomanar Dessert Inc.), and the plaintiff's undertaking for damages was insufficient.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the injunction, finding that the moving parties' own evidence strengthened their connection to the fraudulent scheme.

However, the court granted, on consent, a further release of funds from the Pomanar account for the moving parties' legal defence, subject to the plaintiff's costs being paid first.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff condominium corporation sought an order for possession of the defendants' unit pursuant to a statutory lien for unpaid common expenses, which included costs from prior compliance litigation regarding defective plumbing.

The defendants, self-represented, had resisted the plumbing replacement and made unfounded fraud allegations, leading to significant legal costs.

The court determined the value of the lien, specifically excluding the costs of the lien enforcement action itself based on a strict statutory interpretation of the Condominium Act.

The court granted a possessory order, suspended for 60 days to allow the defendants to discharge the lien, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff for the action.

The appellant, Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, appealed an arbitration decision that held it solely liable for Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) payments to an injured person, despite Zurich Insurance Company being the actual primary insurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada had previously ruled that Chubb, as the first insurer to receive a misdirected SABS application, was deemed an insurer for the claim.

The Superior Court found that the arbitrator erred by not fully analyzing the interplay between the Insurance Act and O. Reg. 283/95.

The court concluded that both Chubb and Zurich were insurers of equal priority due to the unique circumstances and must share liability 50/50, with each responsible for 2% compound interest for delays attributable to them.

Following a successful defamation trial where the self-represented plaintiff was awarded $850,000 in damages, the court assessed costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, noting both parties engaged in contesting peripheral issues.

The plaintiff was awarded $11,535.16 for transcripts and a $7,000 counsel fee for the trial, but claims for hotel stays, motion filing fees, and book binding were denied.

The court provisionally fixed costs at $18,535.16, allowing the plaintiff ten days to submit proper invoices for previously incurred legal fees.

This was a default application by a mortgagee seeking to set aside an unauthorized tenancy agreement and obtain possession of a condominium unit due to the unit owner's mortgage default and breach of a mortgage term prohibiting leasing without lender approval.

The unit owner had leased the property for five years to a respondent who then sublet it for short-term rentals.

The respondents did not contest the application.

The court granted the application under Section 52 of the Mortgages Act, finding that the tenancy impeded the mortgagee's remedies and that setting it aside would not prejudice any party, as the unit was not a permanent residence.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The court initiated a Rule 2.1 review, at the request of the Ontario Provincial Police, to consider dismissing the plaintiff's action against the Toronto Police Service and Ontario Provincial Police.

The plaintiff's claim alleged police inaction in investigating harassment.

The court found grounds to believe the action was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process against these two defendants due to a lack of factual involvement and issues of vicarious liability under the Police Services Act.

The plaintiff was given 15 days to file a written submission in response, and the proceeding was stayed pending the resolution of the Rule 2.1 process.

This decision concerns a Rule 2.1 review initiated by the court regarding the plaintiff's action.

The court dismissed the action against most defendants (insurers and lawyers) due to a lack of jurisdiction over claims related to SABS benefits (which fall under the Licence Appeal Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction) and the frivolous nature of claims against lawyers based on professional obligations.

The action was allowed to proceed only against two medical doctors.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiffs, GS International Holdings Ltd. and Yin Wu, brought a $5 million action for contractual debt, business defamation, and intentional interference with economic relations against Smart Vision Direct Inc., Galaxy Security Corporation, and Li Fang Chen.

The defendants counterclaimed for $30 million, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and contractual breaches by the plaintiffs and other parties.

The court found Annie Chen (Li Fang Chen) liable for contractual debt ($122,000 to GS International, $30,000 to Gabriel Wu/Yin Wu) and for intentional interference with economic relations ($40,000 to GS International) and defamation ($2,000 to Gabriel Wu).

The court dismissed the counterclaim, finding no breach of fiduciary duty or restrictive covenant by the defendants to counterclaim, largely due to the vague and contradictory nature of the post-separation business agreement and insufficient evidence of damages.

The applicant, an equal shareholder and medical director of fertility clinics, sought interim relief in a corporate oppression claim against her estranged husband, the sole director of most corporate entities.

She alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, and exclusion from decision-making.

The court applied the "serious issue" test for interim injunctions, finding a serious issue and irreparable harm to the business and her professional duties if the status quo continued.

The balance of convenience favored the applicant.

The court ordered the applicant to be appointed as a co-director of all respondent corporations with the individual respondent, and restrained the individual respondent from interfering in patient care or medical processes, aiming to prevent deadlock and preserve the business while acknowledging the underlying matrimonial dispute.

The plaintiff, a former top-performing mortgage development manager, sued the defendant bank for defamation after he resigned during an investigation into fraudulent mortgage applications.

The bank reported him to the Canadian Bankers Association's SIFT database, falsely stating he had knowingly submitted fraudulent documents, which caused three prospective bank employers to withdraw job offers.

The court found the bank failed to prove the defence of justification, as there was no evidence the plaintiff knew of the fraud.

The defence of qualified privilege also failed because the bank lacked grounds to report him under the database's criteria, and its failure to retract the alert for seven years constituted malice.

The plaintiff was awarded $850,000 in total damages, including $200,000 in punitive damages.

This endorsement concerns a Rule 2.1 review initiated by defendants' counsel to dismiss a proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that claims against medical professionals, alleging negligence related to drug prescription, contained sufficient questions to survive a Rule 2.1 review, reserving dismissal for Rules 20 or 21 motions.

However, claims against the insurer for statutory accident benefits were found to be outside the court's jurisdiction, belonging to a statutory tribunal.

Claims against opposing counsel were deemed an abuse of process, as the law does not recognize a cause of action against adversary lawyers without a duty of care, and such suits undermine the administration of justice.

The court ordered a Rule 2.1 notice for dismissal against all defendants except the medical professionals, staying the proceeding pending submissions.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully resisting an anti-SLAPP motion brought by two defendants and partially succeeding on a motion to strike pleadings.

The court, interpreting section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, ruled that a responding party who successfully resists an anti-SLAPP motion is generally not entitled to costs unless exceptional circumstances warrant it.

Despite the plaintiff incurring significant legal expenses and the judge's view that the motion was "on the wrong side of the boundary" of abusive use, the court found no basis to deviate from the statutory rule, compelling it to deny costs.

However, a separate settlement for $4,000 was reached with another defendant (CUHMA) for their appearance.

The defendant Phillip Franchetto brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss negligence claims against him arising from a head-on motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiffs, passengers in the other vehicle, alleged Franchetto was negligent for his speed and evasive maneuvers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Franchetto's actions were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care, nor were they a legal cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.

The court emphasized that expert opinions based on hindsight and counterfactuals cannot supplant the legal standard of a reasonable and prudent driver in an emergency.

The husband brought a motion to correct the calculation of a spousal support award previously set aside and substituted by the court on appeal.

He argued for a "netting-down" of the retroactive sum to account for after-tax costs and benefits, or to address an undecided issue.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that present-value calculations were inappropriate for arrears and that the income tax implications did not warrant a reduction.

The judge emphasized that the husband had deliberately avoided paying spousal support and should not benefit from tax advantages he forewent, citing public policy against rewarding such conduct.

The defendants Kenneth LeDez and Ron Linden brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), or alternatively, to strike certain pleadings under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiff, a hyperbaric medicine specialist, sued after LeDez accused her of unethical conduct and orchestrated her removal from a professional association, stemming from her "off-label" use of hyperbaric procedures.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendants lacked a valid defense, and that the public interest in allowing the suit to continue outweighed protecting the defendants' expressions, which were found to exceed privileged occasions and potentially be malicious.

The alternative motion to strike pleadings was granted in part, striking claims for unlawful interference with economic relations, conspiracy, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty, but allowing the corporate oppression remedy claim to stand as it was based on specific corporate acts rather than expressions.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a 2008 Quebec default judgment against the defendants in Ontario.

The defendants raised a two-year limitation period defence under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that the action was not prescribed due to acknowledgment of debt, discoverability, or promissory estoppel.

The court found no valid written acknowledgment, rejected the discoverability argument as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the defendants were domiciled in Ontario and had means to enforce the judgment, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to a lack of evidence of an intention to affect legal relations regarding the limitation period.

The action was dismissed as prescribed, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The court issued supplementary reasons regarding costs for an interim injunction motion.

The defendants sought to revisit the costs award, arguing that an offer to settle the motion should attract costs consequences under Rule 49.

The court found that the defendants' offer was insufficient as it did not fully address the plaintiff's concerns, particularly regarding non-solicitation, and that the plaintiff had obtained what it sought.

The court dismissed the defendants' request to revisit the costs, affirming the original costs award to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, an insurance brokerage, brought a motion for interim injunctive relief to prevent former employees and rival brokerages from using confidential client information and soliciting clients.

The individual defendants resigned en masse and allegedly used client lists from the plaintiff.

The defendants argued an injunction was unnecessary due to an undertaking not to use confidential information.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm due to the alienation of confidential information, and that the balance of inconvenience favored the plaintiff.

An interim injunction was granted prohibiting the defendants from possessing, disclosing, using (including for solicitation), altering, destroying, copying, removing, or transferring the plaintiff's confidential information, including information acquired mentally.

A separate non-solicitation order was not granted, as the confidential information injunction was deemed sufficient.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The respondent father, sole owner of the matrimonial home, brought a motion under s. 23 of the Family Law Act to dispense with the applicant mother's consent to sell the property.

The mother had enjoyed de facto exclusive possession for seven years while the father paid all carrying costs, resulting in severe financial hardship for him.

The court harmonized the legal standards for selling a matrimonial home under the Family Law Act and the Partition Act, holding that the test for a solely owned home should be the same as for a jointly owned home: whether the party proposing the sale is acting maliciously, vexatiously, or oppressively.

Finding no such conduct by the father, the court granted the motion, dispensed with the mother's consent, and ordered exclusive possession to the father to prepare the home for sale.