Richard H.K. Schwarzl

The offender, Jonathan Weir, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after killing his best friend with an unlawfully possessed, prohibited machine gun.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, including the four-year minimum for manslaughter with a firearm, and arguments regarding police misconduct during arrest and detention.

The judge found Weir's moral blameworthiness to be high, closer to criminal negligence than a "near accident" due to his reckless handling and storage of firearms and ammunition while intoxicated.

While acknowledging some police misconduct (improper strip searches), the court found it not egregious enough to justify a sentence below the statutory minimum.

The final sentence was 51 months (4¼ years) after credits for pre-sentence custody, rights violations, and strict bail conditions.

The defendant was tried concurrently on a provincial careless driving charge and a criminal charge of driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

The court addressed two main issues for the criminal charge: the validity of the screening demand and the admissibility of the Certificate of a Qualified Breath Technician.

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption, validating the screening demand and subsequent breath tests.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the photocopy of the Certificate of a Qualified Breath Technician was admissible as a true copy.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of both the careless driving offence and the criminal driving with excess blood alcohol concentration offence.

The offender, A.D., was convicted of two counts of sexual interference involving two 10-year-old students at an elementary school where he worked as a custodian.

The offences involved progressive physical contact, including gyrating, over clothing, and occurred multiple times.

The Crown sought consecutive sentences totaling three years, while the defence proposed a concurrent 90-day sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, multiple victims, age difference, and the location of the offences, alongside mitigating factors including the offender's age, poor health, role as caregiver, low risk of reoffending, and expression of regret.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of 17 months on each count, along with ancillary orders including DNA, firearms prohibition, SOIRA, and section 161 orders.

This is a sentencing decision for an offender found guilty of Dangerous Driving Causing Death and Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm.

The incident involved the offender unsafely passing vehicles at high speed on a curved road with double solid lines, resulting in a head-on collision that killed one person and caused severe, permanent injuries to two others.

The offender, a 27-year-old first-time offender with no prior criminal or traffic record, expressed deep remorse and suffered significant injuries himself.

The Crown sought 3-4 years immediate incarceration and a 5-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence under two years and a 2-year prohibition, highlighting the absence of typical aggravating factors (alcohol, prior bad driving, etc.).

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for dangerous driving causing death (concurrent with 16 months for bodily harm), to be served under house arrest with electronic monitoring, and a 4.5-year driving prohibition.

The judge concluded that a penitentiary sentence was not necessary, and a conditional sentence with strict conditions adequately addressed accountability, denunciation, and deterrence given the specific mitigating factors.

The defendant, Tandeep Braich, stood trial on a charge of driving with excess blood alcohol.

The primary issue was whether a five-minute delay in informing the defendant of his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms constituted a violation, and if so, whether the breath test results should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter breach, determining that the delay was reasonable given the circumstances, including officer safety and ensuring the defendant's comprehension of his rights.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court concluded that the evidence would not be excluded, as the seriousness of any purported breach was low, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests was minimal, and the evidence was reliable and essential to the prosecution.

Consequently, a finding of guilt was recorded.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol.

He brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention (s. 9) and violation of his right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

The court dismissed both Charter claims, finding that the initial stop was a lawful investigative detention and that the police were reasonably diligent in facilitating his right to counsel, despite his lack of diligence in pursuing alternatives.

Consequently, the breath test results were admitted, and the defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Simon Williams, faced charges of possessing child pornography.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging violations of his section 8 Charter rights due to delayed filing of Reports to a Justice (RTJs) and misleading Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants.

The court found that the RTJs were filed "as soon as practicable" given the investigating officer's workload and travel, and that any delay was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

The court also affirmed the validity of the ITOs, finding no misleading omissions or impermissible speculative inferences regarding the defendant's propensity to collect child pornography.

Consequently, the defendant's Charter claims were dismissed, the evidence was admitted, and guilty verdicts were entered on both counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to remain and driving while suspended under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial justice erred in finding the appellant was the driver based on circumstantial evidence, and whether the offences occurred on a 'highway'.

The appeal court upheld the finding of identity, concluding it was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the driving occurred on a public highway rather than a private road, as the evidence suggested the incident happened on a private access road.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The defendant was tried on one criminal charge (driving with excess blood alcohol) and two provincial charges (speeding, driving with two licenses).

The court found the defendant guilty of the provincial offences.

For the criminal charge, the issues were the validity of the roadside screening test and breath demand under section 8 of the Charter, and whether breath test procedures established blood alcohol concentration beyond a reasonable doubt under section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter breach, determining the officer's belief in the screening test's accuracy was reasonable.

Despite discrepancies in the qualified technician's testimony regarding alcohol concentration units and a blank test result, the court preferred the Certificate of Qualified Technician, concluding the discrepancies did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was found guilty of all charges.

The defendant, Dylan Cummins, was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 320.15 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the prosecution proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant did not have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The court also addressed an alleged violation of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, finding a breach occurred at the police station related to drug trafficking charges (later withdrawn), but determined there was no causal, contextual, or temporal connection between this breach and the evidence for the breath sample charge.

Consequently, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, leading to a finding of guilt for failing to provide a breath sample.

The offender was found guilty of unlawfully in a dwelling house and sexual assault.

The court considered sentencing submissions, including the appropriateness of a conditional sentence order (CSO).

The judge determined that a combination of real jail and a CSO was appropriate, imposing 90 days intermittent jail and a fine for the sexual assault, and a 10-month CSO followed by probation for the unlawfully in a dwelling house offence.

Ancillary orders were also imposed.

The defendant, Brennen Harman, was charged with unlawfully being in a dwelling house and sexual assault.

The Crown alleged that Harman entered the complainant's locked basement apartment while she slept and sexually assaulted her.

The defendant denied the claims, suggesting the complainant fabricated them after being evicted.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, concluding that he had access to the apartment, a demonstrated sexual interest in the complainant, and that the complainant's testimony was credible and corroborated by other evidence, rebutting the fabrication defence.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence on the offender following his designation as a dangerous offender.

The offender had sexually assaulted and forcibly confined a 23-year-old victim in April 2017.

He had a significant criminal history including prior sexual offences against children and adults.

Two psychiatrists provided evidence regarding risk assessment, treatability, and management prospects.

The court found that neither a conventional determinate sentence nor a determinate sentence with long-term supervision would adequately protect the public, given the offender's chronic dangerousness, lack of insight, minimization of responsibility, sexual deviance, and poor treatment outcomes despite multiple prior interventions.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking three orders: (1) to set aside the default judgment and striking of his Motion to Change; (2) to set aside the order allowing the applicant mother's Response to proceed as an uncontested trial; and (3) to set aside ex parte temporary orders restricting his access to his son and imposing a restraining order.

The father had a history of missed court appearances and procedural non-compliance spanning several years.

The court set aside the default judgment and striking order, finding that the interests of justice favored allowing the father to be heard on the mother's newly sought relief in her trial materials, despite his poor procedural conduct.

The court restored the 50-50 residence arrangement but maintained the restraining order and imposed conditions on the father's conduct, including restrictions on alcohol and drug use during the child's residence with him and prohibition on personal use of the child's electronic devices.

The Crown applied to designate the accused as a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The accused argued that his future treatment prospects were compelling and that a Long-Term Offender Supervision Order would be appropriate.

The court found that the accused's pattern of sexual violence over a 17-year period, his persistent denial of responsibility, his anti-social personality traits, and his failure to benefit from previous treatment demonstrated that his threat to public safety was intractable.

The court designated the accused as a dangerous offender under multiple provisions of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with possession of fentanyl and methamphetamine after police seized drugs and paraphernalia from her vehicle following a 911 call reporting her unconscious in her car.

The defendant challenged the warrantless search and seizure as violating section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the seizure lawful under both the plain view doctrine and as incident to arrest.

The court held that the officer was lawfully positioned, the contraband was immediately apparent as criminal evidence, and the discovery was legally inadvertent despite the officer's expectation that drugs might be present.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant in an automobile on November 1, 2018, while driving the complainant home from a medical appointment in Toronto.

The complainant testified that the accused repeatedly touched his genitals and inner thigh over his clothing while driving, despite the complainant pretending to sleep.

The accused denied any sexual touching, claiming he only shook the complainant's shoulder to wake him and kept both hands on the wheel due to heavy traffic.

The trial judge found the complainant credible but harbored reasonable doubt about his reliability given his drowsy state and the practical impossibility of the accused simultaneously driving safely in rush hour traffic while engaging in the alleged conduct.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol concentration following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol to any degree, based on the totality of evidence including observations of physical signs of impairment, inconsistent statements regarding the route driven and alcohol consumption, and the defendant's own acknowledgment that he knew he had consumed too much alcohol to drive safely.

The Crown also established compliance with the statutory prerequisites under section 320.31 of the Criminal Code for relying on the Certificate of Qualified Technician to prove blood alcohol concentration.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and fentanyl, and three counts of driving while disqualified.

The Crown sought 22 months less pre-trial custody credited at 1.5:1 and a lifetime driving prohibition.

The defence sought 17 months with 2:1 credit for pre-trial detention.

The court found that while most pre-trial detention conditions were not particularly harsh, the offender suffered two assaults resulting in bodily harm, warranting enhanced credit at 2:1 for 40 days.

The court sentenced the offender to 20 months on the driving offences (less 14 months pre-trial credit for 6 months remaining) with a 10-year driving prohibition, and 4 months consecutive on the drug offence followed by 2 years probation.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess blood alcohol concentration, and dangerous driving following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the first two charges, leaving only the dangerous driving charge for trial.

The court found that the defendant's driving over approximately 25 kilometres, characterized by sustained lane violations, erratic speeds, failure to maintain control, and resistance to police intervention, constituted dangerous driving under the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of dangerous driving.