Richard A. Lococo

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination against a university.

The adjudicator had dismissed the complaint under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had an outstanding civil action against the university regarding the same essential factual content—the inclusion of a failed academic year on her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 34(11) to be reasonable, confirming that the provision requires an applicant to choose between the Tribunal and a concurrent civil action at the time the application is filed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing its application to evict a tenant who had smoked in his unit for 22 years.

A neighbouring tenant had vacated due to the cigarette smoke and odour, which the landlord was unable to remedy despite various efforts.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by failing to consider the landlord's ongoing statutory obligation under s. 20 of the Residential Tenancies Act to maintain the complex fit for habitation for future tenants.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a re-hearing before a differently constituted Board.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion for summary dismissal and the granting of an order that two related actions be tried together, the court determined the issue of costs based on written submissions.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing that the motion was unmeritorious and conducted in a manner that unnecessarily prolonged proceedings.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for rare and exceptional cases involving reprehensible conduct and found that the unsuccessful motion did not meet that threshold.

The court also considered the respondent’s claimed impecuniosity but held that financial hardship is only one factor among many under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Partial indemnity costs of $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax were awarded.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario appealed a motion judge's refusal to grant a sealing order for Minutes of Settlement entered into with the respondents in 2001.

The appellant sought to rely on the settlement in its defence of new actions brought by the respondents while preserving its confidentiality.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to recognize settlement privilege as an important interest under the Sierra Club test.

The Court held that the appellant had not waived privilege and that the salutary effects of protecting settlement privilege outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle.

Following dismissal of a motion to extend an interim injunction relating to demolition of a historic school building and the discontinuance of a related judicial review application, a respondent school board sought costs against the applicant.

The applicant argued he was a public interest litigant acting to preserve a heritage building under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs against public interest litigants and applied factors including lack of personal financial interest, the broader public importance of heritage preservation, and the litigant’s good‑faith conduct.

The court concluded the applicant qualified as a public interest litigant and had not acted vexatiously or abusively.

Consistent with the usual approach in public interest litigation, the court declined to order costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of several decisions relating to his 2003 dismissal from the Ministry of Environment, including decisions by the OLRB, the Grievance Settlement Board, and a Superior Court judge who dismissed his civil action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the Superior Court's final order, which belongs in the Court of Appeal.

The Court also held that setting aside a private settlement agreement is not the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review, and that the OLRB decisions were both out of time for review and reasonable.

The application was deemed an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a Certificate of Assessment and declare Minutes of Settlement void.

He argued that he did not understand the terms of the agreement and lacked independent legal advice.

The Divisional Court heard the matter de novo based on the motion record.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to provide his own affidavit evidence to support his claim of non est factum, and that independent legal advice is not a strict legal requirement for an agreement to be enforceable.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a prior decision dismissing his motion to vary the terms of an interim injunction issued on consent.

The court considered rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal.

It concluded that the moving party failed to meet the required onus under either branch of the rule.

The issues raised, while important to the parties, were not of sufficient importance to justify appellate review.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The plaintiff dentist brought an action against his former employee for misappropriation of funds.

The defendant employee brought a motion to strike the statement of claim or for summary judgment dismissing the action, arguing it was statute-barred and lacked sufficient particulars.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to consolidate the action with the defendant's separate constructive dismissal action.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding the pleadings sufficient and that genuine issues of material fact required a trial.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion in part, ordering the two actions to be tried together or consecutively to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

Following a family law trial concerning custody, mobility, and child support, the successful party sought costs after obtaining sole custody and permission to relocate with the child to another province.

The court applied the presumption under rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules that a successful party is entitled to costs.

Although an offer to settle had been made, the court held that the final order was not as favourable as the offer and therefore declined to award substantial indemnity costs under rule 18.

The court also applied rule 24(10) and appellate authority restricting recovery of costs for earlier procedural steps where no costs order had been made.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount reflecting only trial-related steps and submissions.

In this family costs decision following trial, the successful applicant sought substantial costs on a full indemnity basis relying on an earlier offer to settle.

The court held that although the applicant was entitled to costs under the presumptive rule for successful parties, the offer did not trigger full indemnity consequences because the final order preserved a future review mechanism for spousal support that the offer would have waived.

The court further held that the responding party's precarious financial circumstances were relevant to quantum, though not entitlement.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 inclusive on a partial indemnity basis, payable within 180 days.

In a family trial concerning custody, mobility, access, and child support for a very young child, the court rejected joint custody because the parties lacked the ability to communicate and co-parent effectively.

Sole custody was granted to the mother, and she was permitted to relocate to Edmonton with the child after the court applied the best-interests analysis governing relocation cases.

The court ordered liberal access when the father is physically present in Alberta or the child is in Ontario, with interim access modifications before the move.

Retroactive and ongoing child support were set based on the father's declared and imputed income, and further orders were made respecting special expenses, benefits, life insurance, and passport cooperation.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim for delay under Rule 24.01, and to set aside ex parte orders validating service.

The plaintiff's counsel had inadvertently marked the file as closed, resulting in a delay of over three years in advancing the action.

The court found that while the delay was intentional for a short period, it was not contumelious, inordinate, or inexcusable.

The court also declined to set aside the ex parte service orders, noting the defendants were aware of the action and suffered no actual prejudice.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to correct the terms of a final order regarding the parties' matrimonial home and joint line of credit.

The corrected order requires the applicant to pay half of the mortgage, taxes, and insurance pending the sale of the home, and to indemnify the respondent for their joint line of credit.

The parties' other claims, including for net family property and spousal support, were dismissed.

The parties separated after a short marriage.

The applicant sought the sale of the matrimonial home and division of net family property, while the respondent sought spousal support and exclusive possession.

The court ordered the matrimonial home to be listed for sale and the parties to share carrying costs.

The court found the respondent was entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis, but declined to order periodic or lump sum payments, finding that the applicant's assumption of the parties' joint line of credit debt fully offset any spousal support obligation.

The applicant was ordered to indemnify the respondent for the joint debt.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion in writing for leave to appeal a final child support order made under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was not required because the order was final, not interlocutory.

However, the applicant was out of time to file the appeal.

Rather than dismissing the motion, the court stayed it and granted the applicant leave to amend the motion to proceed as a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal.

Following dismissal of a commercial lease and nightclub-related civil action after trial, the successful defendants sought substantial or full indemnity costs, relying in part on an unaccepted offer to settle and alleged objectionable conduct by the plaintiffs.

The court held that Rule 49.10 did not automatically justify enhanced costs where the action was dismissed outright and, applying appellate authority, found no egregious or reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.13.

Costs for represented defendants were fixed at partial indemnity in the amount of $35,000 inclusive, while self-represented defendants were awarded a moderate partial indemnity amount of $6,000 inclusive after applying the governing framework for self-represented litigants.

Costs were ordered payable by the plaintiffs only.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario opticians could lawfully dispense corrective eyewear using a business model in which an onsite refractive test would be faxed to a remote optometrist or ophthalmologist who had not examined the customer, and who would then issue a prescription.

The court held the applicants failed to establish the legality of the model, accepting that the combined statutory scheme and professional standards governing opticians, physicians, and optometrists precluded dispensing based on a prescription issued without examination of the customer.

The court further held that, even if the model were legally permissible, declaratory relief should be refused because the application was based on hypothetical facts, no actual lis existed, and the court should not intervene in an unresolved policy debate concerning refractive testing regulation.

The application was dismissed with costs to the respondent fixed at $23,000 inclusive, and the intervenors bore their own costs.

The father brought a motion to change a 2006 final order to terminate his child support obligations for his two adult children.

The mother opposed the termination for one child and sought reimbursement for extraordinary expenses and spousal support.

The court found that both children were no longer dependents under the Family Law Act, as they had completed their initial post-secondary education or were no longer enrolled full-time.

The mother's claims for extraordinary expenses were dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction for non-dependents, insufficient evidence, and the father's overpayment of child support.

The spousal support claim was also dismissed as it was not properly pleaded, delayed, and lacked merit on compensatory or need-based grounds.

The father's motion to terminate child support was granted.