Ricardo Golec

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds of a Charter section 8 violation relating to an unreasonable search and seizure.

The trial judge found that the appellant had abandoned his house and car keys when approached by police, thereby defeating any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the police officers' testimony.

The court also rejected arguments of uneven scrutiny and misapprehension of evidence.

The appellant appealed her convictions on two counts of impaired operation causing bodily harm, two counts of driving over 80 causing bodily harm, and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle accident in which the appellant's vehicle overturned after she failed to negotiate a curve.

The central issue on appeal concerned the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the W.(D.) direction as it applied to the appellant's statement at the accident scene: "I don't know what happened.

My car just lost control." The Court of Appeal found that while the initial charge was adequate, the recharge contained serious errors in the application of the W.(D.) direction, particularly the omission of the second and third branches of the instruction in the recharge, which constitute non-direction amounting to misdirection on a critical aspect of the defence.

The applicant, who was facing drug trafficking charges, brought an application under s. 490(10) of the Criminal Code for the return of $11,700 and US$20 seized from his parents' home.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because it intended to seek forfeiture of the funds if a conviction was obtained.

The court held that a bare assertion of future intent to seek forfeiture, without any evidence connecting the funds to the alleged offence, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to order the return of property.

As the applicant provided uncontradicted evidence that the funds were from a lawful business, the application was granted and the funds were ordered returned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and making child pornography available, as well as his sentence.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in not providing reasons for dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application; (2) the trial judge erred in not finding a breach of section 8 Charter rights; (3) the trial judge erred in credibility assessments of defence witnesses; and (4) the trial judge erred in not applying the Kienapple principle to stay one conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, though it acknowledged that the trial judge had erred in failing to provide reasons for the section 11(b) decision and that the Crown's warrantless request for Internet subscriber information violated section 8 rights.

However, the Court found that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) given the seriousness of the offences and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The applicants, Nicola Nero, Dean Wiwchar, and Martino Caputo, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time.

This application followed their convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder.

The court analyzed the total delay, defence delay (considering it collectively for co-accused), and whether the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances (discrete events such as preliminary inquiry issues, counsel unavailability, interlocutory appeals, and extensive disclosure from multiple police forces) or case complexity.

The court found that after deducting periods attributable to defence delay, the net delay for each applicant was below the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Furthermore, the court determined that the case's inherent complexity, the involvement of multiple defendants and prosecutions, voluminous disclosure from various police agencies, and an international aspect constituted exceptional circumstances justifying any delay beyond the ceiling.

The court also considered the case as transitional, noting the parties' reasonable reliance on the law as it existed prior to Jordan.

Consequently, the applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed, as no breach of the applicants' s. 11(b) rights was demonstrated.

The applicants were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to murder and first-degree murder.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of the conspiracy count, arguing that entering convictions for both offences would violate the rule against multiple convictions for the same delict.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the offences lacked both the factual and legal nexus required to engage the rule.

The conspiracy was complete weeks before the murder, and the legal elements of the offences protect different societal interests.