Ranjan K. Agarwal

This addendum corrects an error in a previous costs decision (2018 ONSC 4862) regarding the amount of costs requested by Brewers Retail Inc. The original decision mistakenly stated Brewers Retail requested $600,000 on a partial indemnity basis, when the correct amount, based on an amended bill of costs, was $744,396.42, all inclusive, comprising fees, HST, and disbursements.

The court confirmed the costs award subject to this correction.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' proposed class action on summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis totalling approximately $2.3 million.

The plaintiffs and the Class Proceedings Fund argued that the costs should be reduced to $600,000 in the aggregate, asserting that the case was not complex, was in the public interest, raised novel points of law, and that a large costs award would have a chilling effect on class actions.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the litigation was primarily commercial, involved complex issues, and that the normal costs rules should apply.

The court awarded the defendants their requested costs, subject to a reduction of one expert witness's fee.

In an appeal from judicial review proceedings, the appellants challenged a law society decision refusing accreditation to a proposed law school because of a mandatory covenant restricting sexual intimacy to marriage between a man and a woman.

The majority held that the regulator had statutory authority to consider the covenant’s impact on equal access, diversity in the profession, and potential harm to LGBTQ prospective students.

Applying the Doré/Loyola framework, the Court found the decision proportionately balanced freedom of religion with statutory public-interest objectives and was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, with concurring reasons and a dissent that would have allowed the appeal.

Following the dismissal of a proposed $2 billion class action regarding the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $2.3 million.

The plaintiffs and the Class Proceedings Fund argued for no costs, asserting the case was novel and brought in the public interest.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the claims were grounded in established negligence principles and prosecuted aggressively with an expectation of costs.

The court awarded the defendants their claimed costs in full on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs, victims of the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, brought a proposed class action in Ontario against Loblaws (who sourced garments from the factory) and Bureau Veritas (who conducted social audits).

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21, arguing the claims were governed by Bangladesh law, were statute-barred, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that while it had jurisdiction simpliciter, the claims were governed by Bangladesh law under the lex loci delicti rule and were statute-barred by a one-year limitation period.

Furthermore, the court found that under both Bangladesh and Ontario law, it was plain and obvious that the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, nor was Loblaws vicariously liable or in breach of any fiduciary duty.

The action and the certification motion were dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in the provision of goods and services by the respondent, a security company.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, arguing its operations at the Greater Toronto Airport Authority fall under federal jurisdiction.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that the provision of security services at the airport is integral to a federal work or undertaking (aeronautics).

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that numerous financial institutions conspired to manipulate the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs reached early settlements with three groups of defendants (UBS, BNP, and Bank of America) totaling $15,950,000.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of the settlements and Class Counsel's fee request.

The court approved the settlements, finding them fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, particularly given the litigation risks and the value of the settling defendants' cooperation.

The court also approved Class Counsel's fee request of $3,987,500 plus disbursements.

Trinity Western University (TWU), an evangelical Christian university, sought accreditation from the Law Society of Upper Canada for its proposed law school.

TWU requires students to sign a community covenant prohibiting sexual intimacy outside of heterosexual marriage.

The Law Society denied accreditation, finding the covenant discriminated against the LGBTQ community.

TWU appealed the Divisional Court's dismissal of its judicial review application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Law Society's decision was subject to a reasonableness standard of review.

The Court found that while the denial of accreditation infringed TWU's freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, the Law Society reasonably balanced this infringement against its statutory mandate to protect the public interest and ensure equal access to the legal profession.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, and ethnic origin after his distribution contract was terminated.

The respondent terminated the contract because the applicant failed to obtain a WSIB clearance certificate, as required by a new independent contractor model.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant could not point to any evidence beyond his own suspicions linking the termination to his ethnic origin.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action regarding beer pricing and market allocation in Ontario sought leave under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act to discontinue the action against the LCBO and treat it as an unnamed co-conspirator.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, finding that the discontinuance should occur, if at all, only after the close of pleadings, as the remaining defendants had not yet filed statements of defence and might assert cross-claims or third-party claims against the LCBO.

The court also found the evidentiary record inadequate to justify discontinuance.

The plaintiff railway company sought interlocutory injunctive relief after former employees joined a direct competitor and allegedly downloaded and circulated confidential commercial information, including customer lists and revenue data, to solicit the plaintiff’s clients.

The parties agreed to an injunction preserving confidential information and restricting its use, but disputed whether an independent court-appointed monitor should oversee compliance with the order.

The court found the defendants had initially fallen short in complying with an earlier undertaking but had taken substantial remedial steps, including forensic searches, employee discipline, and written directives prohibiting use of the information.

The court concluded that appointing a monitor with broad investigative and supervisory powers would be overly intrusive into the defendant corporation’s business operations.

The court held that the contempt power and the existing order sufficiently protected the plaintiff’s interests.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order extending a Mareva injunction that froze its shares in a Toronto-based company.

The injunction was originally granted ex parte to secure an international arbitration award against the Kyrgyz Republic.

On appeal, fresh evidence was admitted showing the underlying arbitral award had been set aside by a Russian court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction on the basis of the fresh evidence.

The Court also found that the respondent had breached its duty of full and frank disclosure on the original ex parte motion by failing to disclose material facts regarding a foreign court's ruling on the arbitral tribunal's lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal on the basis of race, colour, ethnic origin, disability, and sex, culminating in her termination.

The respondents brought a preliminary request to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegations relating to the applicant's termination under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding that a prior grievance arbitration had already appropriately dealt with the substance of those claims by determining she was terminated for just cause (dishonesty) rather than disability discrimination.

The Tribunal also dismissed the remaining allegations, finding them to be either untimely, not part of a continuous series of incidents, or lacking a reasonable prospect of success.

The respondent, Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, sought leave to appeal an order continuing an ex parte Mareva injunction obtained by Stans Energy Corp. The moving party argued that Stans Energy Corp. failed to disclose material information, specifically an English translation of a foreign court decision questioning the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal that issued the underlying award.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal the continuation of the injunction, finding conflicting decisions on the test for materiality of non-disclosure on ex parte motions and determining that the issue was of sufficient importance to warrant appellate review.

Leave to appeal the specific terms requiring a third party to hold dividends in trust was refused.

Following the dismissal of her application for judicial review, the applicant opposed an award of costs, arguing the case involved novel human rights issues of public importance.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the proceeding was a quest for personal vindication arising from fractious collective bargaining, not a public interest matter.

The court awarded the successful respondents $7,500 in costs, discounting their requested amount of $15,000 to exclude expenses related to the involvement of three intervenors.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring it to post $140,000 in security for costs before trial.

The plaintiff argued there were conflicting decisions regarding the test for initiating a motion after a matter is set down for trial under Rule 48.01(1).

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting the plaintiff had conceded it could post the security without prejudice.

The applicant requested reactivation of her human rights application, which had been deferred pending a union grievance arbitration.

The arbitrator had upheld her termination and found no discrimination based on disability.

The respondents did not oppose reactivation but requested dismissal under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code and for lack of a reasonable prospect of success on the remaining grounds.

The Tribunal granted the request to reactivate and ordered a summary teleconference hearing to address whether the allegations should be dismissed, whether they have a reasonable prospect of success, and whether certain corporate and personal respondents should be removed or added.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination and harassment.

The complaint arose from sexist blog posts made by a union president during a labour dispute.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the blog posts were not made 'in the workplace' and that the Tribunal appropriately considered the union president's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association when determining the posts did not constitute discrimination with respect to employment.

The applicants, who identify as atheists, alleged that the respondent school board discriminated against them on the basis of creed by permitting only the Gideons to distribute religious literature (the New Testament) to grade five students.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario held that atheism falls within the definition of 'creed' under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the board's original policy, which allowed only one religious group to distribute texts, was discriminatory.

Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded that the board's revised policy, which ostensibly allowed other groups to distribute materials but was applied inconsistently and restrictively, also failed to comply with the Code.

The Tribunal ordered the board to cease distributing religious publications unless it developed a new, non-discriminatory policy.