Ranjan K. Agarwal

Following dismissal of a motion for summary judgment arising from claims connected to a Ponzi scheme, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the factual circumstances, but the court held that novelty alone does not justify departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The defendants sought either substantial indemnity or partial indemnity costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy unsuccessful but not unreasonable.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to each defendant, with modest reductions applied to certain claimed amounts.

The plaintiffs and defendants were all victims of a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by an investment advisor.

The plaintiffs, who were late entrants to the scheme, provided bank drafts directly payable to the defendants, who were early entrants, under the mistaken belief they were investing in legitimate bridge financing.

When the scheme collapsed, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for the return of their money, alleging unjust enrichment and mistake of fact.

The plaintiffs brought a consolidated motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the defendants were unjustly enriched or if the payments were made under a mistake of fact, and noting that the novel legal issues and ongoing bankruptcy proceedings required a full trial.

The Tribunal determined the appropriate remedy after previously finding the respondents failed to accommodate the applicant's back injury for a 38-day period.

The applicant sought $25,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The Tribunal awarded $6,000, noting the objective seriousness was mitigated by the short duration and the respondents' subsequent provision of appropriate accommodation.

The Tribunal declined to order future compliance remedies, finding the corporate respondent had already implemented satisfactory human rights policies, training, and return-to-work protocols.

The appellant sold his minority interest in two businesses and entered into agreements containing non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality covenants.

The duration of the non-competition and non-solicitation covenants was tied to the period he held an indirect interest in the businesses, which could only be disposed of with the consent of third-party lenders and the board.

The Court of Appeal held that the duration of these covenants was unreasonable and unenforceable because it depended on the unpredictable consents of unascertainable third parties, creating an indeterminate period with no fixed outside limit.

The confidentiality provision, however, was upheld as reasonable.

The respondent requested an adjournment of the hearing scheduled for four days later, stating it intended to reconsider the policy at issue following submissions by an intervenor.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting its practice direction that adjournments are only granted in extraordinary circumstances and not simply because parties wish to explore settlement or reconsider their positions.

The respondent employer requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision finding it failed to accommodate the applicant's disability.

The respondent argued the adjudicator placed undue weight on ambiguous WSIB case manager notes when assessing credibility regarding whether the applicant was forced to work beyond his medical restrictions.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding the respondent was attempting to re-argue the case and challenge factual findings, which does not meet the test for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

The adjudicator maintained that the WSIB notes corroborated the applicant's testimony.

The applicants, an atheist father and his daughter, brought human rights applications alleging that the respondent school board's policies regarding the distribution of religious publications in schools discriminated on the basis of creed.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association sought leave to intervene.

The Tribunal granted the Commission leave to intervene and make an opening statement.

The CCLA was granted leave to intervene, but its participation was limited to submissions on how Charter values should inform the interpretation of the Code, as the Tribunal declined to allow the CCLA to introduce new constitutional issues not raised by the applicants.

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction and preservation order against former employees who started a competing realty tax business, alleging breach of non-competition and non-solicitation agreements.

The court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any lost sales or market share could be compensated in damages.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The court dismissed the motion for an interim injunction and forensic inspection but ordered the defendants to preserve any documents and devices belonging to the plaintiff.

The applicant filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and age, and reprisal for filing a complaint.

The applicant, an order picker, suffered a back injury and required modified duties.

The Tribunal found that the respondent failed in its duty to accommodate the applicant in April and May 2007 by requiring him to perform tasks beyond his medical restrictions.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the allegations of harassment, failure to investigate, and failure to accommodate in June 2007 and thereafter.

The Tribunal also found that the termination of the applicant's employment was not a reprisal, but rather the result of his unreasonable refusal to accept a suitable modified position on the afternoon shift.

The hearing was bifurcated, and the matter was directed to proceed to a remedy hearing for the established Code violation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim, arguing the motion judge failed to address the 'finished products discount'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the discount issue was not pleaded in the counterclaim, and the appellant neither brought a refusal motion nor sought to amend its pleadings.

The motion judge did not err in not addressing the issue or in failing to raise the question of an amendment on his own initiative.

The applicant sought a declaration that non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality agreements he signed with the respondents were unenforceable as an illegal restraint of trade.

The court found that the covenants were connected to a commercial sale transaction rather than just an employment contract, and therefore subject to a less rigorous standard of reasonableness.

The court concluded that the covenants were unambiguous, protected a legitimate business interest, and were reasonable in their scope, territory, and duration.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of place of origin, citizenship, sex, and reprisal against his former university, hospital, and colleagues.

Following a preliminary hearing to determine if the applicant's documentary evidence established a prima facie case, the Tribunal found that the applicant failed to comply with procedural directions and submitted an 86-page document filled with argument, speculation, and inadmissible material.

The Tribunal admitted the evidentiary portions but concluded that the applicant's allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination lacked necessary particulars and were based on unsupported inferences and personal hostility rather than prohibited grounds.

The application was dismissed for failing to establish a case for the respondents to meet.

An employee of the appellant hospital defrauded his employer by causing it to issue cheques to a made-up entity for services never rendered.

The cheques were deposited by an accomplice at the respondent bank.

The hospital sued the bank for conversion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the made-up entity was a 'non-existing person' under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act, which allowed the bank to treat the cheques as payable to bearer and provided a complete defence to the conversion claim.

The respondents requested an order compelling the self-represented applicant, who resides in Iran, to attend the hearing in person rather than by electronic means.

The respondents argued that in-person cross-examination was necessary for credibility assessments.

The applicant argued that his case relied primarily on documentary evidence and that travel costs and visa limitations posed significant hardship.

The Tribunal dismissed the respondents' request, permitting the applicant to present his case-in-chief in writing and appear by teleconference for the initial stage of the hearing, finding no significant prejudice to the respondents at this stage.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging his employment was terminated because of his disability.

His former employer, Royal Group Inc., brought a request to add Galanda Building Systems Inc. as a respondent, arguing that the termination resulted from Galanda's decision not to offer the applicant employment following an asset purchase.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that the alleged facts could lead to a finding that Galanda breached the Code and that Galanda would not suffer prejudice.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The applicant, an intervener in the court below, brought a motion to be added as a party under Rule 18(5) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada in order to seek leave to appeal.

The underlying judgment declared that a child could have three parents.

None of the original parties or the Attorney General sought to appeal the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that the applicant lacked a specific personal interest in the outcome of the litigation and failed to meet the test for public interest standing.