Rachel Laurion

The court dismissed two motions brought by the defendant, Y.Y.G.M. SA (“YYGM”): a motion for summary judgment on the basis of expired limitation periods, and a motion to dismiss or stay the action as an abuse of process due to alleged multiplicity of proceedings.

The court found genuine issues requiring trial regarding the applicable limitation periods for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims, including the enforceability of Connecticut choice of law clauses and the factual circumstances of the oral and written agreements.

The court also rejected the abuse of process argument, finding no parallel proceedings against YYGM and no substantial prejudice.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim to add a new defendant and, controversially, to add a claim of deceit against CBRE Limited, the vendor's agent.

The court granted the uncontested amendments but dismissed the proposed deceit claim against CBRE.

The court found the deceit claim was not properly pleaded, lacking the full particulars required by Rule 25.06(8) for allegations of fraud or misrepresentation.

The allegations were deemed insufficient to establish deceit without specific details of false representations, knowledge, intent, reliance, and resulting loss.

The court emphasized the seriousness of a deceit allegation, especially against a realtor, and the need for strict pleading standards.

Costs were awarded to CBRE Limited.

This endorsement addresses an appointment to settle a costs judgment previously rendered.

The plaintiffs, Amelin Engineering Ltd. and Michael Elinson, objected to Michael Elinson's personal liability for costs.

The defendants, Steam-Eng Inc. and Blower Engineering Inc., submitted a draft order reflecting a compromise on the set-off of costs.

The court, being functus officio regarding the original costs disposition, rejected both parties' immediate positions.

The judge refused to sign the defendants' draft order because it reflected a compromise rather than the court's original disposition.

The court directed the defendants to submit a new draft order that accurately reflects the original costs endorsement, outlining the process for its approval.

This is a motion for leave to intervene brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) in an appeal concerning the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion.

The underlying dispute involves a defamation and harassment action by 40 Days for Life against Brooke Dietrich for online protest activities.

The CCLA sought to intervene to make submissions on the application of protest jurisprudence to online expressive activity and the development of the tort of internet harassment in light of freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the CCLA leave to intervene, finding that it could make a useful contribution on public policy issues without causing injustice or undue prejudice to the parties, despite the motion being brought at a late stage.

The applicants sought the appointment of an Inspector to investigate the management and affairs of two companies, Morris Kerbel Holdings Limited and Paladium Construction Limited, alleging oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct by the respondents under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants had not met the second and third parts of the three-part test for appointing an inspector, specifically regarding the necessity and appropriateness of such an extraordinary remedy given that information could be obtained through ordinary litigation tools like an oppression proceeding.

The court also noted concerns about the broad scope, unknown costs, and lack of company resources to fund the investigation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for negligent misrepresentation, which was found to be statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The trial judge also found the action could not succeed on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellants, as professional engineers, knew or ought to have known of their claim much earlier than when they filed their statement of claim, despite the respondents' ameliorative efforts and superior expertise.

The court emphasized that an expert report was not necessary for discoverability in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge had found they failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay, a cumulative component of the test affirmed in Faris v. Eftimovski.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's determination that the appellants' explanation for the delay was not acceptable, thus failing to satisfy one of the two necessary components to prevent dismissal.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion by the defendants to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's unfounded and vitriolic allegations of fraud and dishonesty against them, which continued even in his costs submissions.

The plaintiff, self-represented, also raised impecuniosity.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $17,500, finding the allegations against the lawyers' professional integrity warranted such an award, despite the plaintiff's impecuniosity claim and some potential duplication of defence counsel hours.

The defendants in a certified class action regarding COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims brought a motion seeking joint adjudication and common case management of common questions across approximately 79 overlapping proceedings.

The motion was opposed by several plaintiffs in individual actions who wished to proceed independently.

The court dismissed the motion, affording deference to a prior case management decision that declined to stay the individual actions, and finding that forcing joint adjudication would inappropriately undermine the plaintiffs' right to opt out of the class proceeding and cause undue delay.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against the lawyers who represented his former employer in a prior wrongful dismissal action, alleging they conspired to manipulate facts and breached a fiduciary duty to him.

The defendant lawyers brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff and their conduct in representing their clients was protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

A case management conference was held to address procedural issues in several consolidated actions.

The court scheduled a motion to clarify a previous order dismissing the plaintiff's motion for default judgment against one of the defendants.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to examine non-parties and obtain documents prior to a Rule 21 motion to strike, noting that no evidence is admissible on such a motion.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent misrepresentation against the defendants, alleging that steam generators purchased for resale in the Former Soviet Union failed to perform as represented in promotional brochures.

The defendants counterclaimed for unpaid invoices.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, finding it was statute-barred under the former Limitations Act because the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the equipment's deficiencies well outside the six-year limitation period.

The court also found no detrimental reliance on the brochures.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed for lack of proof.

Following the dismissal of the defendant insurers' motion to temporarily stay 17 individual actions pending the determination of certification in a class proceeding, the successful plaintiffs sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs requested $86,589, which the court found excessive for a relatively simple stay motion.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) and considering proportionality, the court fixed costs at $35,000 all-inclusive, payable by the defendant insurers.

The defendant insurers brought a motion to temporarily stay 17 individual actions for COVID-19 business interruption losses pending the certification of a related class action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was overlap in issues and facts, staying the individual actions would cause significant injustice and prejudice to the plaintiffs, who had legitimate reasons for pursuing their claims individually and expeditiously.

The appellants (Roustan/RINC) appealed a trial decision that found Grant Thornton LLP (GT) breached a contract but awarded no damages for share losses, dismissing their action.

GT cross-appealed on costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's causation analysis or refusal to award various damages (lost opportunity, share loss, special, nominal), and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's costs award as not an error in principle or plainly wrong.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 36 to cross-examine the 89-year-old president of the defendant companies out-of-court before trial, citing his progressive memory decline.

The defendants opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under Rule 36.01(2) because the plaintiffs were not the party introducing the witness's evidence.

The court granted the motion, finding that the witness's evidence in chief had already been captured by affidavit, and securing his cross-examination before trial was necessary to preserve his evidence and ensure fairness.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim shortly before the scheduled trial.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the lengthy delay created a presumption of prejudice that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The court agreed, finding that the defendants failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The court also noted that actual prejudice would result, given the need for further discoveries and the declining memory of the defendants' key witness.

The motion was dismissed, save for an undisputed amendment to reduce the damages claim.

The plaintiff successfully defeated the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion and sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered whether to depart from the statutory presumption in section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides that a successful responding party is generally not entitled to costs.

Finding that the defendants' motion was not frivolous, ill-conceived, or brought at an unjustifiably late stage in the proceeding, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award costs.

No order as to costs was made.

The plaintiff, a retired music teacher, brought a defamation action against the school board and its superintendent regarding letters sent to parents about hidden cameras discovered in music rooms.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that while the letters related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that the claim had substantial merit, there were grounds to believe no valid defence existed, and the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The appellant appealed the striking of his wrongful termination claim against the respondent employer.

The claim was struck by the motions judge under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The appellant had been terminated on October 6, 2015, and was required to commence his action by October 6, 2017.

Although the appellant sent a letter on September 29, 2017, purporting to be a Notice of Action, it did not comply with the formal requirements of Rule 14.03(2) and Form 14C of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant did not file his Statement of Claim until November 1, 2017, which was outside the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claim and dismissed the appeal.