Rachel Laurion

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 36 to cross-examine the 89-year-old president of the defendant companies out-of-court before trial, citing his progressive memory decline.

The defendants opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under Rule 36.01(2) because the plaintiffs were not the party introducing the witness's evidence.

The court granted the motion, finding that the witness's evidence in chief had already been captured by affidavit, and securing his cross-examination before trial was necessary to preserve his evidence and ensure fairness.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim shortly before the scheduled trial.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the lengthy delay created a presumption of prejudice that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The court agreed, finding that the defendants failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The court also noted that actual prejudice would result, given the need for further discoveries and the declining memory of the defendants' key witness.

The motion was dismissed, save for an undisputed amendment to reduce the damages claim.

The plaintiff successfully defeated the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion and sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered whether to depart from the statutory presumption in section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides that a successful responding party is generally not entitled to costs.

Finding that the defendants' motion was not frivolous, ill-conceived, or brought at an unjustifiably late stage in the proceeding, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award costs.

No order as to costs was made.

The plaintiff, a retired music teacher, brought a defamation action against the school board and its superintendent regarding letters sent to parents about hidden cameras discovered in music rooms.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that while the letters related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that the claim had substantial merit, there were grounds to believe no valid defence existed, and the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The appellant appealed the striking of his wrongful termination claim against the respondent employer.

The claim was struck by the motions judge under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The appellant had been terminated on October 6, 2015, and was required to commence his action by October 6, 2017.

Although the appellant sent a letter on September 29, 2017, purporting to be a Notice of Action, it did not comply with the formal requirements of Rule 14.03(2) and Form 14C of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant did not file his Statement of Claim until November 1, 2017, which was outside the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claim and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her motion to set aside an administrative dismissal for delay.

The appellant had commenced a Small Claims action but later retained counsel who commenced a Superior Court action and intended to transfer the Small Claims action.

The Small Claims action was dismissed for delay.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge erred in law by concluding that a motion to transfer demonstrated a deliberate decision not to advance the litigation, by considering the appellant's potential claim against her former counsel, and by finding that the loss of a limitation defence constituted prejudice caused by the delay.

The dismissal was set aside and the action transferred to the Superior Court.

This costs endorsement followed a prior decision where the plaintiffs' action for breach of contract was dismissed due to a lack of proven damages, despite a finding of breach.

The court determined that the defendant, Grant Thornton LLP (GT), was the more successful party, notwithstanding some mixed success, as the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and defamation were dismissed outright, and no remedy flowed from any of the plaintiffs' findings.

The defendant's offer to settle did not meet the requirements of Rule 49.10(2)(b), thus no costs consequences flowed from its non-acceptance.

Applying the "fair and reasonable" principle for fixing costs and considering Rule 57.01 factors, including the moderate complexity and the $10 million claim, the court awarded GT partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $175,000.00.

Following the release of trial reasons finding the defendant breached its contract but awarding no damages, the plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to amend the reasons.

The plaintiffs sought nominal damages, special damages, damages for the purchase of new shares, and damages for loss of chance.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that nominal damages were inappropriate where general damages were unproven, special damages lacked causal link, and the other claims were either already disposed of or not raised at trial.

The plaintiff school brought an action for defamation against two former students and their paralegal based on an email the paralegal sent to York University inquiring about the school's relationship with the university.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing the email was protected by absolute privilege.

The court granted the motion, finding that the email was a reasonable pre-litigation communication made in the course of investigating the clients' claims and was therefore protected by absolute privilege.

The appellants appealed interlocutory orders granting defamation and harassment injunctions, a publication ban, and substantial costs against them.

The dispute arose after the appellants created websites and online petitions expressing concern about their adult son's relationship with an older man, including hyperlinks to articles about online exploitation.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge applied the wrong test for defamation injunctions and that the websites alone were not clearly defamatory.

However, the court held that hyperlinking to the articles effectively identified the respondents, constituting publication.

The defamation injunction was narrowed to only require removal of the hyperlinks.

The harassment injunction and publication ban were set aside for lacking legal and evidentiary foundation.

The appeal was granted in part, with costs awarded to the appellants.

The plaintiff noted the corporate defendant in default after experiencing significant difficulties effecting personal service on the online-only business.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside the noting in default, citing inadvertence and delay in escalating the claim internally.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's diligence, the low threshold for setting aside a noting in default was met and the matter should be adjudicated on its merits.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.