Phillip W. Sutherland

The court sentenced Travendous Beals after guilty pleas to possession of fentanyl, unlawful possession of a firearm while prohibited, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offences, Beals’ personal background, and the application of sentencing principles, including the impact of systemic anti-Black racism (Morris factors) and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan factors).

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, reduced by pre-sentence custody, and made ancillary orders.

The decision addresses a motion by the defendants (including His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario and several OPP officers) to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ Amended Amended Statement of Claim and Economical Insurance Group’s Defence and Crossclaim, under Rules 21 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court strikes certain paragraphs for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, particularly those alleging a private duty of care in negligent investigation by police officers to victims, but allows others to stand and grants leave to amend.

The court reviews the legal principles for striking pleadings and the scope of police officers’ duty of care, ultimately finding that a tenable claim may exist based on statutory duties.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff’s action arising from a motor vehicle accident involving escaped cattle.

The court found no evidence of negligence, breach of duty of care, or public nuisance on the part of the defendants.

The decision emphasizes the requirement for the responding party to put their best foot forward on a summary judgment motion and clarifies that the mere escape of a farm animal is insufficient to establish liability without evidence of negligent action or inaction.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought forfeiture of $99,210 in Canadian currency seized at Fallsview Casino, alleging it was the proceeds of unlawful activity, specifically money laundering.

The respondent, Branavan Kanapathipillai, claimed the funds were from legitimate gambling and a third mortgage.

The court reviewed expert evidence, financial tracing, and the respondent’s explanations, ultimately finding the Attorney General met the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities.

The court ordered the funds forfeited, finding the respondent’s explanations unconvincing and the circumstances highly suspicious.

This is a motion for court approval of a settlement in a complex medical malpractice case involving a person under disability, Nathaniel Hughes.

The plaintiffs sought approval of a $4.5 million settlement, including a structured annuity, for injuries sustained by Nathaniel as an infant at Peterborough Regional Health Centre.

The court reviewed the settlement under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the risks of litigation and the best interests of the person under disability.

The court found the settlement, including legal fees and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable given the complexities and risks, and approved it.

The respondent (1000093910 Ontario Inc.) brought an urgent motion for the court to sign a draft order including a provisional execution, which was opposed by the prospective purchaser (2557904 Ontario Inc.).

The purchaser had filed an appeal and sought a stay of a prior endorsement.

The court considered the urgency due to significant daily costs and an expiring financing offer.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction under section 195 of the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act to grant provisional execution, rejecting the purchaser's arguments that such relief was not properly requested or that jurisdiction lay solely with the Court of Appeal.

Balancing the irreparable harm, the court found that the prejudice to the applicant (Peakhill Capital Inc.), respondent, second mortgagee, and guarantors if provisional execution was not granted outweighed the harm to the purchaser.

The motion for provisional execution was granted.

The defendants, Clyde Zhang and City of Vaughan, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Xiao Hong Ye, had filed a claim alleging nuisance from an outdoor condenser unit owned by Zhang and negligence/breach of duty of care by the City of Vaughan for failing to enforce by-laws.

The court, applying the robust interpretation of Rule 2.1, found that the plaintiff's claim presented a possible action and was not one of the 'clearest of cases' warranting dismissal at this preliminary stage.

The court refused to grant the defendants' requested relief, noting that other remedies were available to address potential limitation issues or lack of duty of care.

This decision addresses the costs award following a jury verdict in favour of the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sought costs on an actual indemnity basis, arguing complete success and a more favourable Rule 49 offer to settle compared to the Defendants' "hardball" offer.

The court, applying Rules of Civil Procedure 57.01 and 49, found the Plaintiff was the successful party and that the Defendants' unreasonable settlement position warranted a higher costs award.

The court awarded the Plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis up to September 15, 2023, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $284,800.73, emphasizing that the principle of proportionality had minimal bearing due to the Defendants' conduct.

The plaintiff initiated a civil action against the Town of Ajax after tripping and falling on a sidewalk discontinuity.

While the parties settled the quantum of damages, the issue of liability remained.

The court found that the sidewalk was in a state of non-repair, establishing a prima facie case of liability against the Town.

However, the Town successfully invoked the statutory defence under section 44(3)(a) of the Municipal Act, 2001, by demonstrating it did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know about the specific state of repair of the sidewalk before the accident.

Consequently, the action against the Town was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an oral motion during trial to strike portions of an affidavit and its exhibits, primarily on grounds of hearsay, inadmissibility as business records, opinion/legal conclusion, prior consistent statements, and non-compliance with discovery rules.

The court largely dismissed the motion, finding most documents admissible as business records under section 35 of the Evidence Act.

It ruled that diary notes were not inadmissible prior consistent statements and granted leave for information not provided within 60 days due to lack of prejudice.

However, the court struck one speculative sentence from the affidavit and ruled that numerous photographs were not admissible as business records.

The plaintiffs, a law firm and its lawyers, brought a summary judgment motion for defamation against a former client, the defendant, for negative online statements posted on Google Reviews.

The defendant's review alleged the plaintiffs were "incompetent," "untrustworthy," "highly negligent," "shady," "pathetic," "a joke," and "awful lawyer." The court found these statements defamatory, satisfying the three-part test from Grant v. Torstar.

The defendant failed to advance any valid defence, including an anti-SLAPP motion, due to procedural non-compliance.

The court assessed general damages, considering factors such as the plaintiffs' professional standing, the seriousness and public nature of the statements, and the defendant's initial refusal to retract or apologize.

Despite the defendant's financial situation, the court awarded the plaintiffs $20,000 in general damages and $9,500 in costs, emphasizing that online comments are not immune from legal repercussions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to discharge the defendant's construction lien, arguing it was discharged when the defendant inadvertently "registered" an application to delete it.

The defendant argued the lien was not discharged because the "registration" was incomplete as it was never certified by the Land Registrar and was subsequently withdrawn.

The court, applying statutory interpretation principles to the Land Titles Act and Land Registration Reform Act, held that "registration" is a staged process requiring both receipt and certification by the Land Registrar.

Since the application to delete the lien was received but not certified and was withdrawn, it was never fully registered, and thus the original lien was not discharged.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed.

The appellant, N.H., appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to medical treatment for a mental disorder (antipsychotic medication and/or electroconvulsive therapy).

The Board's decision was based on N.H.'s inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions due to his mental illness, despite understanding the relevant information.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of palpable and overriding error, finding that the Board's conclusion regarding N.H.'s lack of appreciation was amply supported by the evidence, including his inconsistent testimony about his mental illness.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Board's finding of incapacity.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 44 of the Construction Act for the return of monies deposited into court, relying on an adjudicator's interim determination that no monies were owed to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that an interim adjudication decision alone is insufficient to warrant the release of security.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, holding that an adjudicator's determination, while admissible, is an interim decision and not a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that the lien claim no longer requires security under s. 44(5) of the Act.

The court emphasized that releasing security based solely on an interim adjudication would undermine the Act's purpose of providing security for lien claimants.

This decision addresses the second part of a bifurcated trial concerning a construction contract dispute.

The plaintiff, a construction company, sought payment for unpaid invoices, while the defendants counterclaimed for deficient and incomplete work, as well as punitive, exemplary, and general damages under the Consumer Protection Act.

The court found that the defendants had unjustifiably terminated the contract.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for outstanding payments was largely allowed, with a minor reduction for an acknowledged credit.

The defendants' extensive counterclaim for damages was mostly dismissed, as they failed to provide sufficient evidence for many claims and were found to be the breaching party.

Only a small portion of their compensatory damages claim for specific deficiencies was allowed.

The appellant, a former elementary school teacher, appealed convictions for 16 counts of sexual offences and his sentence.

The appeal raised issues including the trial judge's curtailment of cross-examination regarding 'avoidance' and 'delayed disclosure' (collusion defence), the admission and alleged misapprehension of evidence about a principal's warning, and the application of the totality principle in sentencing.

The court found that the trial judge erred in impermissibly curtailing cross-examination on two counts (3 and 11), setting aside those convictions and ordering a new trial for them.

All other grounds of appeal against conviction were dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, but the total incarceration period was reduced from 720 days to 630 days due to the two set-aside convictions.

The court also considered fresh evidence regarding collateral consequences of the convictions but did not reduce the sentence further based on them.

The plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent golf balls from the defendants' golf course from entering their property, causing damage and posing a safety risk.

The court dismissed the motion, primarily because the plaintiffs failed to provide a mandatory undertaking concerning damages as required by Rule 40.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favored the defendants, who had taken steps to mitigate the issue and whose business would be significantly impacted by the injunction.

The plaintiffs, Rosehaven Homes Limited and Bram-Rose Homes Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) after the defendants failed to close a real estate transaction.

The defendants argued the APS was invalid due to issues like lack of ID verification, unconscionability, wilful blindness, and that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages by refusing a vendor take-back mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Rosehaven Homes Limited, finding no genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments regarding the APS's validity and mitigation, awarding damages and prejudgment interest to Rosehaven Homes Limited.

This decision addresses costs and prejudgment interest following a seven-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $361,875.33 in damages.

The plaintiffs sought $220,915.33 in partial indemnity costs, while the defendant proposed $154,697.70.

The court, applying the modern costs rules, awarded the plaintiffs $130,000 in fees and $50,809.21 in disbursements, totaling $197,709.21 in costs, plus $1,698.90 in prejudgment interest.

The court emphasized proportionality, the non-applicability of the old cost grid, and the need for detailed information for claimed disbursements.

This case involves a Charter challenge to sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3(1) (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted as part of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA).

The applicant argued these provisions violate sections 2(b), 2(d), and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 infringe section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, as they make the lawful activity of selling sexual services more dangerous by preventing sex workers from taking safety measures like sharing expenses or openly advertising.

These infringements were not saved by section 1 of the Charter.

The court declined to rule on the section 2(d) challenge and found itself bound by prior appellate and Supreme Court decisions regarding the section 2(b) challenge to advertising.

Further submissions on the appropriate remedy were requested.