Peter Maund

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge a young person on charges of robbery and pointing a firearm related to a carjacking.

The reviewing judge found that while the preliminary inquiry judge erred in concluding there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to commit the accused to trial, this error was not jurisdictional in nature.

Because the preliminary inquiry judge considered the whole of the evidence and did not act arbitrarily, the erroneous weighing of inferences did not deprive him of jurisdiction.

The application was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, proceedings were halted for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon assessing the jury's availability to resume the trial in the fall, the court conducted individual inquiries with several jurors.

The court discharged two jurors due to undue hardship related to childcare, schooling, and employment concerns exacerbated by the pandemic.

As only nine jurors remained, and the parties did not consent to continue without a jury, a mistrial was declared.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The four co-accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to be seated at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box during their trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security and the default practice of using the prisoner's box.

The court balanced the security concerns, which required six escort officers if the accused sat at counsel table, against trial fairness considerations, including the need for effective communication between the accused and their counsel during a lengthy trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused met their onus and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication and ensure the accused were viewed as individuals by the jury.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a key witness to testify remotely from an undisclosed location during a preliminary inquiry into a first-degree murder charge.

The witness, who was the girlfriend of one of the accused and had direct knowledge of the defendants' conduct at the scene, had received an anonymous threatening message and reported being followed.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that the right to confront witnesses would be compromised and that alternative protective measures were available.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's fears were genuine and reasonable, and that the legislative amendments to section 486.2 of the Criminal Code lowered the threshold for such orders from "necessary" to "facilitate."

The applicants, Brian Nelson and Andrew Ramdass, brought certiorari applications to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing them to stand trial for manslaughter.

The charges arose from a physical altercation between two groups that resulted in a death.

The court dismissed Nelson's application, finding there was direct evidence from a witness that he punched the victim, which was sufficient for committal.

However, the court granted Ramdass' application and quashed his committal, concluding there was no admissible evidence from which a properly instructed jury could infer he intentionally applied force to the victim.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary hearing judge's order discharging the accused on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The Crown alleged the accused and the deceased were street racing when the deceased crashed and died.

The reviewing judge found the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to take the Crown's evidence at its highest and by creating a reasonable apprehension of bias through excessive intervention and questioning of a police witness regarding speed calculations.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused for trial on charges of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving while street racing causing death.

The accused was convicted after trial of two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where he approached two young women fundraising for charity, mistakenly believing one had stolen money from him.

He grabbed one by the wrist and brandished a knife.

Subsequently, while on bail pending sentencing, he was arrested carrying a concealed 12-inch knife and pleaded guilty to breaching a no-weapons recognizance and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The sentencing judge imposed a custodial sentence of six and a half months, taking into account the accused's paranoid schizophrenia and its causal connection to the offences, while balancing the need for denunciation and protection of the public.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge heard Charter and voluntariness voir dires on a blended basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, ultimately proceeding only with the section 10(b) right to counsel argument.

The defence also challenged the voluntariness of statements made to police.

The trial judge found that all statements were voluntary but that the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated because police failed to wait a reasonable time for the defendant's second counsel of choice to call back before proceeding with breath testing.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The charge involved driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The application was heard following the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which established presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that while the net delay of 17 months and 21 days fell below the 18-month ceiling for provincial courts, the delay was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The defence demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, the case was straightforward to somewhat more than straightforward, and the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to address delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE spot-check.

During arrest, the defendant's turban was accidentally knocked off.

The turban was not returned for over three hours, despite the defendant's religious observance as a Sikh.

The Crown conceded that the failure to return the turban violated the defendant's freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a section 24(2) analysis under R. v. Grant to determine whether admission of breath sample evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found the breach serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests significant, and that the long-term repute of the administration of justice favoured exclusion of the evidence.

The breath samples were excluded and the defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and having care or control of a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from LCBO loss prevention officers who observed the defendant enter the store showing signs of intoxication, be refused service, and subsequently enter his truck in the parking lot.

The defendant testified he only intended to retrieve his phone to call a taxi.

The court found the defendant was in the driver's seat of the vehicle with keys in hand and rejected his evidence as unreliable and illogical.

The presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was engaged and not rebutted.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault involving brief anal penetration of the complainant during a workplace party after consensual dancing and kissing.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the accused’s lack of criminal record, positive pre‑sentence report, and rehabilitative prospects.

The defence sought a sentence of six months less a day due to immigration consequences that could lead to deportation.

The court held that while immigration consequences may be considered, they cannot justify a sentence outside the appropriate range.

A custodial sentence of nine months followed by two years’ probation was imposed as proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s responsibility.

The accused was tried without a jury on charges of attempted murder, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice arising from a hotel room confrontation involving a sex worker and a client.

Surveillance video, text messages, and witness testimony showed the accused entered the room with a handgun during an argument over payment and a gun discharged shortly before the complainant fled with a head injury.

The court found the accused possessed and fired the firearm and caused the complainant’s injury, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury was caused by the bullet or that the accused had the specific intent to kill.

The court also found the force used was not justified as defence of another and that the accused later attempted to influence a witness’s evidence through a letter.

Convictions were entered for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice, while the accused was acquitted of attempted murder and robbery.

The accused was tried on charges of attempted murder, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice following an altercation in a hotel room.

The incident occurred when the accused intervened in a dispute between a sex trade worker and a client over payment.

The court found the accused guilty of possessing a loaded restricted firearm, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice (for passing a letter instructing the worker to lie).

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder due to lack of specific intent, and robbery because the theft was completed before force was applied.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a parking lot hit‑and‑run collision.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding both identification and impairment and alleged the trial judge relied on improper hearsay evidence of a witness’s prior description of the driver.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the combination of eyewitness recognition and circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the identification finding.

It also concluded that the trial judge properly assessed impairment at the time of driving and that the prior description evidence was not improperly used to prove identity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following an incident in Mississauga on November 25, 2011.

The court examined five key issues: whether police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand, whether the demand was made as soon as practicable, whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, and whether impairment was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds existed for the breath demand and that the first breath test was taken within two hours.

However, the court found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable due to unreasonable delays caused by the investigating officer's decision to transfer the investigation to a RIDE officer without promptly calling for one.

Consequently, the breath test results were excluded as inadmissible.

Despite exclusion of the breath evidence, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of the evidence, including observations by multiple officers and an eyewitness of signs of impairment and erratic driving.

The accused was acquitted of the excess blood alcohol charge.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for historical sexual offences against three complainants who were between eleven and thirteen years old at the time of the abuse.

The offences involved acts including gross indecency, sexual assault, and sexual touching for a sexual purpose, committed while the offender occupied positions of trust such as a hockey coach, mentor, and neighbour.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence under ss. 718, 718.01, and 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, given the prolonged abuse, breach of trust, and lasting harm to the victims.

Although the offender had no prior criminal record and positive character evidence, these factors carried limited mitigating weight in light of the gravity of the offences.

A global sentence of eight years’ imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml.

At trial, the accused’s statements to police were ruled inadmissible due to Charter breaches, yet the trial judge relied on those statements and other improper inferences to conclude the accused was the driver.

On appeal, the Crown conceded error on the impaired driving conviction.

The court held the trial judge materially erred by relying on inadmissible evidence and by drawing unreasonable inferences from equivocal circumstantial evidence regarding the identity of the driver.

The convictions were therefore unreasonable and unsupported by sufficient admissible evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg in 100 mL of blood.

At trial, the defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the screening device was an 'approved screening device' because the officer used the acronym 'ASD' and referred to it as an 'Alcotest 6810' rather than its full regulatory name.

The defence also argued the ASD result was invalid because the officer lacked notes confirming he checked for mouth alcohol.

The court rejected both arguments, finding that the acronym 'ASD' is a commonly understood term that requires no further explanation, and accepting the officer's evidence of his invariable practice to ask about recent alcohol consumption.

The accused was found guilty.