Peter Maund

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge heard Charter and voluntariness voir dires on a blended basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, ultimately proceeding only with the section 10(b) right to counsel argument.

The defence also challenged the voluntariness of statements made to police.

The trial judge found that all statements were voluntary but that the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated because police failed to wait a reasonable time for the defendant's second counsel of choice to call back before proceeding with breath testing.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The charge involved driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The application was heard following the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which established presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that while the net delay of 17 months and 21 days fell below the 18-month ceiling for provincial courts, the delay was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The defence demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, the case was straightforward to somewhat more than straightforward, and the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to address delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE spot-check.

During arrest, the defendant's turban was accidentally knocked off.

The turban was not returned for over three hours, despite the defendant's religious observance as a Sikh.

The Crown conceded that the failure to return the turban violated the defendant's freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a section 24(2) analysis under R. v. Grant to determine whether admission of breath sample evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found the breach serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests significant, and that the long-term repute of the administration of justice favoured exclusion of the evidence.

The breath samples were excluded and the defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and having care or control of a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from LCBO loss prevention officers who observed the defendant enter the store showing signs of intoxication, be refused service, and subsequently enter his truck in the parking lot.

The defendant testified he only intended to retrieve his phone to call a taxi.

The court found the defendant was in the driver's seat of the vehicle with keys in hand and rejected his evidence as unreliable and illogical.

The presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was engaged and not rebutted.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was tried without a jury on charges of attempted murder, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice arising from a hotel room confrontation involving a sex worker and a client.

Surveillance video, text messages, and witness testimony showed the accused entered the room with a handgun during an argument over payment and a gun discharged shortly before the complainant fled with a head injury.

The court found the accused possessed and fired the firearm and caused the complainant’s injury, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury was caused by the bullet or that the accused had the specific intent to kill.

The court also found the force used was not justified as defence of another and that the accused later attempted to influence a witness’s evidence through a letter.

Convictions were entered for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice, while the accused was acquitted of attempted murder and robbery.

The accused was tried on charges of attempted murder, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice following an altercation in a hotel room.

The incident occurred when the accused intervened in a dispute between a sex trade worker and a client over payment.

The court found the accused guilty of possessing a loaded restricted firearm, aggravated assault, and attempted obstruction of justice (for passing a letter instructing the worker to lie).

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder due to lack of specific intent, and robbery because the theft was completed before force was applied.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a parking lot hit‑and‑run collision.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding both identification and impairment and alleged the trial judge relied on improper hearsay evidence of a witness’s prior description of the driver.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the combination of eyewitness recognition and circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the identification finding.

It also concluded that the trial judge properly assessed impairment at the time of driving and that the prior description evidence was not improperly used to prove identity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following an incident in Mississauga on November 25, 2011.

The court examined five key issues: whether police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand, whether the demand was made as soon as practicable, whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, and whether impairment was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds existed for the breath demand and that the first breath test was taken within two hours.

However, the court found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable due to unreasonable delays caused by the investigating officer's decision to transfer the investigation to a RIDE officer without promptly calling for one.

Consequently, the breath test results were excluded as inadmissible.

Despite exclusion of the breath evidence, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of the evidence, including observations by multiple officers and an eyewitness of signs of impairment and erratic driving.

The accused was acquitted of the excess blood alcohol charge.

The Crown brought an estreatment application seeking forfeiture of a $25,000 recognizance after the accused breached bail conditions and failed to appear in court.

The sureties, the accused’s father and his partner, argued they had exercised appropriate supervision and sought relief from forfeiture.

Applying the factors set out by the Court of Appeal concerning forfeiture of recognizances, the court considered the sureties’ diligence, financial circumstances, relationship with the accused, and efforts to locate him after the breach.

The court emphasized the importance of the “pull of bail” in maintaining the effectiveness of the bail system.

Partial forfeiture was ordered rather than the full amount.