Peter A. Daley

Sentencing following jury convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault arising from historical sexual abuse of a child by an adult babysitter in a position of trust.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the abuse involved repeated vaginal intercourse over approximately two years, grooming, intimidation, and egregious breach of trust, while declining to treat the secretly arranged abortion as an aggravating factor because paternity was not proven.

Applying the governing sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, the court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated and that a conditional sentence was wholly unfit.

A six-year penitentiary sentence was imposed on the sexual interference count, the sexual assault count was conditionally stayed, and ancillary DNA, SOIRA, weapons, and no-contact orders were made, but a s. 161 prohibition order was refused.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after police stopped a vehicle in which he was a passenger and found a loaded handgun hidden in a sock in the seat pouch in front of him.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the presence of the accused's DNA on the sock.

The court found that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the firearm, as there was no direct evidence connecting him to the gun and alternative explanations for the DNA transfer could not be excluded.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Charter application seeking exclusion of drugs, a firearm, and other evidence obtained through a search warrant executed at his residence.

The court reviewed the telewarrant process and the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO), finding that the warrant relied largely on an unproven confidential informant with no reliability record and minimal corroboration.

The ITO contained misleading statements and significant omissions, including speculative allegations linking the accused to drug activity and failure to disclose surveillance showing no suspicious activity.

The court concluded that the issuing justice lacked sufficient reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds and quashed the warrant.

Considering additional Charter breaches, including excessive force during execution and violation of the right to counsel, the court excluded the seized drugs, firearm, and ammunition under s. 24(2).

Following dismissal of summary judgment motions brought by certain defendants, the court addressed costs.

Although the plaintiff and a defendant successfully opposed the motions, the court found the issues were close calls and that it had not been unreasonable for the moving defendants to bring the motions.

Substantial or elevated indemnity costs were rejected as no reprehensible misconduct was established.

Applying the reasonableness factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for both successful parties and ordered that those costs be payable in the cause.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The primary issue was whether the Crown had proven that the breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” for the purpose of the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The appellant argued that unexplained delays in preparing the Intoxilyzer and transferring custody undermined the presumption.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the entire timeline and reasonably concluded that the delay was explained by necessary procedures including changing the alcohol standard solution and warming the machine.

The conviction was upheld.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The underlying action arose from a pedestrian–motor vehicle accident and included tort claims against the driver and statutory accident benefits claims involving the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

Applying the contextual test and the four factors from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., the court examined the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the motion was not brought promptly, the court found that the delay was largely attributable to counsel’s inadvertence and unusual circumstances including illness, staff turnover, and an office flood, and that the defendants had not demonstrated actual prejudice.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside.

A case supervision conference was convened in several related proceedings involving estate administration and associated civil claims.

The court discovered that a corporate party, The Canada Trust Company, was not represented by counsel despite earlier assumptions by other parties.

In addition, a new action had recently been commenced, complicating coordination of the proceedings.

As a result, the court adjourned the scheduled long motion and directed that service be effected on the unrepresented party.

The court scheduled a further case supervision conference and directed counsel to prepare a coordinated litigation timetable.

The applicant brought a motion to change a prior child support order that had imputed income at $55,000 and required monthly payments of $762.

The court reassessed the payor’s income from 2009 onward based on evidence of significantly reduced earnings and disability benefits.

Applying the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court recalculated support obligations for 2009–2012 and determined modest arrears remained after accounting for payments and credits.

The court ordered ongoing monthly support based on current income and directed that a portion of funds previously held in trust be paid into court as security for future child support obligations.

The balance of the trust funds was ordered released to the applicant, subject to payment of the recalculated arrears.

The moving defendants, including a receiver manager and a bank, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff condominium corporation's claims for construction deficiencies, breach of warranty, oppression, and conspiracy, as well as various cross-claims.

Applying the 'full appreciation' test from Combined Air, the court found that the voluminous and conflicting evidentiary record precluded making dispositive findings on a summary judgment motion.

The motion was dismissed with respect to the plaintiff and the cross-claiming architect, and the action was directed to proceed to trial.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking an order requiring the minor plaintiff to attend a psychological assessment by a defence expert following a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff alleged traumatic brain injury and psychological impairments.

The plaintiffs argued the request amounted to an impermissible second defence medical examination and alleged concerns regarding the proposed expert’s impartiality.

The court held that further medical examinations may be ordered where necessary for trial fairness and where the proposed assessment involves different expertise from prior examinations.

Considering the plaintiff’s extensive expert evidence and the importance of expert testimony for a young child’s injuries, the court found the further assessment justified.

The court ordered the minor plaintiff to attend the psychological assessment and required the child’s mother to attend and participate in the interview.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging her daughter fraudulently transferred title of a jointly owned property into her own name and subsequently encumbered it with multiple mortgages.

One of the mortgagees brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against it, and the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment against the mortgagees and default judgment against her daughter.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the 'full appreciation' test could not be met on the incomplete documentary record, and that a trial was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to avoid the fraud and to allocate the loss among the competing parties under the theory of deferred indefeasibility.

The applicant sought to prohibit the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) from enforcing support arrears after he and his wife consented to an order extinguishing all arrears and withdrew from the FRO.

Prior to the consent order, the applicant made a support payment that was returned for non-sufficient funds (NSF), but the FRO had already disbursed the funds to the wife.

The court dismissed the application, finding that under sections 57 and 58 of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, the FRO has an independent statutory right to continue enforcement to recover the NSF amount as reimbursement for monies paid out, regardless of the parties' private agreement to extinguish support arrears.

Following a family trial between self-represented former spouses, the court determined equalization, spousal support, child support, and related accounting disputes arising from mortgage refinancing proceeds and carrying costs of the matrimonial home.

The court rejected the moving party's request for unequal distribution, attributed equal value in the matrimonial home to each spouse, and ordered the home sold because the responding party had not proven an ability to buy out the other interest.

The court found the responding party remained entitled to spousal support on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, but fixed support at a nominal amount of one dollar per year due to the inadequate record regarding current means and employment limitations.

Child support arrears were recalculated under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, and both parties received specified credits to be applied on distribution of sale proceeds and equalization.

On a motion by judgment creditors for directions regarding monies paid into court pursuant to prior costs orders, the moving parties sought payment of the funds to their solicitors on the basis of a solicitor’s lien.

The responding party opposed payment and asserted a claim for equitable set‑off based on earlier default judgments obtained in unrelated actions against different parties.

The court held that equitable set‑off requires a sufficient connection between the debts and generally mutuality between the parties.

Because the judgments relied upon involved different parties and separate proceedings, and no evidence justified piercing the corporate veil to establish mutuality, the claim for equitable set‑off failed.

The court ordered the monies paid out of court to the moving parties’ solicitors.

Sentencing decision following convictions for break and enter with intent to commit robbery and unlawful confinement arising from a home invasion.

The offender and a co‑accused gained entry to a dwelling by ruse and confined the occupants while searching for prescription drugs.

The court considered aggravating factors including a significant criminal record, violence during the confinement, and commission of the offences while on probation.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, difficult personal background, mental health issues, substance abuse history, and Gladue considerations as an Aboriginal offender.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and restorative justice principles, the court imposed a custodial reformatory sentence.

The applicant wife and respondent husband separated after a 16-year marriage.

The court determined issues of equalization, child support, spousal support, and access.

The court imputed $14,400 in annual cash income to the respondent from his automotive business, setting his income for child support purposes at $102,729.67.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $173,430.90.

Spousal support of $600 per month was made final due to the applicant's economic disadvantage.

The respondent was granted Saturday access to the children, but overnight access was denied due to safety concerns and the lack of a proper plan.

Following the dismissal of an action seeking a declaration that a public road existed along the shoreline of Georgian Bay properties, several defendant groups sought costs.

The defendants argued for substantial indemnity costs based on alleged misconduct by the municipality, while the plaintiff contended that costs should be limited and apportioned globally among defendants.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiff.

Applying Rule 57.01 principles, the court assessed partial indemnity costs individually for each successful defendant group, reducing some claims to account for duplication, inefficiencies, and unsupported expert disbursements.

Costs were awarded separately to the defendants in amounts the court found reasonable and proportionate.

The appellants brought a motion to a full panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge.

The single judge had quashed their appeal from an interlocutory order of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists refusing production of third party records, and refused to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review.

The full panel upheld the quashing of the appeal, agreeing it was an interlocutory order.

However, the panel set aside the refusal to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review, finding that the appellants raised an arguable point regarding procedural fairness and the need for third party records to effectively cross-examine key witnesses.

The City of Ottawa sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision ordering the processing of a freedom of information request for the personal emails of a municipal employee.

The employee had used his workplace email address for volunteer work unrelated to his employment.

The Divisional Court held that the emails were not within the 'custody or control' of the City under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court applied a purposive approach, finding that the legislation was intended to enhance democratic accountability, not to capture the private communications of employees merely because they were stored on a government server.

The application for judicial review was granted and the IPC decision was set aside.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board terminating his payments.

After the appeal was set down, the Board reviewed its order and reinstated the payments retroactively, rendering the appeal moot except for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot but awarded the appellant $4,000 in costs, noting the appeal had been necessary.