Paul H. Starkman

The tenant appealed the terms of relief from forfeiture granted by the application judge after being found in breach of a commercial lease for permitting loitering and failing to comply with the Liquor License Act.

The landlord cross-appealed, arguing the lease should have been terminated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the application judge crafted a balanced remedy and properly exercised his discretion under the Commercial Tenancies Act.

The appellant builder appealed a License Appeal Tribunal decision awarding the respondent homeowners $11,234 to replace ceramic tiles that did not comply with the Ontario Building Code.

The parties consented to an order setting aside the Tribunal's decision and substituting an award of $4,000 plus costs.

The Divisional Court approved the settlement, noting that the Tribunal erred in effectively ordering specific performance rather than assessing damages based on the floor's useful life or the cost of stiffening it, as required by prior jurisprudence.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a decision setting aside a Master's order requiring the plaintiff to post security for costs.

The court found that the lower court's brief decision was based on well-settled law and did not raise an issue of significance meriting the attention of the Divisional Court.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to declare a share valuation null and void, and the granting of the respondents' application to declare the valuation binding.

The appellants argued the valuator acted as an arbitrator and failed to follow an understanding regarding document disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the valuator was not an arbitrator and had no contractual obligation to provide the requested documents.

The appeal, including an appeal on costs, was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of the appellant's persistent and unwarranted pursuit of meritless legal proceedings.

The Court also dismissed an application to adduce fresh evidence and upheld the motion judge's refusal to permit cross-examination on an affidavit, noting the right to cross-examine is not absolute.

The appellant builder appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to stay a negligence claim in favour of arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the arbitration clause did not encompass claims in negligence.

Furthermore, because the homeowner's claim involved other parties not bound by the arbitration agreement, the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under s. 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to refuse a partial stay to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

Under s. 7(6) of the Act, this discretionary decision was unappealable.

The appellant vendor appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment for the return of a $15,000 deposit to the respondent purchaser.

The Divisional Court had previously declined jurisdiction, finding the order was not for a 'single payment'.

The Court of Appeal held the Divisional Court erred in its jurisdictional analysis but retained the appeal to save the parties further expense.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in his conclusion that the appellant's explanation for the default was inadequate and that the respondent would be entitled to relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment of $15,000.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 19(1)(a)(i) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order appealed from was not an order 'for a single payment'.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Act.

The prosecutor appealed an order granting certiorari that had quashed a justice of the peace's refusal to permit cross-examination of a chief building inspector on a disclosure motion in a provincial offences prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that certiorari was not barred by the Provincial Offences Act because the impugned ruling was a pre-trial order not directly appealable under s. 116(1).

However, the refusal to permit cross-examination did not breach natural justice, as the justice of the peace was entitled to control the disclosure process and require the defence to show why cross-examination was necessary.

The defence failed to establish a basis for further disclosure or for compelling cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, the certiorari order was set aside, the matter was remitted for trial, and no costs were ordered.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision finding that a letter agreement removed its right to renew a commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the letter agreement did not expressly set aside the renewal clause and that a provision requiring good faith negotiation for a five-year lease was ambiguous.

Applying the doctrine of contra proferentem against the respondent landlord who drafted the agreement, the court concluded the renewal right remained in place.

The court also noted the application judge failed to provide reasons for her decision.

The appellant purchaser entered into an agreement to buy a parcel of land from the respondent vendor.

The vendor's predecessor in title had obtained a consent to sever abutting lands, conveyed the severed lands to herself, and subsequently conveyed the remaining lands to the vendor.

The purchaser requisitioned the title, arguing the conveyance to the vendor violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act because the predecessor still owned the abutting lands at the time of the conveyance.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the exception in s. 50(6) of the Planning Act only applies if the remaining part is conveyed before the consented part.

Since the consented part was conveyed first, the exception did not apply, and the conveyance to the vendor violated the Act.