Owen Rees

The defendants, John and Elaine Wright, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff, Laura Burley's, claim against them.

Burley had slipped and fallen on a municipal sidewalk adjacent to the Wrights' apartment building, where she was a tenant.

The City of Ottawa admitted responsibility for the sidewalk.

The court found that the Wrights did not owe a common law duty to maintain the municipal sidewalk, were not "occupiers" under the Occupiers' Liability Act, had no common law duty to warn about public sidewalk conditions, and no implied contractual duty to maintain the sidewalk or provide direct passage through the building.

The motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing Burley's action against the Wrights.

The City's crossclaim against the Wrights was also dismissed by consent.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand.

The appeal argued that the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, specifically requiring "reasonable and probable grounds to believe" that the accused had care or control of a motor vehicle, instead of the lower standard of "reasonable grounds to suspect" as required by s. 320.27(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the trial judge indeed applied the wrong legal standard, which affected the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff, a home décor retailer, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant landlord for breach of a 10-year commercial lease.

The defendant failed to complete required work and provide possession of a larger premises, and was noted in default.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that the lease was validly executed, specific performance of the lease, and damages.

The court found the lease valid and breached, granted specific performance, determining the property was "unique" due to the plaintiff's business needs and distributor agreements.

The court distinguished the case from the concerns raised in Argyll regarding long-term supervision of specific performance for commercial leases.

The claim for damages was adjourned until they fully crystallized.

The respondent, a Lieutenant Commander in the Royal Canadian Navy, sought a temporary order to relocate with the three children of the marriage to North York, Ontario, due to a mandatory career development posting.

She also sought temporary sole decision-making authority and permission for the children to obtain passports and travel internationally without the applicant's approval.

The applicant opposed the relocation and the request for sole decision-making.

The court granted the temporary relocation, finding it to be in the children's best interests, particularly given the mother's primary caregiving role and the career implications of refusing the posting.

However, the court denied the request for sole decision-making authority and passport/travel permissions, deeming these issues for trial.

The court also provided guidance for the parties to agree on a revised parenting schedule.

The appellant, Abigail Morris, appealed her conviction for sexual interference (sexual assault conviction stayed under Kienapple principle) involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The appeal challenged whether voluntariness requires subjective consent of the accused, the admissibility of prior sexual communications (Seaboyer application), reliance on myths and stereotypes, and the use of context evidence to infer voluntariness.

The court dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's premise that voluntariness equates to subjective consent of the accused.

It found no error in admitting the prior sexual communications, nor in the trial judge's determination of voluntariness, which was based on the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statements, not on myths or stereotypes.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical malpractice and informed consent action.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented for most of the litigation, failed to serve any expert medical report to support her claims, despite repeated requests from the defendant's counsel and court orders.

The court found that expert evidence was required for both the negligence and informed consent claims, and that the case did not fall within the "clearest of cases" exception.

Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action.

The applicants sought to declare Capucine Loyer incapable and be appointed as her joint guardians for property and personal care.

They also sought prospective appointment of substitute guardians (Stéphane Loyer and Martine Lepage).

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) objected to the prospective appointment as a matter of law.

The court found Capucine Loyer incapable and appointed the applicants as joint guardians.

However, the court dismissed the request for prospective appointment of substitute guardians, holding that the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, does not permit such appointments, emphasizing the need for ongoing judicial oversight and protection of the incapable person's rights under the Act and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

This motion concerned the appointment of a litigation guardian for Adam Montgomery Blair, the applicant, who was deemed mentally incapable due to a frontal lobe brain injury, seizures, schizophrenia, and memory deficit.

The court applied Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, to determine if the applicant was a person under disability requiring a litigation guardian.

Based on medical evidence and a capacity assessment, the court concluded that the applicant lacked the capacity to instruct counsel and litigate.

As no other suitable person was willing or able to act, the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as the applicant's litigation guardian.

The applicant, Melynda Layton, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction against the Canadian Dental Hygienists Association, her neighbour, regarding a dispute over access to an alleyway and her backyard parking.

Layton alleged a right of way and breaches of various statutes (Municipal Act, Fire Code, Road Access Act, Trespass to Property Act) and torts (breach of contract, trespass, nuisance, conspiracy, intentional interference with economic relations).

The Association denied the full extent of the right of way and counterclaimed.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that for private parties seeking interlocutory relief under s. 440 of the Municipal Act, the three-part RJR-MacDonald test applies.

While a serious issue was found regarding the Fire Code contravention, the court determined that the comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, was adequate, and thus, equitable injunctive relief by a private party was not warranted.

For other claims, irreparable harm was not established as damages were compensable.

This is a costs endorsement following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to trial preparation and substantial indemnity for trial preparation and trial.

The defendants argued for a cap on costs, asserting the Small Claims Court Act should apply due to the damages awarded being below the Small Claims Court limit.

The court found that the action, brought under simplified procedure in the Superior Court, was not subject to the Small Claims Court Act's cost cap.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs for trial preparation and trial, and partial indemnity for earlier proceedings, due to the defendants' reprehensible conduct, including deliberate departure from approved building plans, failure to comply with interim court orders, and improper conduct during trial.

The total costs awarded to the plaintiff were $110,000.

The Superior Court of Justice heard competing motions under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the appointment of a litigation guardian for Joan Montgomery.

The court found Ms. Montgomery to be a person under disability due to mental incapacity, evidenced by long-standing paranoid delusions and an inability to understand the litigation process or instruct counsel.

Given that no other proper person was willing or able to act, the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as her litigation guardian for both consolidated proceedings.

A request for a sealing order regarding medical records was adjourned for further submissions, and allegations against Ms. Montgomery's counsel were adjourned sine die.

The plaintiffs initiated an action against the defendants for breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation concerning investment rental properties and their management.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the action amenable to summary judgment and determined that the plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of their loss and its cause by December 12, 2017, at the latest, when they terminated their property management agreement.

As the Statement of Claim was issued on March 16, 2020, beyond the two-year limitation period, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the action as time-barred.

The National Bank of Canada sought summary judgment against personal guarantors, Rajendra Pahuja and Shanta Pahuja, for a defaulted loan to Centrestone Granite and Marble Inc. The Bank also claimed fraudulent misrepresentation against Mr. Pahuja for non-disclosure of a prior guarantee.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging duress and non est factum regarding Ms. Pahuja's guarantee, and improvident actions by the court-appointed receiver.

The court granted summary judgment to the Bank, finding Mr. Pahuja liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and upholding Ms. Pahuja's guarantee, dismissing the defendants' claims of duress and non est factum.

The counterclaim regarding the receiver's actions was dismissed as res judicata.

The plaintiff sued his neighbours for nuisance and the tort in Rylands v. Fletcher due to water and debris migration from their property onto his.

The defendants had built their property in deliberate disregard of city-approved plans, leading to improper roof slope, downpipe placement, grading, and retaining wall construction.

The court found the defendants liable for nuisance, awarding the plaintiff compensatory damages for property repairs and general damages for loss of enjoyment.

A mandatory injunction was issued requiring the defendants to undertake specific remedial construction to abate the nuisance.

Punitive damages were denied as disproportionate given the injunctive relief.

The plaintiff tripped over sandals left on the back stoop of the defendant's home by the defendant's wife.

The plaintiff sued the defendant under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant met the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

The court held that an occupier is not required to police a capable adult spouse's habit of leaving sandals on a stoop, nor to warn visitors of such a habit.

The court also found that causation was not established and noted in obiter that the plaintiff would have been 25 percent contributorily negligent for failing to look where she was stepping.

The plaintiff, self-represented, brought a claim against the defendants concerning the 2008 acquisition of Aurelian Resources Inc. by Kinross Gold Corporation, alleging conspiracy, share price manipulation, wrongful acquisition of shares, and concealment.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, being scandalous/frivolous/vexatious/abuse of process, and being time-barred.

The court struck the claim in its entirety for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action due to lack of material facts and proper pleading of elements.

Claims arising directly from the 2008 acquisition were also struck as time-barred.

However, the court granted leave to amend the non-time-barred portions of the claim, acknowledging the plaintiff's self-represented status and misunderstanding of pleading rules.

The applicant, a federal election candidate, sought an extension to file his electoral campaign return under s. 477.68 of the Canada Elections Act, having missed statutory deadlines.

He also sought relief from the consequences of non-compliance under s. 477.7 of the Act.

The court determined it lacked the power to extend the deadline for bringing the s. 477.68 application, aligning with recent jurisprudence that statutory deadlines require express parliamentary discretion for extension.

However, the court granted relief under s. 477.7, finding the applicant was unaware of his official agent's failure to file the return on time and that the agent-designate took reasonable steps to rectify the situation once discovered.

The court directed the Chief Electoral Officer to accept the return as if filed by the deadline, with no costs awarded.

The applicant sought an order for the sale of a jointly-owned property and 50% of the proceeds.

The respondent brought a cross-application seeking a constructive trust, arguing for an equitable division based on contributions since separation.

The court granted the sale, finding no oppression, and imposed a constructive trust, awarding the applicant 35% and the respondent 65% of the property's value.

This division balanced the respondent's sole mortgage payments post-separation against the applicant's continued legal interest and co-signing of mortgage renewals.

The specific method of disposition (partition or sale) and costs were deferred for further submissions.

The accused, Vinod Vasavan, sought a bail variation under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to permit contact with his wife, who had recanted her initial allegations of domestic violence.

The Crown opposed the variation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review an undertaking given to a peace officer under s. 498(1)(c).

The court held that s. 520 only applies to orders made by a justice under s. 515, and that the proper recourse for varying such an undertaking, in the absence of consent, is an application to a justice under s. 502(2) to replace the undertaking with a release order.

The applicant, Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte First Nation, sought an order to evict the respondent from community rental housing on the reserve due to alleged breaches of his tenancy agreement.

The First Nation claimed the respondent drove vehicles through neighbouring yards, stored dismantled camper trailers in his backyard, and damaged a fence.

The respondent denied the breaches and argued unfair treatment, also challenging the binding nature of the rental agreement and the applicability of the Council's Rental Unit Policy.

The court found the rental agreement binding through conduct and determined that the respondent had breached it by interfering with neighbours' quiet enjoyment, violating by-laws regarding vehicle storage, and damaging property.

The court granted the eviction order, requiring the respondent to vacate the unit within 30 days, but declined to include a police enforcement clause.