Marina Tronin

The appellant's children were brought to a place of safety by the Children's Aid Society.

The protection application was later withdrawn and the parties reached an agreement.

The appellant subsequently brought a motion for a declaration that the CAS acted unlawfully by not obtaining a warrant, and sought costs.

The motion judge declined to rule on the warrant issue and declined to order costs.

The appellant appealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision to decline declaratory relief or in her application of costs principles.

This endorsement addresses a motion by the applicant father, Jonathan Granda, for a temporary parenting order seeking equal parenting time on a 2-2-3 schedule.

The court reviews the parties’ caregiving history, the applicant’s mental health, allegations of family violence, and the child’s needs.

The court finds that the respondent, Brenna Duffey, was the primary caregiver and that the child requires stability, not increased transitions.

The motion is dismissed, and the existing interim parenting schedule remains in place.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that three children (I.D., A.D., H.D.) were in need of protection and an order for their placement with the maternal grandmother under Society supervision.

The court found the children to be Inuit based on their strong self-identification and cultural participation, despite some uncertainty regarding ancestral connection.

The court granted the summary judgment, finding the children in need of protection due to the mother's failure to protect them from a father with sexual offense charges, her emotional dysregulation, and health issues affecting her parenting capacity.

The court ordered the children's placement with the maternal grandmother for six months under Society supervision, emphasizing the augmented best interests test for Indigenous children under the Federal Act.

The applicant wife moved for an order under the Partition Act for the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home prior to trial.

The respondent husband opposed the motion, relying on a temporary without prejudice consent order that granted him exclusive possession.

The court held that a material change in circumstances was not required to vary a temporary without prejudice order.

Finding that the husband had no competing interests under the Family Law Act that would defeat the wife's prima facie right to sale, the court granted the motion and ordered the home to be listed for sale.