Court of Justice

Respondent parents sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against the Children's Aid Society following dismissal of a child protection application.

The Society had brought proceedings alleging the child was at risk of emotional harm due to exposure to the father's alleged criminal behavior.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer's investigation ultimately supported the parents' position that the child was not in need of protection.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding the Society had conducted a thorough investigation, remained open-minded, reassessed its position as information became available, and acted respectfully toward the parties.

The court held that costs against child protection agencies should only be awarded where the public would perceive the Society acted in a patently unfair and indefensible manner, a threshold not met in this case.

The accused was charged with possession of controlled substances, firearm offences, and possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana following his arrest and the execution of search warrants.

The defence challenged the validity of the search warrant and sought to exclude evidence obtained from an unlawful cell phone search.

The Crown conceded the cell phone search was unlawful but invoked the Step 6 Garofoli procedure to rely on unredacted information from a confidential human source.

The court found the search warrant was validly issued based on the credible and compelling information from the confidential informant, even without the cell phone evidence.

The court upheld the warrant and admitted the evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The Crown obtained a roadside breath sample via an Approved Screening Device following a traffic stop.

The defence challenged whether the demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code and whether the accused's Charter rights to counsel were violated.

The trial judge found that an informal demand was made within seconds of the officer forming reasonable suspicion, followed by a formal demand minutes later.

The delay in administering the test was found to be reasonably necessary given the time required to obtain the screening device.

The accused's right to counsel was not violated as there was insufficient time to realistically consult counsel before the test.

The trial judge convicted the accused.

The defendant was charged with driving with a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant holding a cell phone in his hand while operating a motor vehicle at an intersection.

The defendant testified that the phone had fallen from its dashboard mount due to rough road conditions and that he was merely cleaning debris from the screen when observed.

The court classified the offence as one of absolute liability and found that the prosecution proved all essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the defendant's explanation as incredible and found that even if the offence were strict liability, the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

Conviction entered.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a RIDE spot check.

The impaired charge was dismissed due to lack of evidence of impairment.

On the Over 80 charge, the defence raised multiple Charter breaches including timing of breath samples, failure to videotape, lost evidence, lack of reasonable grounds, and denial of right to counsel.

The court rejected all Charter breach arguments and found the Crown proved the accused operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

Conviction entered.

A motion by the maternal grandfather (R.W.) to vary an interim order placing two young children in the temporary care and control of the Children's Aid Society.

The grandfather sought placement of the children in his home.

The court applied the test under subsection 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act, finding a material change in circumstances but ultimately dismissing the motion.

The court found that while the grandfather's application merited consideration, insufficient evidence regarding the children's needs, the grandfather's ability to manage the older child's special medical needs (spina bifida), and unresolved concerns about the grandfather's marijuana use and financial obligations created too much uncertainty to warrant moving the children prior to trial.

The court emphasized the importance of continuity for very young children and the risk of multiple placements.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood following a random sobriety check.

The defence challenged the arrest on grounds of Charter violations: alleged lack of reasonable grounds for arrest under s. 8, and alleged failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice under s. 10(b).

The Crown sought to admit breath sample analysis results.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest existed but found a breach of s. 10(b) rights when police failed to leave voicemail messages for chosen counsel and misrepresented the availability of those lawyers.

Under s. 24(2), the court admitted the breath sample evidence as the societal interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the seriousness of the Charter breach.

The accused was convicted of the over-limit charge but acquitted of impaired driving due to reasonable doubt regarding functional impairment.

The accused was charged with defrauding her employer, the LCBO, by scanning items through her cash register, accepting cash payments, and then immediately voiding the sales without turning over the cash.

On eight separate occasions between October 10 and 25, 2014, the accused engaged in this pattern of conduct.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video surveillance and electronic journal records.

The court found that the only reasonable inference from the undisputed facts was that the accused deliberately kept the cash while concealing the purchases from the employer's records.

The defence argued that a supervisor could have removed the money, but the court rejected this as speculative.

The accused was found guilty of fraud under $5,000.

The defendant was charged with driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired driving.

The Crown conceded that the impaired driving charge could not be supported and it was dismissed.

The court considered three issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device (ASD) sample; whether the ASD demand was made "forthwith"; and whether the Intoxilyzer samples were taken "as soon as reasonably practicable." The court found that while reasonable suspicion existed based on the odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, the ASD demand was not made forthwith—there was at least a nine-minute delay between formation of suspicion and the demand.

Additionally, the Intoxilyzer tests were not taken as soon as practicable, as the officer believed he had three hours to conduct the tests rather than understanding the requirement for prompt administration.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the defendant on the remaining charge.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against two complainants, with allegations spanning 1980-1981.

The Crown proceeded with a joint trial on all counts.

The accused applied for severance of the counts by complainant.

The court granted the severance application, finding that the benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together were minimal and that the cumulative effect of relevant factors, particularly the possibility of the accused testifying on one set of counts but not the other, and the uncertain merit of a similar fact evidence application, favoured separate trials.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a recognizance that prohibited him from possessing drug paraphernalia, specifically scales.

Police stopped him for riding a bicycle on the sidewalk without lights.

During the stop, which lasted over six minutes, police conducted a criminal investigation into bail compliance without advising the defendant of his Charter rights to counsel.

The defendant was detained and questioned about scales, which he admitted to possessing.

The Crown conceded that sections 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court applied the section 24(2) test and excluded the evidence of the scales, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

A costs endorsement following a trial regarding child support obligations between the parties.

The father sought retroactive child support adjustments and termination of his support obligations, while the mother sought retroactive support.

The court found divided success on the original claims but determined the father was the more successful party overall, particularly based on his reasonable offer to settle that the mother rejected.

The court awarded costs to the father in the amount of $12,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.

The accused was charged with three counts of threatening death contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The threats were contained in a letter written to President Barack Obama on December 17, 2012, with copies sent to various recipients.

The letter expressed grievances against the Toronto Star, University of Toronto Law School, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and posed rhetorical questions about whether the accused should "pump bullets" into staff members of these organizations.

The accused argued the letter was purely rhetorical and not intended to threaten.

The court found that the language constituted threats of death on an objective standard and that the accused intended to intimidate.

The accused was convicted on all three counts.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and arrested for driving under suspension after failing an approved screening device test.

A search incident to arrest revealed crack cocaine in his possession.

The defence sought exclusion of the cocaine evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging three breaches: arbitrary arrest under s. 9, unreasonable search under s. 8, and failure to provide complete right to counsel information under s. 10(b).

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted the evidence.

The accused was found guilty of possession of cocaine.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the roadside screening demand, failed to properly advise him of his right to counsel, and failed to take breath samples 'as soon as practicable'.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the police evidence credible and the delays reasonable.

The court also noted the lack of audio and video recording of the police interaction, urging police services to adopt such technology.

The accused was found guilty.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought motions for interim openness orders permitting sibling contact between two children who had been separated for nearly four years.

The respondent adoptive parent opposed the orders, fearing that contact would lead to reintroduction of the biological parent into the child's life.

The court granted the interim orders, finding that the sibling relationship had been previously determined to be valuable and that the failure to maintain contact resulted from administrative and discretionary failures by the child welfare agency and the adoptive parent's resistance, not from any change in the children's best interests.

The court implemented a gradual restoration of contact through letters, cards, and supervised face-to-face meetings.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of criminal harassment contrary to section 264 of the Criminal Code for non-consensually distributing intimate images of the complainant on a pornographic website.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court found the offence to be serious given the prevalence of non-consensual sexting, the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the accused's degree of responsibility.

However, the court considered the accused's exemplary character, rehabilitation efforts, remorse, guilty plea, and the collateral consequences already suffered.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, no contact with the complainant, and restrictions on possessing intimate images.

The offender was convicted after trial of sexually exploiting a 16-year-old complainant by violating his position of trust as a coach at a cheerleading gym.

The sexual relationship began when the complainant was 15 years old with explicit sexting and escalated to multiple acts of sexual intercourse and fellatio after she turned 16.

The offender was a 25-year-old employed full-time and working as a coach at the gym where he met the complainant.

The complainant was highly vulnerable, dealing with parental conflict, self-harm, depression, anxiety, and her mother's terminal cancer diagnosis.

The court found the offender deliberately exploited these vulnerabilities and kept the relationship secret, knowing it was wrong.

A separate charge of sexual assault was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The offender received a six-month jail sentence followed by three years of probation with conditions including a mandatory 10-year SOIRA order and DNA order.

The respondent brought a motion to change a child support order dated May 27, 2008, which required him to pay $194.00 per month based on imputed annual income of $22,880.00.

The respondent argued that his medical condition had worsened since the original order, rendering him incapable of any gainful employment.

The applicant opposed the motion, contending that the respondent remained capable of working and had failed to meet his parental support obligations.

The court found that the respondent had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances sufficient to vary the order.

Although the respondent's medical condition had deteriorated, the medical evidence did not support total incapacity for work, and the respondent had failed to undertake reasonable efforts to retrain or seek suitable employment within his limitations.

The motion was dismissed.